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The power to inflict the death penalty formed a vital part of the disciplinary process 
in all the major armies during the First World War. Yet serious historians have 
neglected the subject. This thesis addresses the topic in a critical manner and 
challenges the view that executions were arbitrary, reflecting a distant and uncaring 
High Command. 
Analysis of military and criminal law in Europe and the United States establishes a 
comparative framework from which to proceed. Changing ideas about discipline and 
duty as the war impacted on both the military and British society are assessed. The 
concept of morale - so important to military commanders during the war - is evaluated 
in the context of changing demands on the army as it adjusted to the absorption of 
'citizen soldiers' and conscripts as well as disappointment on the battlefield. 
Differences between Regular, Territorial and 'New Army' formations are assessed. So 
too is the impact of the big offensives such as the Battle of the S o m e  in 1916. 
Finally, three divisions (one Regular, one Territorial, and one 'New Army') are 
subjected to detailed analysis from their initial deployment on the Western Front then 
to the Italian Front where a different disciplinary approach can be detected. 0 
The central theme of the thesis is that whilst some British commanders adopted a 
progressive approach to discipline most clung to traditional ideas of deterrence. In this 
they were encouraged by the very nature of British military law which differed from 
continental and American models in vital areas. Driven by the fear of a collapse in 
discipline amongst their 'citizen soldiers' some commanders took refuge in traditional 
methods of punishment to maintain what they termed 'fighting spirit'. This, however, 
altered at the end of 1917 when traditional approaches gave way to new forms of 
management. 
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Introduction 
"The primary object of the infliction of the death sentence is that it 
shall act as a deterrent. . . . After all, what alternative punishment is 
there, when troops are facing the enemy?" 
Major-General Sir John Wyndham Childs.' 
Writing in 1997, Professor Ian Beckett remarked that 'there is a seeming public 
obsession fuelled by some popular works with the relatively minor matter of 3 12 
wartime executions [on the Western Front only]'.2 The 'popular' works to which 
Beckett refers are numerous, but most notably include Anthony Babington's For the 
Sake ofExumple and Shot ut Dawn by Julian Putkowski and Julian S y k e ~ . ~  These two 
works are the first point of reference for historians concerned with British executions4 
yet both are deficient, though in different ways. Moreover, they both adhere to a style 
and tradition the origins of which can be traced directly to Ernest Thurtle's 1924 a 
Major-General Sir John Wyndham Childs, Episodes and Reflections (Cassell and Co., London, 1930) 
pp. 143 & 145. 
Ian F. W. Beckett, 'The Military Historian and the Popular Image of the Western Front, 1914-1918' in 
The Historian, No. 53 (1997) p. 12. 
Anthony Babington, For the Sake of Example: Capital Courts-Martial 1914-18 The Truth, revised 
edition (Leo Cooper, Barnsley, 1993) and Julian Putkowski and Julian Sykes, Shot at Dawn, revised 
edition (Leo Cooper, Barnsley, 1992). These have been followed by a steady flow of newspaper 
articles about the campaign to pardon the executed soldiers. See, for example, The Independent, 16 
August 1993. 
The work of Babington and Putkowski and Sykes are frequently cited in other works on the First 
World War. For instance, Martin Gilbert, The First World War (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 
1994), cites both works in his bibliography. Another of Babington's works, Shell-shock: A History of 
the Changing Attitudes to War Neuroses (Leo Cooper, Barnsley, 1997), was even cited as an influential 
study by Sir Edward Sommers in his Review of Deaths by Execution in the Great War of 1914-1918, 
which was placed before the New Zealand Government in October 1999. Although far from the 
definitive word on the subject, this indicates just how Babington's name has become synonymous with 




polemic, Shootings at Dawn.5 Similar traditions are to be found in fictional works 
such as The Secret Battle by A. P. Herbert (1919)6 and more recently in the Alan 
Bleasedale television play The Monocled Mutineer (BBC - 1986). 
There has been a backlash against these works - usually defending the actions of 
the army. This approach is implicit in Beckett's own rejection of the subject. A most 
recent essay by John Peatty argued that 'It is not the job of the historian to sit in 
judgement on the past and second guess the action of our forebears - although, 
frankly, many historians do 
preferring instead to quote modem-day journalists in his defence of the army's actions 
and, therefore, his work amounts to no more than yet another polemic, albeit from a 
different point of view. More erudite studies do exist. Professor David French used 
the executions of the First World War to provide a context for his study of discipline 
in the Second World War and David Englander's work has provided an excellent 
comparative framework, which seems to invite future exploration of the topic8 
Unfortunately, up until now the polemical works have clouded the issue. 
Sadly, Peatty avoids any analysis of the material, 0 
a Consequently, there has been little specific analysis of military executions during the 
war. This is a great pity because despite Beckett's dismissal of the subject, the death 
Ernest Thurtle, Shootings at Dawn (Victoria House Printing Co., London, 1924). 
A. P. Herbert, The Secret Battle (Methuen, London, 1919). The story was loosely based on the case of 
5 
Sub-Lieutenant Edwin Dyett of the Royal Naval Division. Dyett was executed in early 1917 - only the 
second officer to be shot during the war - and his case was the cause of considerable media and 
political reaction in Britain. Dyett's case, of all those executed, continues to arouse most interest and is 
the sole subject of Leonard Sellers' book, For God's Sake Shoot Straight (Leo Cooper, London, 1991). 
Once again, though, it is void of historical analysis, focusing instead on revelations of apparent 
injustice. ' John Peatty, 'Capital Courts-Martial during the Great War' in Brian Bond et al, 'Look to Your Front': 
Studies in the First World War by The British Commission for Military History (Spellmount, 
Staplehurst, 1999), p, 102. 
* David French, 'Discipline and the Death Penalty in the British Army in the War against Germany 
during the Second World War', in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33 (4), 1998, pp. 531-545. 
David Englander, 'Mutinies and Military Morale' in Hew Strachan (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History 
of the First World War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), pp. 191-203. 
4 
penalty formed a vital component in the British High Command's approach to 
discipline. The numbers involved, far from being 'relatively minor' were the 
equivalent of a whole infantry brigade: official sources record that the threat of the 
death penalty hung over more than 3,000 men, but the real number probably exceeded 
4,000.9 This number far exceeds the number of civilians condemned by criminal 
courts during a comparable period of time, but studies of capital punishment in 
criminal cases have not been dismissed so lightly. Furthermore, the trial and review of 
cases must have occupied an enormous proportion of the time of very senior officers. 
The impact on those touched by executions, either as members of firing squads or 
witnesses, has seldom been considered by historians. The works of David French and 
David Englander have shown how military executions can provide the basis for 
serious analyses of military discipline and morale. All armies engaged in the conflict 
carried out executions but some, such as the British, demonstrated less restraint than 
did others. Why this should be the case has not been adequately explained. It is my 
contention that in order to understand this last question we need to look beyond purely 
military considerations; that social and cultural structures were every bit as important 
in defining the respective armies' approach to the death penalty. 
Having considered the British army's disciplinary structures within the greater 
context of other armies, we need to assess how those structures were applied: how 
were ideas about discipline formed and what events shaped its meaning to 
Statistics of the Military Efsort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914-1920 (War Office, 
HMSO, London, 1922), p. 649 suggests that there were 3,080 condemnations during the war, with 346 
executions carried out. This, though, is a highly conservative figure which does not include Indian 
troops or civilians. It is unlikely that the actual figure will ever be known, but there is evidence to 
suggest that it is far greater than officially recorded. See G. Oram, Death Sentences passed by military 
courts of the British Army 1914-1924 (Francis Boutle, London, 1998). 
5 
contemporaries? It is not within the scope of this study to analyse the evolution of the 
British army as an institution, but we should note that during the second half of the 
nineteenth century and up until the eve of the First World War, the army had 
undergone considerable change. It was modernising. The nature of military discipline 
was also changing, although there was considerable resistance to any attempts to 
liberalise the military code. The advent of modern warfare, which the army had 
recognised before 19 14, presented fresh challenges to commanders. Previous studies 
have concentrated on strategic considerations and the implications of new 
technology," but manpower concerns and the discipline of a changed army was every 
bit as important to contemporaries. Although apparent to military pundits before 
1914, this took on huge importance at the outbreak of war with the rapid and vast 
a 
expansion of the army. The war, it could be argued, slowed down modernising 
reforms on matters such as discipline, at least in the first years. Faced with a desperate 
military situation almost from the beginning, British commanders, it seems, fell back 
on traditional ideas of control based on the principle of deterrence, and executions 
became commonplace in the years 1914-1917. 0 
The emergence, for the first time, of a 'mass' British army challenged existing ideas 
about troop morale, which had been defined largely in terms of individual character. 
Eventually, it also sounded the death knell for traditional ideas about control of the 
army following the recruitment of huge numbers of men, very few of whom intended 
to be professional soldiers. The creation of a 'citizen army' had altered the relationship 
l o  See, for example, T. H. E. Travers, 'Technology, Tactics and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, 
and British Military Theory, 1900-1914' in Journal ofModern History, Vol. 5 1 (June 1979), pp. 264- 
286. 
6 
between leaders and led, but also tested the organisational and administrative 
structures of the army. Traditional punishments such as the death penalty were 
initially applied with as much vigour as ever they were in the old regular force, but by 
the end of the war traditional approaches to discipline and morale gave way to forms 
consistent with the modernising voices of the pre-war era. By the final year of the war 
the army had altered its disciplinary policy, if not the actual code, and in practice at 
least it began to resemble some of its continental counterparts, though not all. 
The process of change, however, was not universally consistent. There were great e 
variations between different units. It appears that different traditions influenced 
practices in certain types of formation. It has been argued elsewhere that regular 
divisions, for example, were subjected to harsher forms of discipline than territorial 
force divisions. l 1  Was this trend reflected in the approach to the death penalty? The 
evidence suggests that, broadly speaking, it was. But the situation was far more 
complex, especially in the divisions of the New Army where practices varied 
enormously. Variations also existed in regular or territorial formations and we need to 
assess the role of divisional commanders in particular. Death sentences and 
executions were only a small part of the disciplinary process, but they formed 
arguably the most important component in an army dominated by ideas of deterrence. 
Executions might not provide an accurate barometer of discipline in any given unit, or 
army for that matter, but they do provide us with a unique sounding board- a 
framework on which to make comparisons. 
0 
Gary Sheffield, 'Officer-Man Relations: Morale and Discipline in the British army 1902- 1922', PhD 1 1  
thesis, King's College, London, 1994. 
7 
A total of 359 executions of men serving with the British Army are recorded in 
official documents (twenty-nine of which were carried out after the armistice): 321 for 
military offences such as desertion and cowardice etc., the remaining forty for 
murder. l 2  Additionally, an unknown number of Indian soldiers were also executed13 
and it appears that records relating to the execution of British soldiers are 
in~ornp1ete.l~ 
Professor Beckett's assessment is correct in two respects. Firstly, when compared to 
the enormity of casualties during the First World War the execution of 361 men might 
well appear to be of little importance. Secondly, the relevant literature has tended to 
0 
be dominated by .popular, anecdotal accounts which, consistent with public 
perceptions; have concentrated on apparent injustices. But these have overlooked 
potential areas for serious historical analysis such issues as the use of the death 
sentence in the British ,Army as a disciplinary device and its impact on morale as well 
as the social and cultural context of the death penalty. However, Beckett's comments 
underestimate the impact ,that the wartime executions had on soldiers in the trenches. 
The number of references to executions in diaries, letters and memoirs is surely 
testament to the nature of their impact and for many soldiers the experience of 
e 
witnessing an execution or the fear generated by the rumours circulating in the 
trenches was a profound part of their wartime experience. 
PRO W0213/1-34 and WO90/6-8 and W092/3&4, Courts-Martial registers. Also PRO W07 11387- 
690, Judge Advocate General's Records. 
l 3  There is no record of Indian executions. If a record was maintained then it has not survived. 
Two executions of British soldiers have been omitted from the official records. These are Corporal 
William Price and Private Richard Morgan of 2 Bn Welsh Regiment who were executed in early 1915 
for the murder of their own CSM. Neither Price's nor Morgan's details are recorded in the Judge 
Advocate General's Records or in the Courts-Martial registers at the PRO. 
14 
8 
Professor Beckett is equally critical of the current campaign to gain pardons for 
. -  . .  . 
those executed which he views as applying 'modern morality to the past' - a line also 
taken by Peatty." This does raise some interesting questions. What, for example, does 
one then do about approximately 3,000 other men sentenced to death who were 
ultimately spared by the Commander-in-Chief? There is scant attention paid to these 
cases. Do they not deserve pardons too? The implications not only for those convicted 
by military courts but also those convicted under the criminal code are too vast to 
warrant serious consideration by historians and are best left to the politician. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the approach and scope of many studies about executions 
has been dictated by the writers'' concerns about injustice and a genuinely heartfelt 
belief that those executed should be pardoned. The inaccessibility of official records 
for seventy-five years has also contributed to concerns of a 'cover-up', leading to.fears 
that the situation might have been far worse than it actually was. This has deflected 
attention away from the true historical debate concerning the use of the death penalty, 
or at least the threat of its use, as an instrument of control. 
The death sentence was the ultimate disciplinary weapon available to British 
courts-martial and there can be little doubt that the High Command considered it to be 
an essential component in the maintenance of discipline, a view supported by the 
Committee of Enquiry chaired by the Right Honourable Sir Charles Darling.I6 
Interestingly, there was a contemporary campaign against the military use of the death 
penalty headed, as is also the case with the current campaign, by a Labour MP, Ernest 
l5 Ian F. W. Beckett, 'The Military Historian', p. 12. See also John Peatty, 'Capital Courts-Martial'. 
'6 Report of the Committee Constituted by the A m y  Council to Enquire into the Law and rules of 
Procedure Regulating Military Courts-Martial (HMSO, 19 19) [hereafter referred to as The Darling 
Report]. 
9 
Thurtle. It may well be the case that Thurtle was less concerned with the putative 
iniquity of military justice but saw in the executions an opportunity to attack the army 
itself." Nevertheless, Thurtle's role in the subsequent abolition of the death penalty 
for most military offences in 1930 cannot be overstated.'* Principal amongst Thurtle's 
concerns was the power vested in the Commander-in-Chief who, in the absence of 
any appellate system, acted as final arbiter in all matters of military justice. This 
differed from the French Army's judicial process which placed the ultimate decision 
in capital cases on the shoulders of the President of the Republic. However, the report 
of the Darling Committee, published in 1919, not only supported the existing system 
of military justice but also concluded that the Commander-in-Chief had acted 
properly and judicio~sly. '~  His role was central to the whole process and we must 
gain a firm grasp of this if we are to understand the workings of military discipline. 
In 1924 Thurtle published Shootings at Dawn, his own account of the wartime 
military executions.20 This collection of supposedly eyewitness accounts set the trend 
that others were to follow. Anonymous witnesses recalled the details of several 
executions. The style is anecdotal and little in the way of analysis is attempted. Of 
course to be fair to Thurtle his purpose was to shock the public and thereby bring 
about a change in the law. The successive horror stories certainly achieve their aim. 
An account of the execution of three members of the Durham Light Infantry is 
typical: 
" See David Englander and James Osbourne, 'Jack, Tommy and Henry Dubb: the Armed Forces and 
the Working Class' in Historical Journal, No. xxi (1978) pp. 593-621. 
l* By 1930 the only offences punishable by death were treason and mutiny 
*" Thurtle, Shootings at Dawn. 
The Darling Report. In particular see paragraph 105. 
10 
"A motor ambulance arrives conveying the doomed men. Manacled and 
blindfolded they are helped out and tied up to the stakes. Over each man's 
heart is placed an envelope. At the sign of command the firing parties, twelve 
to each, align their rifles on the envelopes. The officer in charge holds his stick 
aloft and as it falls thirty-six bullets usher the souls of three Kitchener's men to 
the great unknown. As a military prisoner I helped clear the traces of that 
triple murder. I took the posts down . . . I helped carry those.bodies to their last 
resting place; I collected all the blood-soaked straw and burnt it. Acting upon 
police instructions I took all their belongings from the dead men's tunics 
(discarded before being shot). A few letters, a pipe, some fags, a photo. I could 
tell you of the silence of the military police after reading one letter from a little 
girl to 'Dear Daddy,' . . . '121 
The horror of an execution has been explicitly recalled. Its purpose is clear and it is 
highly effective. 
Unfortunately for Thurtle, his reliance on eyewitness testimony and liberal use of 
hearsay evidence together with the unavailability of official records has resulted in a 
document with many more than the usual problems. Many of the events described in 
Shootings ut Dawn contain factual errors. Furthermore, the language is often over 
emotive: references to shootings or murders in cold blood abound - a deliberate 
literary strategy to manipulate the reader's emotions. Even Thurtle's statistics are 
Thurtle, Shootings at Dawn, p. 7 .  21 
11 
incorrect: he cites a total of 264 executions.22 Rather than being an account of the 
executions carried out during the First World War, it would be more accurate to 
regard Shootings ut Dawn as evidence of the impact executions had on morale and on 
certain parts of British society. 
The unavailability of official records, which were closed to the public for seventy- 
five years, also hampered William Moore's 1974 publication The Thin Yellow Line.23 
Most of the book is concerned with exploring the military and medical responses to 
fear and cowardice. Executions were dealt with in this context. Not surprisingly, the 
result was an interesting appraisal of the main topic but an altogether unsatisfactory 
account of courts-martial that could only hint at the impact of executions and death 
a 
, ' I  
' 
3 2 ., sentences in the British Army without making very much sense of them. However, a 
useful comparison was made with the justice system employed by other armies. This 
clearly showed that the British Army was far more frequent than were the armies of 
France and Germany in its use of the firing squad to maintain discipline. These 
comparisons were themselves hindered by the absence of official records of French or 
German executions. The French records, rather like the British, were closed to public 
scrutiny and the German records had apparently been destroyed in World War 11. 
Nevertheless, Moore was able to make use of secondary accounts such as Guy 
Pedroncini's study of the French mutinies of 1917.24 
0 
Without the benefit of access to official records Moore's book disappoints as far as 
executions are concerned, but the simple comparisons with other armies pointed the 
22 Thurtle, Shootings at Dawn, p. 3. 
24 Guy Pedroncini, Les Mutineries de I91 7 (PUF, Paris, 1967). 
William Moore, The Thin Yellow Line (Leo Cooper, Barnsley, 1974). 23 
12 
way forward. Most revealing was the short section on the American Army, which was 
the only army to make a medical examination a legal requirement in capital cases. 
Before a sentence of death could be carried out a second opinion about the 
condemned man also had to be sought. Unfortunately, Moore does not analyse why 
such a different and seemingly enlightened approach existed only in the American 
Army and the apparently lower number of executions in the French and German 
Armies are not sufficiently explained. 
In 1981 Judge Anthony Babington was granted access to the still closed files of the a 
Judge-Advocate-General, including all the proceedings relating to the executed 
soldiers. The result was For the Sake of Example, first published in 1983. It is the first 
comprehensive study of military executions during the, war and, as one might expect 
from a judge, the focus is firmly on the legality and justice accorded these men by the 
courts-martial. However, his claim in the preface to the second edition that his work is 
'a definitive study of the capital courts-martial in the British Army during the First 
World War'25 is not realised. Babington provides a useful narrative of the executions 
and of Thurtle's role in the abolition but little in the way of analysis. His comparisons 
between the various armies achieve little more than Moore had a decade earlier. 
0 
One of the conditions by which Babington was granted access to the files was that 
he did not divulge the identities of any of the executed men. Consequently, names of 
individuals are not revealed nor is the identity of the units concerned. This appears to 
have seriously handicapped the work: references to the fighting experience of units 
and the circumstances of alleged offences are vague. Judge Babington, naturally, 
25 Babington, For the Sake of Example, p. ix. 
13 
, :  1 
. . ? ' . ,  
. (  
concentrates on the judicial process. In so doing he neglects to contextualise the cases 
and the relationship between morale and discipline is not sufficiently explored. For 
the Sake of Example follows the tradition started by Thurtle in focusing on justice in 
the courts-martial and provides a link between Thurtle's politically motivated attack 
on the army and the current media campaign for parliamentary pardons for those shot 
by British firing squads. Considering the unique access to files granted to Babington, 
his book is a disappointment. 
Babington's later book, Shell-Shock: A History of the Changing Attitudes to War 
Neuroses", is an ambitious,attempt to explore the condition from ancient times to the 8 
present day. The most important section concerns the First World War. Here, 
Babington discusses many of the same cases that he dealt with in For the Sake of- 
Example but, as the title implies, they are set into the context of the military and 
medical reaction to the condition. This makes for a much more satisfactory account of 
these cases, but it does not match the more erudite studies of the condition by Eric 
Leed and Martin Stone.27 The latter is an invaluable aid to understanding the social 
and cultural as well as military significance of 'shellshock' during the First World 
War. Nor does Babington's work come close to the original theses of Peter Lynch 
(1977) and Peter Leese ( 1989).28 Surprisingly, Babington does not refer to any of 
26 Anthony Babington, Shell-Shock: A History of the Changing Attitudes to War Neuroses (Leo 
Cooper, Barnsley, 1997). 
2' Eric b e d ,  No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War One (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1979) contains an excellent section on discipline and war neuroses. Martin Stone, 
'Shellshock and the Psychologists' in W. F. Bynum, R. Porter and M. Shepherd (Eds.) Anatomy of 
Madness, Volume I1 (Tavistock Press, London, 1985) explores the perception of psychological 
treatment of neuroses before the war and the impact of the war on both psychology and psychiatry. 
** Peter John Lynch, 'The Exploitation of Courage: Psychiatric Care in the British Army 1914-1918, 
MPhil thesis, University College, London, 1977. Peter Jeremy Leese, 'A Social and Cultural History of 
Shellshock, with particular reference to the experience of British soldiers during and after the Great 
War, PhD thesis, Open University, 1989. 
14 
these works, nor are they contained in h s  bibliography. The condition known as 
shellshock was a factor in determining the approach to discipline in the army. It was 
also a factor in many of the capital trials. The army's reluctance to accept the 
condition as a genuine one no doubt affected the outcome of many cases. The 
relationship between the condition and the death penalty needs to be explored, but 
Babington's work provides little of use here. 
A far more incisive account appeared in The Unknown Army by Douglas Gill and 
Gloden Dallas in 1985.29 Their examination of the working class and the British Army 
showed that there was more resistance to military authority than had previously -been 
revealed. However, dissent had been spontaneous. Political and pacifist movements 
had made few inroads to the army. In this respect the authors reflected the earlier 
argument advanced by David Englander and James O~bourne.~' Gill and Dallas were 
able to show how the death penalty, or the threat of it, was used by the British High 
Command to instil obedience to its will. An essential feature of this process was the 
reading out on parade of the names of executed soldiers, as recorded in General 
Routine Orders, to deter would-be deserters. Reactions to this practice varied. In 
particular, it seems the Australians, who were immune to the death penalty, were 
appalled by the harsh treatment meted out to British soldiers whilst some German 
commanders appear to have been jealous of the extent of their British counterparts' 
power. This became an essential feature of the 'stab in the back' legend after the war. 
But could the military authorities inculcate in their men a blind obedience on threat of 
death alone? I will argue that it could not. Most armies developed alternative 
29 Douglas Gill and Gloden Dallas, The Unknown Army (Verso, New York, 1985). 
30 David Englander and James Osbourne, 'Jack, Tommy and Henry Dubb'. 
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strategies and whilst the threat of the death penalty was a potent weapon in securing 
the obedience of the men it was not the only one. The citizen armies of France and 
Germany differed markedly from the British, but by the end of the war even the 
British army had come to realise that it needed to gain and maintain the consent of the 
troops if it was to continue fighting the war. 
The identities of all the executed soldiers were finally revealed six years after For 
the Sake of Example first appeared. Julian Putkowski and Julian Sykes, the authors of 
Shot at Dawn3', had put names to each capital case even though the records had still 
not been'opened to public scrutiny because of the seventy-five year rule. As a result, 1 
references to individuals and their units were more specific and greater analysis was 
possible. Extensive appendices, the result of meticulous research, provided vital 
statistical data of the ages of those executed, their units, dates and locations. 
Comparisons between units, theatres of the war and the various phases of the war 
were now possible. Reliance on sources other than official records resulted in some 
errors. Many of these were corrected in the revised edition, published in 1992, and an 
updated edition is due in 2001. However, the authors' main concern remained that of 
justice. Included in the first edition was a call for 'the exoneration of all those who fell 
victim to British Army firing squads during the First World War'; it was repeated in a 
statement in the revised edition.32 It appears likely that the publication of Shot at 
Dawn has been a major factor in the campaign for parliamentary pardons for all 
capital cases, which resulted in a review by the Blair government in 1998. 
Putkowski and Sykes, Shot at Dawn. 31 
32 Putkowski and Sykes, Shot at Dawn, p. 5.  
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Part of the legacy of the work of Babington, Putkowslu and Sykes has been the 
inclusion of references to executions in general histories of World War I. There are 
few references to executions in the British Army to be found in general histories 
published prior to 1989, when Putkowslu and Sykes first revealed the identities of the 
condemned men.33 This has now changed and historians such as Martin Gilbert and 
John Bourne have considered the executions sufficiently important to be included in 
their works.34 Unfortunately, the former appears to have drawn his material entirely 
from the works of Babington; Putkowski and Sykes with the result that his references -0 
1 ,  have not done justice to the subject matter. The analysis remains superficial and the 
only attempt at an explanation is to quote one soldier who stated 'I cannot stand 
The inclusion of a map in.Gilbert's Atlus of the First World War showing the 
hometowns of twenty executed men is even more puzzling.36 Bourne's reference, 
although brief, considers the impact of the threat of execution on soldiers in an 
incisive and succinct manner. He highlights the impact of the influx of millions of 
' civilians, adding that 'there was neither a real understanding of its [the regular army] 
values nor a desire to share them'. The army's sociology and long-established methods 
of operation, he argues, faced the threat of revolutionary change.37 The death penalty 
and other disciplinary practices, I will show, eventually became victims of this force 
for change. 
33 Works such as John Terraine, The Great War (Wordsworth editions Ltd, Ware, 1997) and A. J. P. 
Taylor, The First World War: An Illustrated History (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1966) refer to 
executions of French soldiers following the 1917 mutinies, but make no mention of the more numerous 
British executions, or any others for that matter. 
Martin Gilbert, First World War (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1994). John M. Bourne, Britain 
and the Great War 1914-1918 (Edward Arnold, London, 1989). 
3s Martin Gilbert, First World Warp.  288. 
3h Martin Gilbert, The Routledge Atlas of the First World War: The Complete History, second edition, 
(Routledge, London, 1994). 
37 J. M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War, p. 216. 
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For the historian, the true value of Shot at Dawn probably lies in the possibilities 
that it opened up. The extensive amount of data contained in Putkowski and Sykes's 
publication formed the basis for part of my own statistical analysis of the British 
executions. From this base I extended the research to include all the death sentences 
passed by courts-martial during the war whether or not they resulted in an execution.38 
This 'wider' study produced some surprising results. Firstly, the performance of all the 
Commanders-in-Chief in the various theatres of the war remained remarkably 
consistent: approximately ten percent of the cases referred to each of them were 0 
- t  confirmed. Most importantly, this. percentage also remained consistent when viewed . . !  
in tthe context of the country of origin for each unit. Men sentenced to death from 
English, Scots, Welsh, Irish, Canadian and South African units all stood a one in ten 
chance of having their sentences-confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief. The 
exceptions to this were the Australians, whose own regulations practically forbade 
executions, and New Zealanders, who were more than twice as likely to have their 
sentences confirmed, When viewed together, men serving with ANZAC units fared 
the same as others. It appears that New Zealanders paid the price of Australian 
immunity from execution.39 The consistency achieved in the imposition of the death 
penalty warrants further attention. It is argued in this study that the proportion of one 
execution in every ten condemnations was no coincidence, but rather a managed 




38 A complete annotated list of over 3,000 death sentences passed by British courts-martial, the 'raw 
material' of this research, has been published. See G. Oram, Death Sentencespassea' by military courts 
o the British Army 1914-1924 (Francis Boutle, London, 1998). 
''Gerard Oram, 'Worthless Men: Death Sentences in the British Army During the First World War', 
unpublished MPhil thesis, University of Hertfordshire, 1997. 
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appearing excessively harsh. This last consideration was most important because, it 
will be argued, the military authorities needed to retain the support of politicians and 
troops alike. The army did not want to have its power to discipline its men 
compromised by political interference, not could it afford to lose the consent of the 
troops. This, therefore, casts some doubt on the generally held belief that the 
Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) was personally responsible for confirming sentences. 
Although nominally the role of the C-in-C, it is highly unlikely that he could devote 
the amount of time necessary to review each case, let alone maintain a ratio of one 
execution in every ten condemnations. 
. 
i 
Some of these ideas were developed in the published version of my thesis, which 
appeared in 199EL4O Particular reference was made to the influence of pre-war 
attitudes and beliefs concerning 'race' and degeneration. The research indicated that 
Irish soldiers were statistically more likely to be sentenced to death than were other 
soldiers. This was explained .in the context of concerns about the quality of the Irish 
'race'. Although considered natural warriors, especially during the time of the Boer 
War, by 1914 concerns about Irish loyalty had reactivated nineteenth-century ideas of 
Anglo-Saxonism over supposed Celtic inferiority and indiscipline. The war in South 
Africa had also focused attention on the physical quality of British recruits and this in 
turn had given additional stimulus to the eugenics movement. I have argued that 
whilst the disproportionate condemnations of Irish soldiers merely reflects a more 




G. Oram, Worthless Men: Race, Eugenics and the Death Penalty in the British A m y  during the First 40 
World War (Francis Boutle, London, 1998). Hereafter referred to as Worthless Men. 
19 
During the process of reviewing death sentences and making recommendations senior 
officers’ concerns about degeneracy could be a crucial factor.41 
Interestingly, it has been argued elsewhere that these same groups, the Irish and the 
degenerate, were widely believed to be pre-disposed to suffering from the condition 
known as shellshock. In peacetime these ‘outsiders’ were considered abnormal and as 
such were often deemed to be a threat to society. During the war, it has been argued, 
this was considered a threat to military efficiency and di~cipl ine.~~ 
Studies of the Dominion armies under British command have also taken account of 
‘ *  0 ’ .  
the question of discipline and the death penalty. Principal amongst these is 
7 .  Christopher Pugsley’s study of discipline in the New Zealand Division, On the Fringe 
. >  ofHell, and a number of studies about the Canadian Corps by Desmond M0rton.4~ A 
* -, key feature of these works& is the analysis of the relationship between the Dominion I 
%unit and the British command as well as other units in the army. Pugsley has shown ’ I 
that the use of the8death penalty against New Zealand soldiers, including two 
Australian nationals, was more frequent than for other soldiers in the army 
commensurate to the number of condemnations; a conclusion supported by my own e 
research (see above). Pugsley focuses particular attention on the role of the 
commander of the New Zealand Division, Russell. It was he, Pugsley argues, who 
was responsible for the harsh code of discipline imposed on the New Zealanders and 
Oram, Worthless Men, pp. 84-101. 41 
42 Joanna Bourke, ‘Effeminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma: The Sufferings of ‘Shell-shocked’ 
Men in Great Britain and Ireland, 1914-39’ in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 35 (1) (2000), 
pp. 57-69. See also George Mosse, ‘Shell-shock as a Social Disease’ also in Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol. 35 (1) (2000), pp. 101-108. 
Christopher Pugsley, On the Fringe of HeEl (Hodder and Stoughton, Auckland, 1991). Desmond 
Morton, When Your Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War (Random House of 
Canada, Toronto, 1993) and ‘The Supreme Penalty: Canadian Deaths by Firing Squad in the First 
World War‘ in Queen‘s Quarterly, No. 79 (1972) pp. 345-352. 
43 
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that the excessive zeal shown by the courts-martial, staffed by New Zealand officers, 
was actually moderated by the British High Command. The death penalty became an 
instrument by which Russell sought to rid the New Zealand Division of the 
'"incorrigibles", the 10 per cent of his New Zealanders who were always in trouble'.44 
Pugsley's central argument is that the harsh approach resulted in the emergence of the 
New Zealand Division as a highly disciplined and efficient fighting force, arguably 
the most effective unit in the British Army by the end of the war.45 
Morton's work on the other hand conforms more closely to the 'British pattern of 
anecdotal narratives that tend to pose questions rather than providing answers. This is 
a pity for in the Canadian Corps there was an easily identifiable minority: French- 
speaking Canadians. Morton quite correctly identifies that the number of French- . 
Canadian soldiers sentenced to death by British courts-martial was disproportionately 
high. But he makes little attempt at an explanation beyond the reaction) of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Thomas Tremblay, the commander of the 22"d battalion, who insisted on five 
executions to purge his unit of 'tramps and  ne'er-do-well^'.^^ The war effort had never 
been well supported by French-speaking Canadians and recruitment was particularly 
poor amongst that section of the population. Those who were recruited were 
concentrated into two battalions, the 22"d and the 14th. These two battalions alone 
account for thirty-six of the 222 death sentences against soldiers of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force's 258 battalions. This is an aspect that warrants further study and 




Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell, p. 119. 
Morton, When Your Number's Up, p. 251. 
44 
4s Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell. 
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What the works of Pugsley and Morton do have in common is that both authors 
assess the use of the death penalty within the wider context of an increasing sense, on 
the part of the respective Dominions armies, of independence from British control. 
Morton finds it paradoxical that 'in a period when Canadians were expanding their 
autonomy in many other areas of military administration and authority, there seems to 
have been no question of the right of a British Commander-in-Chief to order the 
execution of C a n a d i a n ~ ' . ~ ~  His conclusion that the Canadian authorities must have 
been satisfied with the situation is not borne out by other developments, namely the 
insistence on Canadian officers being present at Canadian courts-martial. It seems 
more likely that the Canadians did not entirely trust the British and that what 1 
eventually emerged amounted to aaompromise. By the time of the Second World 
War Canadians were no longer under the jurisdiction of the British commander, 
which is hardly indicative of complete satisfaction with the previous arrangement. 
. 
I 
Morton does, however, make the.very astute observation that 'the avowed purpose 
of military law is not to do absolute justice to the individual but to maintain 
d i~c ip l ine ' .~~  In this brief statement he sums up the main problem with many of the 
works discussed here. The impact of the death penalty needs to be measured by its 
effect on groups, not just individuals. That is not to suggest that the concerns about 
injustices are irrelevant, for the impact on morale, esprit de corps and unit esteem 
needs to be analysed. The fear and pity, not to mention shame, felt by the comrades of 
men executed bv firing: sauad has never been fullv exnlained. Sienificantlv. this 
47 Morton, 'Deaths by Firing Squad', p. 350. 
48 Morton, 'Deaths by Firing Squad', p. 346. 
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aspect of military discipline, often present in the papers of rank and file soldiers, is 
usually absent from senior officers' published memoirs. 
If concerns about apparent injustices have dominated most accounts of British 
executions then the influence of these concerns has been less noticeable in studies of 
executions in the other armies. Studies of the French Army tend to focus on the 
mutinies of 19 17. As a consequence there is a greater emphasis on the political rather 
than the judicial significance of executions. Guy Pedroncini's study of the 1917 
mutinies was concerned with the judicial process but the context remained a political @ , 
Pedroncini was mainly concerned with the rehabilitation of the reputation of 
Petain and the mutinies of 1917 provided an ideal platform for this. Petain's 
understanding of war and of soldiers, Pedroncini argues, enabled him to reassert 
control over the army by introducing sensible reforms and improving morale without 
merely giving in to the mutineers' demands.50 The execution,of so-called leaders of 
the mutiny is symbolic of Petain's command of an army which was otherwise 
degenerating towards anarchy. 
' 
0 Pedroncini compiled statistics from the Archives de la Justice Milituire which 
suggest that forty-nine executions followed the mutinies of 1917. Prior to that it 
appears that the execution of approximately seven poilus each month was typi~al .~ '  
This may seem a lot, but it is far lower than the British total. With a far larger army 
than the British, the reputation for harshness acquired by the French appears 
unfounded upon comparison. The introduction in 1916 of a right of appeal to the 
Pedroncini. Les Mutineries. 
50 Pedroncini, Les Mutineries. 
5 1  Pedroncini, Les Mutineries. 
49 
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President was never matched by a similar development in the British Army (although 
something like it did exist in the American Army on its entry into the war in 1917). 
This is indicative of a political dimension to the use of the death penalty in the French 
Army. 
Leonard Smith further developed the 'political' theme. Smith has explored the 
nature of the relationship between the rank and file, their officers and the High 
Command against the background of the social and political concerns of 1917. The 
. result is a highly compelling and incisive argument that the parameters in the 'power- 
relationship' were in a state of constant change. The balance of that relationship 
shifted throughout the war in favour of the poilus so much so that the nature of 
, discipline itself can be regarded as negotiable to a certain extent. So too it seems was 
the conduct of the war after 1917 when Petain, the new Commander-in-Chief, 
temporarily abandoned the large-scale offensives. In return, Smith argues, the poilus 
. accepted a limited number of executions of their own.n~mber.~* 
Forty-nine men were selected for execution from the original number of 554 death 
sentences following the mutinies of 19 17. These were 'token' displays of authority. 
So-called leaders were selected, tried and sentenced by conseils de guerre. The 
identification of the 'leaders' of the mutinies, those destined to pay the price of the 
mutiny and, therefore, of the concessions gained, raises interesting points. Military 
courts convicted approximately ten percent of the 40,000 mutineers with 554 
receiving death sentences. Most of these were subsequently commuted but the 
selection of forty-nine poilus for execution does not appear to have been entirely 
Leonard V. Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 5 2  
Jersey, USA, 1994). 
24 
arbitrary.53 According to Smith the 'leaders' were variously selected for their 'poor 
spirit', poor antecedents or because they were intelligent. Another, it seems, was 
selected merely because he was a local man.54 The implication is that unit 
commanders took advantage of the opportunity to remove unwanted men as well as 
any that they found difficult to deal with such as those identified as 'intelligent'. 
Selection was far from random. 
The absence of any real opposition to these 'token' executions, Smith argues, 
amounts to a tacit approval by the 'citizen-soldiers' of.the reassertion of discipline by 
the Cammander-in-Chief. The 'political' relationship was, therefore, a two-way 
arrangement. The executions amounted to a symbolic gesture of reinstated control of 
0 
I 
the army. In return, many of the poilu's grievances were addressed: the High - ,  
j Command acquiesced on the issues of extra leave, rations and the abandonment of the. 
costly large offensives. In this respect, Smith argues, it was the poilus who 
manipulated the course of the negotiations not Petain who remained 'more reactive 
than active, in a situation he never fundamentally ~ontrol led ' .~~ It is on this point of 
Petain's command of the situation, and by implication of the army, that Smith most 
seriously deviates from Pedroncini's argument. Smith asserts that 'the courts martial 
served to display the theoretically (and only theoretically) absolute power of the 
command ~t ruc ture ' .~~  
z 
0 
53 The ratio of executions to death sentences passed is strikingly similar to that in the British Army. In 
both the French and British cases it is approximately eleven percent. 
54 Leonard V. Smith, 'War and.'Politics': The French Army Mutinies of 1917' in War in History 2 (2) 
(1995) p. 198. 
5 5  Smith, 'War and 'Politics', p. 181. 
56 Smith, 'War and 'Politics', p. 200. 
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Smith and Pedroncini do agree that there is little evidence that the mutinies were 
the result of outside political subversion. The demands of the mutineers reflected 
tangible concerns about their immediate welfare and that of their families. It was the 
frustration of unrealistic expectations, particularly the hopes raised by Nivelle's over- 
confident claims, rather than doctrinaire idealism that ignited what was essentially a 
spontaneous though highly infectious mutiny involving large sections of the French 
Army. 
Pedroncini has tabulated the occupations and trades of the convicted men.57 The 0 
results are reflective of an army conscripted from within a society which was still 
largely agrarian. Farmers and labourers are the most c o m o n  'trade' whilst craftsmen 
and artisans make up the majority of the remainder. Smith concurs with Pedroncini's 
statistics adding that a mere ten per cent were industrial workers 'using the most 
generous definiti~n'.'~ Social elites and the bourgeoisie are absent. This suggests that 
the discipline and its enforcement by the elite in the French Army might have 
reflected peacetime class divisions and tensions. According to David Englander the 
'iron' nature of discipline did nothing to enhance officer-men relations and poilus 
resented the continuance of authority of the 'bosses in uniform' drawn almost 
exclusively from the upper and middle classes.59 In this context it is surprising that 
there was seemingly little opposition to the ultimate statement of authority namely the 
0 
" Pedroncini, Les Mutineries, p. 204. Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience, p. 210, concurs with 
Pedroncini's findings. 
58 Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience, p. 21 1 .  
59 David Englander, 'The French Soldier 1914-18' in French History, Volume 1, No. 1 (1987) pp. 49- 
67. 
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executions that followed the mutiny. Smith does not adequately deal with this aspect 
and it is conceivable that the poilus were less in control than he asserts. 
There are limitations with Smith's work. Most significantly, the study is limited to 
the 5th Infantry Division which Smith admits was not typical of the French Army as a 
' whole. Beyond the presentation of statistical data, there is little in the way of 
comparisons with other French Divisions and only limited reference, mainly in the 
conclusion, to the armies of the other belligerents. However, his assertion that the 
poilu was unique is interesting. As a 'citizen-soldier', Smith argues, the poilu had 
more in common with soldiers in Bolshevik Russia than with the 'subject-soldiers' of . 
Britain and Germany. 
Nicholas Offenstadt has examined the executions and their relationship with 
collective memory of the Great War. He regards the campaign for pardons essentially 
I as a matter of how the war is remembered in Britain and France. He also considers the . 
. absence of a similar campaign in Germany in the same context. Given unrestricted 
access to sensitive military records and drawing from works published in each 
country, Offenstadt found that eugenics might also have been a factor in French army 
executions. 'La thkse d'Oram', he states with reference to Worthless Men, 'trouve 
0 
quelques ClCments de confirmation dans l'armee fransaise'.60 
Comparative assessments such as this are surprisingly rare. Another recent one 
compares desertion in the British and German armies.6' The author, Christoph Jahr, is 
dismissive of the military perspective of morale and discipline which, he argues, is 
6o Nicholas Offenstadt, Les Fusillks de la Grande Guerre et la mkmoire collective (1914-1999) 
(Editions Odile Jacob, Paris, 1999), p. 36. 
1914-1918 (Vandenhoeck und Rupprecht, Gottingen, 1998). 
Christoph Jahr, Gewohnliche Soldaten. Desertion und deserteure im deutschen und britischen heer 61 
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impossible to quantify or define. Instead he prefers a social and cultural approach that 
contrasts the traditions and practices of the German and British armies arguing that 
one of the reasons for the lower number of German executions in comparison to 
British ones lay in fundamental differences in the respective legislation.62 German 
military law required a high degree of proof to sustain a conviction for desertion and 
there were many acquittals. In the British Army on the other hand desertion was 
relatively simple to prove, often being preferred to a charge of cowardice for that 
reason. Very few British soldiers were acquitted of desertion, or any other offence for 
that matter. German soldiers it seems had more rights than their British counterparts 
and prosecutions were seldom attempted in the German Army as a consequence. This 
feature of military justice needs to be examined within a wider comparative 
framework. Was comparative harshness, for instance, present only in the military 
code or was there a parallel in English criminal law? If so, why should this be the case 
in a country that considered itself to be the most progressive of nations? 
0 
I 
The lack of comparative histories leaves a gap in our understanding of the power- 
0 relationship, as Smith would put it, or even of officer-men relations of which 
discipline was a crucial factor. Inflicting the death penalty was the ultimate statement 
of authority and control. Its use was designed to ensure compliance by the rankers to 
the will of the commanders. In the British Army at least, this message was often 
reinforced by compelling the condemned man's own comrades to deliver the fatal 
volley. Every major army of the First World War used the death penalty (if one 
accepts that the Australians were a component part of the British Army and not a 
62 Jahr made a detailed comparison of two German and two British Divisions on the Western Front. 
.. 
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separate force). Yet there were many differences in their traditions, laws and 
practices. For example, a simple act of desertion was not a capital offence in the 
French military code. Only the offence of abandoning a post in the face of the enemy 
(similar to the British offence of cowardice in the face of the enemy) had attracted a 
death sentence in the 5th Infantry Division before the mutiny of 1917.63 This contrasts 
markedly with the British Army where death sentences for desertion were frequent.64 
The similarities and differences between the military law of the respective armies 
have not yet been analysed in any great depth. 
Accounts of British executions have been deficient simply because most authors 
have failed to recognise that military law was not as concerned with justice as it is 
with maintaining discipline. That is not to suggest that the apparent injustices are not 
important because they are. Rumours of unjust executions did much to spread fear 
through the ranks. Ultimately, it was this fear that commanders hoped would ensure 
compliance from their troops. The death penalty was highly valued for this reason. 
Douglas Haig, for example, not only wished to retain the death penalty but also 
pressed unsuccessfully for its extension to the Australians under his command. The 
concerns expressed about injustices, together with the campaign to pardon those 
executed, have much to do with our present day perception of the First World War 
and little to do with understanding discipline and morale in the trenches. 
63 Leonard V. Smith, 'The Disciplinary Dilemma of French Military Justice, September 1914 - April 
1917: The Case of the 5e Division d'infanterie' in The Journal of Military History, No. 55 (January 
1991) pp. 47-68. 
Out of 3,118 death sentences passed on soldiers in the British Army, 2,004 were for desertion. 272 of 64 
these resulted in execution. 
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Contemporary observers understood this more clearly than present day writers 
have. If justice alone was the purpose of military law then the final decision in capital 
cases would have been entrusted to a judicial figure, but this was never the case. The 
French, from early 1915, preferred a political figure to a military one and the final 
decision lay with the President of the Republic. In the British Army where military 
concerns were considered paramount the decision remained with the Commander-in- 
Chief. In common with many other facets of wartime Britain, higher value was placed 
on winning the war than on individual rights or liberties. The overriding concern of 
courts-martial was the state of discipline in the army. For evidence to support this 
view we need look no further than the report of the Darling Committee whch 
concluded: 
0 
, I  
In regard to sentences, we consider that, subject to the right to petition for 
clemency, the decision ought to be left, as at present, to the military 
authorities, who alone are in a position to form a correct judgement as to what 




Discipline was considered to be the determinant factor in such matters and justice 
does not even warrant a mention. It is this fundamental point that has eluded so many 
writers. 
65 The Darling Report, p. 11. 
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The history of executions during World War I was has been written in a style that 
reflects concerns that can also be detected during the war. French histories have 
conformed to the 'political' tradition whilst British studies have been dominated by 
concerns about apparent injustices, which originated with Thurtle's attack on the 
power of the Commander-in-Chief. As a result the current literature is extremely 
limited in its scope. 
Military discipline was a complex issue and the simplistic view that soldiers were 
repressed by incompetent generals located far away from the frontline is no longer 
good enough. Troops were able to negotiate, within certain parameters, their 
continued support. David Englander and Leonard Smith have emphasised this point - 
the latter perhaps overly - but most writers have missed it. The changing relationship 
between men, their leaders, repression and the death penalty requires further 
examination. One historian has recently suggested: 'If the men at the front had not 
somehow defined the war they were waging as their war also, it is doubtful whether 
sheer repression could have prevailed, because in such a case the total collapse of 
motivation would have flooded the damns of military justice'.66 
0 
a 
In order to do this it is first necessary to analyse the legal and cultural dimensions 
of army discipline which, as I have suggested, cannot be understood in military terms 
alone. This will provide us with an analytical framework in which comparisons can be 
drawn. The starting point of any study of military executions must surely be to locate 
their origins. These can be found, I will argue, not so much on the battlefields of the 
~ 
66 Professor Sophie de Schaepdrijver, in her introduction at the Unquiet Graves International 
Conference at Ieper, Belgium, 19 May 2000. See also Sophie de Schaepdrijver, 'Theirs Was Precisely 
to Reason Why: On Slaughter, Sacrifice, and Shootings at Dawn' in In Flanders Fields Magazine, Vol. 
2 (July 2000), p. 18. 
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Western Front, but in the traditions (military, legal, cultural and social) of the 
respective armies. Why did the British army value the death penalty so? How were 
ideas about discipline and morale shaped and where did they come from? How did 
these compare with practices and ideas in other armies and how did they alter over 
time? Military concerns and strategic considerations were only one part of this 
process - usually the final component. We need first to consider how the law was 
constructed and to understand contemporary ideas about discipline, deviance and 
obedience before we can examine the specifically military factors. 
Chapter 1 
"The administration of discipline by the English is very rigid" 
32 
British Military Law and the Death Penalty 1868-1918 
In a recent study of military discipline during the First World War David Englander 
rightly asserted that 'British and Belgian soldiers were more at risk [from capital 
punishment] than either their1 French or German counterparts'.' This contradicts 0. 
existing ideas about both Prussian militarism and popular notions of French military 
justice - or more accurately injustice - such as conveyed by Stanley Kubrick in his 
film Paths of Glory. A comparison of statistics for discipline in the British, French 
and German armies, the three main combatants on the Western Front between 1914 
and 1918, supports Dr. Englander: 'the British condemned more than 3,000 men 
compared with 2,000 in the French army and only 150 in the German army.* Indeed, 
the comparative harshness of the British was especially marked in the case of 
deserters on the Western Front.3 Whilst it should be noted that the number of French * 
soldiers executed (approximately 6004) exceeded that of the British army (officially 
David Englander, 'Mutinies and Military Morale' in Hew Strachan (ed.) The Oxford Illustrated 
History ofthe First World War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), p. 191. I would like to 
acknowledge the enormous debt I owe to Dr. Englander who supervised my research until his tragic 
death. 
Sykes, Shot at Dawn, revised edition (Leo Cooper, London, 1992). Anthony Babington, For the Sake 
of Example, revised edition (Leo Cooper, London, 1993). 
Gerard Oram, Worthless Men: race, eugenics and the death penalty during the First World War 
(Francis Boutle, London, 1998), pp. 51-56. In theatres far from home the British could afford to be less 
severe with deserters who in reality had nowhere to flee to and would inevitably return to their units 
after a short period of time. Disciplinary concerns in these far off places tended to focus on other 
matters such as men sleeping at their posts - an offence for which capital punishment was rarely carried 
out. 
Figures quoted for the French army vary greatly - they are usually cited at anything between 300 and 
700. However, for his recent study, Nicholas Offenstadt, who was granted unprecedented access to the 
I 
William Moore, The Thin Yellow Line (Leo Cooper, London, 1974). Julian Putkowski & Julian 2 
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346, but probably many more5) the two remain comparable given the relative size of 
the armies. Only 48 of the 150 German soldiers condemned by military courts were 
shot. Putting aside for a moment the apparently more oppressive military regimes in 
Eastern Europe and the Italian army, which executed 750 men, the British soldier was 
especially vulnerable amongst those serving on the Western Front. 
On the face of it the British army was not beset by disciplinary problems any more 
than were the other major armies, yet no historian has adequately explained this 
striking difference. This is even more surprising given pervasive British attitudes of 
the time: Germany was castigated as authoritarian and militaristic and France was 
viewed from across the channel as decadent. The French army, so it appeared, was not 
immune from this and its collapse at Sedan was regarded by many in Britain as 
evidence of the moral degeneration of the French, a view seemingly confirmed by the 
chaos-of the Paris Commune. Accordingly, when discipline in the French army 
collapsed in 1917, the British commander, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, 
emphasised what he considered the lack of 'moral qualities' in the French army as its 
major cause.6 Paradoxically, German authoritarianism and militarism had, according 




military records, puts the figure at 600. See Nicholas Offenstadt, 'EnquCte sur les fusiIl6s de 1914-1918' 
in L'histoire, No. 237 (November 1999), p. 65. 
British figures are based on the War Office publication Statistics of the Military Effort of the British 
Empire in the Great War 1914-1920 (HMSO, London, 1922), p. 648. However, this figure does not 
include native labourers, nor does it include Indian troops for whom no official records survive. A 
recent survey of the registers of courts-martial kept by the army has cast doubt on the accuracy of the 
official number of condemnations which, it appears, have been slightly under-estimated. See G. Oram, 
Death Sentences passed by military courts of the British a m y  1914-1924 (Francis Boutle, London, 
1998). The number of executions in the British army, including Indian troops, certainly exceeded 400 
although by how many it is difficult to say. 
1952), p. 234. 
Robert Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 19141919 (Eyre and Spottiswood, London, 
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had a high regard for the discipline of the Prussian army if not their  tactic^.^ Yet these 
continental armies exhibited more tolerance of their soldiers than the supposedly more 
progressive British. Paradoxically, therefore, it was in the country that believed it 
most espoused liberal values that military discipline appears to have taken on its 
harshest form. 
None of this was lost on contemporary observers. In his diary Prince Rupprecht of 
Bavaria commented that: 
The administration,of discipline by the English is very rigid. Whilst on our 
side there is known to me only a single case in which a soldier on account of 
aggravated refusal of duty in the face of the enemy was shot, I gather from a 
compilation of the British orders which have been found, that at least 67 
English soldiers have been shot under martial law in the period between 27 
October 1916 and 30 August 1917.' 
This was an underestimate of British executions during that period, which actually 
numbered eighty-one. Ludendorff famously recorded his envy of Douglas Haig's 
power over matters of discipline and punishment estimating that the real loss to his 
army in terms of manpower ran to tens of thousands.' Indeed, that entry in his 
memoirs, published in 1929, reflected a variation in the stab in the back legend, 
Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1 902 (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
Quoted in Babington, For the Sake of Example, p. 191. 
Moore,The Thin Yellow Line, p. 167. 
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1992), p. 246. 
widely held by former military commanders, that Germany's comparative leniency 
had cost her victory." 
However, the old-fashioned view that British disciplinary harshness was 
attributable to an oppressive and ultimately incompetent High Command will no 
longer do. British commanders, like their German and French equivalents, worked 
within a disciplinary and judicial framework inherited from the nineteenth century.' 
For too long historians have ignored thi.s inheritance, most especially the influence of 
, the parent societies of armies: military discipline, law and organisation should be 
.related to the parent societies. It is no longer sufficient to separate military law from 
a 
I the criminal code as if it had developed organically, isolated from contemporary 
views on criminal behaviour, deviance, punishments and penal policy. It is the 
development of the respective military codes, the context for military discipline and 
' punishments during the First World War, which must now be analysed. 
In this chapter we will discuss the evolution of British military law from the mid- 
nineteenth century to the outbreak of war in 1914, within the wider context of military 
law in other European countries, in particular that of the French and German armies, 0 
and America. It will be shown how the variations in numbers of capital punishments 
inflicted by each army between 1914 and 1918 reflected military traditions and pre- 
existing social structures as well as more general concerns about crime, punishment 
Erich Ludendorff, Kriegfuhrung und Politik, (E. S. Mittler u. Sohn, Berlin, 1922), p. 149. See also IO 
Christoph Jahr, Gewonliche Soldaten. Desertion und Deserteure im deutschen und britischen 
Heer1914-1918 (Vandenhoek & Rupprecht, Gottingen, 1998), p. 330. 
Christoph Jahr excepted, even in recent studies historians have concerned themselves with the 
consequences of the executions rather than the underlying causes. Gary Sheffield, 'Officer-Man 
Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army 1902-22', PhD thesis (King's College, London, 
1994), analyses many of the army's traditions, but has largely avoided military law. The most recent 
publication on the subject of executions, Nicholas Offenstadt, Les Fusillb de la Grande Guerre et la 
Mkmoire Collective 1914-1999 (Editions Odile Jacob, Paris, 1999), as the title suggests, is concerned 
with processes that occurred after the executions rather than before them. 
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and control of the army. It will also be shown that in terms of its military code, far 
from being progressive, Britain lagged behind its continental equivalents in key areas. 
The process by which men were selected for execution, is analysed in a later chapter. 
Here we must focus on the role played by the lawmakers in the history of British 
military executions. British military law was surprisingly stagnant during the war 
years, but other belligerent countries - most significantly Germany - modified their 
codes suggesting, once again, that Britain was relatively less progressive. 
0 The judiciousness of the respective military codes often reflected the status 
ascribed by societies to both the army and to soldiering as a profession. This in turn 
was greatly influenced by the traditional method of recruitment.’* In Britain in 
particular obedience was often deemed to be attainable only through traditional 
concepts of punishment based on fear and deterrence. Indeed, an over-reliance on this 
type of control meant that, come the Great War - by which time corporal punishment 
had been abolished - senior commanders all too readily fell back on capital 
punishment as the sole means of maintaining discipline rather than exploring 
alternatives. e 
i) Background 
The harsh nature of military discipline in Britain owed much to tradition. The 
earliest armies were regulated by Articles of War issued on the prerogative of the 
Crown and valid only for the duration of any given conflict. This power, introduced 
Peter Burroughs, ‘Crime and Punishment in the British army, 1815-1870’ in English Historical 
Review, No. 386, Vol. C (July 1985), pp. 545-571, argues that improved recruiting procedures after 
1870 led to a reduction in the incidence of offences (p. 571). 
3 1  
by William I, was not superseded until the nineteenth-century. But if military law 
seemingly became more the concern of parliament than of the Sovereign, the Crown 
was still able to exert considerable influence in this area, playing the 'apolitical' card 
to great effect - the army shared with the Crown a (mythical) status that supposedly 
transcended politics. The nature of these earlier Articles was pejoratively described in 
a military manual of 1914 as being 'of excessive severity, inflicting death or loss of 
limb for almost every crirne'.l3 Ironically, a certain amount of this severity was to 
return in the years that followed. 
)The peacetime army, thanks to the British aversion to a standing army - originating 
during the late seventeenth centuryI4, did not exist in a modern sense and no 
regulations were thought necessary beyond what was covered by criminal and civil 
law. This changed, however, shortly after the so-called Glorious Revolution 
whereupon the Mutiny Act was passed in 1689. The object of this annually renewable 
act, which made mutiny and desertion a capital offence, remained largely unchanged 
until 1878. It did, however, undergo a series of refinements each reflecting the 
circumstances of the time. The Act, often allowed to lapse during times of peace, was 
frequently re-introduced, usually with an extension of its jurisdiction to include 
overseas territories as the army's garrison duties expanded around the globe. The 
Mutiny Act finally superseded the prerogative power to make Articles of War towards 
the end of the Peninsular War in 1813 and remained in force, largely unaltered until 
. 
0 
Manual ofMiZitay Law, 1914 edition (HMSO, 1914), p. 7. 13 
l 4  The British aversion to a standing army developed during the period of Charles I and Cromwell 
when princes such as Louis XIV were creating them. The aversion was again apparent during the 
Restoration, after the Glorious Revolution and again during the eighteenth century. 
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our period despite ongoing debates about the nature and origins of military crime 
during the early nineteenth century.15 
Increasingly concerned by what it perceived as a drunkenness problem in the army 
the British government ordered an inquiry into military discipline in March 1868 
under the tutelage of the Right Honourable John Wilson Patten MP, colonel of the 
Royal Lancashire Militia. It is clear from the evidence, however, that the Committee 
was uncertain about how to maintain discipline and control of the army in the event of 
the abolition of corporal punishment. Flogging (the usual nomenclature) had been 
partially abolished in 1867 following the death of Private Robert Slim from such 
punishment,16 but it remained available as a punishment during peacetime for crimes 
of mutiny or insubordination involving violence and during wartime it was extended 
to cover desertion and even drunkenness. For a decade the army used flogging 
sparingly, but its re-emergence as a common punishment in Zululand in 1879 
attracted the attention of Liberal politicians, including Gladstone, who rejected the 
'necessary deterrent' argument and denounced the practice as anachronistic. The 
number of lashes was initially reduced by Parliament before its final abolition in 
1881.17 
The shift away from traditional style punishments such as flogging during the late 
1860s reflected a similar trend favouring a more progressive penal policy, which, 
aided bv a statistical reduction in the crime rate. can also be detected in the criminal 
l5 For an analysis of the debate surrounding military crime at this time see Burroughs, 'Crime and 
Punishment in the British army'. 
l 6  Spiers, The Late Victorian Amy ,  p. 73. 
l7 Spiers, The Late Victorian Amy ,  p. 74. 
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code.I8 Public whippings for criminal offences had been abolished in 1862 and the 
last public execution was carried out in 1868, largely thanks to growing public 
disquiet at the effects on society of such punishments. l 9  The effects on offenders 
were, however, of less concern and in the 1860s penal policy did assume a harsher 
character once again, especially with the introduction of the draconian 'Garotters' Act 
1863, which allowed for the administration of up to fifty lashes on prisoners convicted 
of violent offences. This was partly a response to the virtual end of transportation in 
the 1850s and a corresponding perceived rise in violent crime.*' Britain was the last e- 
-Western European country to cling to whipping as a punishment and in both the 
' criminal and military codes we must look to Eastern Europe to find parallels. The 
number of floggings in English local prisons remained fairly constant (approximately 
155 per annum) during the late nineteenth century, although a significant reduction 
was noted in 1894.2' There was considerable concern about the number of corporal 
punishments and it was becoming increasingly clear to British military observers that 
the days of flogging in the army were also numbered. But concerns about how to 
control unruly soldiers closely mirrored the fears aroused by the end of transportation 
- pundits believed, after all, that most troops were drawn from that same criminal 
class. The need to find a suitable alternative became the focus of the subsequent 
report. 
'* Howard Taylor, 'The Politics of the Rising Crime Statistics of England and Wales, 1914-1960' in 
Crime, histoire et socie'tks/Crime, History and Societies 1998, no. 1, vol. 2, p. 6. 
l 9  Martin J. Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law and policy in England, 1830-1914 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990), pp. 92-1 01. 
2o Clive Emsley, Crime and Society in England 17.50-1900, 2"d edition (Longman, London, 1996), pp. 
276-277. 
Sean McConville, Next Only to Death: English local Prisons 1860-1900 (Routledge, London, 1995), 21 
p. 246. 
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The report, published in two parts duringl869;* set in motion a process of yet 
further inquiry and eventually reform, culminating in the annually renewable Army 
Act of 1881 - the basis for the regulation of the British, Dominion and Empire armies 
during the Great War. This process coincided not only with the changing attitude 
towards crime and punishment, but also with a growing realisation amongst military 
pundits that the changing nature of warfare would necessitate an enlargement of the 
army, control of which became a serious concern. Although the report provides a 
unique insight into perceptions about army recruits, discipline and punishment in 
Victorian Britain, it has received little attention from historians. Before arriving at its 
conclusions the Committee examined military law in other countries, including 
France and Prussia, and whilst this evidence tells us more about how the British army 
viewed its continental neighbours, it remains a useful starting point for a comparison 
of military codes across Europe. 
ii) Inquiry and Reform 1865-1881 
The various European military codes had much in common. Nowhere was the final 
arbiter of military justice a judicial or legal appointee. In some countries (Britain, 
Austria-Hungary, Italy) the Commander-in-Chief of the army performed this function 
during wartime. In others, France for example, the head of state theoretically held this 
position. Of course in some cases (Russia, Prussia) the head of state was also the 
Commander-in-Chief of the army making such distinctions superfluous. This had 
important implications in Britain where the role of the Judge Advocate General 
22 The Report of the Courts-Martial Commission 1869, hereafter referred to as either The First Report 
or The Second Report. 
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(JAG), who oversaw the process of military justice, had come under considerable 
scrutiny in the mid-nineteenth century. Army commanders had become increasingly 
concerned at the growing influence of the JAG and saw a threat to their authority if 
judicial considerations were given priority over disciplinary ones.23 This too was 
common in other European armies. In Russia, for example, a Judge Advocate 
(procureur rnilitaire) attended courts-martial to prosecute only and did not act in a 
judicial capacity.24 Typically, in the late nineteenth-century Habsburg army, where 
courts were composed of.representatives of all ranks - an exceptional practice not 0 
continued after the turn of the century - a MiZitHrauditor, who was a qualified lawyer, 
performed a range of legal tasks, but could only make recommendations to the 
military judges. According to one historian 'the [Habsburg] army managed to prevent 
any serious tampering with its Ijudicial]  privilege^'.^^ This reflected practices in 
almost every other European army. The role of non-military persons or departments 
was invariably restricted to purely administrative duties. Nowhere did these civil 
servants wrest a modicum of judicial authority from the military no matter how well 
qualified they were.26 
The British army always resisted any suggestion of political interference. 
Invariably, this was cloaked in the notion of the army's apolitical status, but in reality 
it amounted to a rejection of external control. The army's judicial processes were not 
immune from this. For instance, Lord Wolseley (Commander in Chief 1895- 1900) 
G. R. Rubin, 'Parliament, Prerogative and Military Law: who had legal authority over the army in the 
The Second Report, p. 216. 
23 
later nineteenth century?' in Legal History, Vol. 18, No. 1 (April 1997), pp. 45-84. 
2s Istvtin Detik, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg OfJicer Corps 
1848-1918 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992), p. 146. 
24 
The Second Report, pp. 21 1-223. 26 
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'repudiated the idea of civil rights for soldiers as essentially mischievous and 
rnisc~nceived' .~~ Wolseley's successor, Lord Roberts, faced accusations of exercising 
'despotic power' by removing Colonel Kinlock from his command of the 1' Battalion, 
Grenadier Guards, in a way that had circumvented the normal rules of procedure. It 
was not, the Duke of Bedford told the Upper-Chamber on 28 April 1903, merely 'a 
matter of military law or military procedure. It is a question of the infringement of the 
provisions of an Act of Parliament'.28 But political interference, from whatever 
quarter, was invariably resisted to preserve the army's putative independence. As Lord 
Harris retorted one week later: 
e 
The whole object of the authority which is given to the Commander-in-Chief, 
and to commanders of units, will, it seems to me, be imperilled if noble Lords 
[such as Bedford] are encouraged to take the opportunity of membership of 
this House to call in question the decisions of the Commander-in-Chief on 
military  matter^.^' 
By 1914 the disciplinary power of the Commander-in-Chief remained unalloyed 
having survived threats from lawyers and politicians alike. 
Other similarities between European armies included a hierarchical system of 
courts-martial with varying jurisdiction. Officers were normally only tried by the 
highest form of military court. However, in Italy there was no permanent court with 
27 Rubin, 'Parliament, Prerogative and Military Law', p. 75. 
2a Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), vol. CXXI, column 618. 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), vol. CXXI, column 1 177. 29 
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jurisdiction to try officers, reflecting the. rarity of such trials. This casts some doubt on 
the principle enshrined in the code that the 'private and general are equal before the 
c~urt-martial ' .~~ It was also universally accepted that judicial procedure gave way to 
military expediency during wartime when it was usual for courts, often known as 
drum-head courts, to be convened in the field.31 
Courts-martial in the Habsburg army operated on a three tier system with the 
second and third tiers acting as a court of appeal and a supreme court of appeal 
respectively. The uppermost court did not possess any power to increase sentences, 
but acted purely as a safety valve. Prisoners did have a right to make any 'reasonable 
e 
objection' to.members of the tribunal - a provision also available to British troops3*. 
The court was also obliged to provide am interpreter if proceedings were not held in 
the language spoken by the accused. This reflected the sort of problems faced by the 
multi-ethnic army, but masks the racial aspect of discipline in the Habsburg army 
during the war: Attempts to 'Germanize' the Austro-Hungarian army in the reforms of 
1912 revealed deep-seated mistrust of other troops, particularly ethnic Serbs and 
Croats who tended to experience a harsher form of discipline in much the same way, 0 
as Poles in the German army suffered most from military a~thor i t ies .~~ Sentences 
passed by Austro-Hungarian courts were announced with much ceremony. Usually, 
the president would draw his sword and trumpeters sounded a call three times. If a 
30 Report of Colonel W. Claremont in The Second Report, p. 222. 
The Second Report, pp. 21 1-223. 
The Army Act 1881, s. 51 allowed British soldiers to 'object, for any reasonable cause, to any 
member of the court, including the president . . .'. 
33 Geoffrey Wawro, 'Morale in the Austro-Hungarian Army: The Evidence of Habsburg Army 
Campaign Reports and Allied Intelligence Officers' in Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (eds), Facing 
Armageddon: The First World War Experienced (Leo Cooper, London, 1997), p. 400. Also Benjamin 





sentence of death was promulgated then the president was expected to break a staff in 
front of the condemned man. This was usually done away with during times of war 
when military expediency took over and the military code allowed for individuals to 
'be tried at once by 'drum-head' court-martial, and the sentence carried out on the 
spot'. Interestingly, the Austrian code allowed for decimation, i.e. 'death by shooting, 
inflicted on every tenth man by lot'.34 Russian courts-martial were also hierarchical, 
but appeal - directly to the Emperor - was only allowed on grounds of illegality. 
During wartime sweeping powers were granted to the Commander-in-Chief 'for the 
purpose of facilitating the administration of justice in cases of ne~ess i ty ' .~~  One such 
measure adopted by the Russian army during the war was the re-introduction of 
flogging in ,1915. This, according to a survey of mail censorship, caused deep 
resentment amongst the troops. 36 
I The Ital'ian military code was passed in 1869 and was based on its Sardinian 
predecessor (1840). It was particularly harsh, particularly with its very broad 
definition of desertion. During the First World War, Cadorna, the Italian Commander- 
in-Chief, made ample use of this in imposing a brutal disciplinary regime on his 
troops.37 Military crimes, which included desertion and insubordination, were 
punishable by being shot in front, but so-called 'dishonourable' crimes such as treason 
or murder were punishable by being shot in the buck. Sentences were normally carried 
out within twenty-four hours, but sentences passed by extraordinary drum-head courts 
34 Report of Colonel Hope-Crealock in The Second Report, p. 212. 
36 Irina Davidian, 'The Russian Soldier's Morale from the Evidence of Tsarist Military Censorship' in 
Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (eds), Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced (Leo 
Cooper, London, 1997), p. 429. 
37 John Gooch, 'Morale and Discipline in the Italian Army, 1915-1918' in Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle 
(eds), Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced (Leo Cooper, London, 1997), p. 439. 
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- including death sentences - were carried out summarily and 'ad modum This 
allowed Cadorna to apply strict discipline from the moment of Italy's entry to the war. 
In July 1915 he warned that 'every soldier . . . must be convinced that his superior has 
the scared duty to shoot all cowards and recalcitrants im~nediately'.~~ This was not an 
empty threat and during the war a total of 4,028 men were condemned with 750 
e~ecuted.~' Summary executions were not uncommon, especially after Caporetto, and 
Cadorna resorted to sacking generals (217 of them) and decimation amongst the 
troops. 41 
Despite the common heritage of much European law - not to mention military 
tradition - differences did exist and these often reflected the parent society. British 
observers reported, with apparent envy, on the French system which allowed for the 
removal of the persistent offender into a compagnie de discipline and the reputed bad 
character into light infantry units in Algeria 'so that he may not taint his old comrades 
by going back into their ranks'.?* This aspect of French military justice, enshrined in 
the 1857 code, reflected the concept of the 'dangerous classes' familiar to those 
concerned with national security in France since 1840. This is now most usually 
associated with the period of the Paris Commune when police and army alike were 
fearful of 'an uncontrollable and destructive rising of the "lower depths"' .43 Control 
of the army in such circumstances was understandably considered crucial, and the 
38 The Second Report, p. 22 1. 
39 Cited in Gooch, 'Morale and Discipline in the Italian Army', p. 436. 
40 Englander, 'Mutinies and Military Morale', p. 192. 
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42 The Second Report, p. 223. 
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military code allowed for the swift removal of soldiers who fell into this category. 
Extensive use was made of this provision and executions were certainly not unheard 
of during the revolutionary decades in the middle of the nineteenth century: eighty- 
four men were executed between 1833 and 1851. Significantly, most of these 
occurred in units in North Africa. On the other hand about a third of French courts- 
martial resulted in acquittals44 - a rare finding in the British army.45 
The British army possessed some experience of penal battalions, but it had not been 
a good one. For a period of ten years beginning in 1816 commanders could send 
troublesome individuals to serve in so called 'condemned corps'. These were located 
in unhealthy locations such as West Africa where disease was rife and such a posting 
was tantamount to a death sentence. Concerns about the inhumanity of the practice led 
to it being abandoned in 1826 in favour of transportation. There was a growing 
feeling, however, that transportation was increasingly seen as rewarding offenders 
rather than as punishment. It was abandoned in 1857 and penal servitude in t rod~ced .~~  
The severity of the Prussian code was viewed with some envy from Horse Guards. 
. 
- 
Undoubtedly there was a genuine regard for Prussian-style discipline, but it is also 
likely that Prussian military prowess during the 1860s had boosted the army's 
reputation. This admiration increased after the Franco-Prussian War when the 
draconian Prussian code was contrasted with the lenient French code seemingly 
confirming the view that linked military efficiency to strict discipline. The British 
44 Paddy Griffith, Military Thought in the French Army 1815-51 (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1989), p.172. 
45 Fewer than 8 per cent of British courts-martial resulted in acquittal during the First World War. 
Statistics of the Military Effort, p. 645. 
Burroughs. 'Crime and Punishment in the British armv'. 0.560. 46 
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military attach6 responsible for the compilation of the report on the Prussian code was 
impressed by the sentence of 'loss of nobility' and all that it implied. He was equally 
impressed with the power granted to commanders summarily to inflict corporal 
punishments and the life-long disgrace that went with dismissal from the army.47 
Indeed, notions of honour pervaded the Prussian code and only executions for military 
offences were performed by the honourable method of a firing squad. Otherwise, 
death was inflicted by beheading. 
Such comparisons and the envy they provoked from British military observers took 
no account of the differences in attitudes towards the army in each society. In Prussia 
soldiering was considered a noble and worthy profession - hence the disgrace 
resulting from dismissal from the army. The French army inherited much of its 
identity from its revolutionary and Napoleonic predecessors: the poilu was ideally an 
'Intelligent Bayonet' - a concept partly formed from a reaction against so-called 
Prussian automata - and the State assumed a paternal responsibility towards those it 
compelled to serve in the ranks.48 In Britain the difference could not be more marked. 
Far from being an honourable profession soldiering was considered worthless by most 
classes, but most especially among the working class who regarded the army as a 
refuge for drunkards and criminals rather than a respectable trade. Hunger was the 
most effective of recruiting sergeants and it was no coincidence that the Irish 
disproportionately filled the ranks even of nominally English  regiment^.^' The Duke 
. 
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of Wellington’s comments that ‘the French system of conscription brings together a 
fair sample of all classes; ours is composed of the scum of the earth - the mere scum 
of the earth’50 remained equally relevant at the end of the century. 
The resentment felt by some towards the army was magnified by the deployment of 
the military during the industrial disputes before the First World War, particularly 
following the shooting at Featherstone colliery in 1893 and again in 1911, when 
soldiers shot dead two protestors at Llanelli. This latter incident enlivened the 
subsequent debate over the annually renewable Army Act. Labour MP, George 
Lansbury, told the Commons that ‘the Army was being used in a murderous manner. 
whenever the capitalist class became too much alarmed’. Other members pointed to 
the misuse of the army: radical Liberal MP, Josiah Wedgwood, accused the 
government of using troops as ‘blacklegs to run trains’. The mistrust of the army 
towards their working-class recruits was also revealed with Keir Hardie, Labour MP 
for Merthyr Tydfil, informing the Commons that territorial troops who were also 
colliers had their rifles taken from them when deployed at industrial disputes.” An 
atmosphere of mutual suspicion hung over the relationship between the army and the 
working classes from which the former sought its recruits. 
It was in this context that British army discipline had evolved. The result was a 
form of discipline that was particularly harsh as this was believed to be the only 
effective means of ordering men drawn from the very bottom strata of society. 
However, the challenge to traditional ideas on punishments such as flogging was 
forcing the army to explore alternatives. There were three forms of serious 
Cited in Burroughs, ‘Crime and Punishment in the British army’, p. 548. 50 
5’  Parliamentary debate on the Army (Annual) Bill reported in The Times, 11 April 1912. 
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YEAR No. imprisoned No. flogged 
1865 16,804 60 1 
1866 19,257 5 10 
1867 19,854 150 
punishment available to Victorian courts-martial: imprisonment, flogging and 
marking (known also as branding, this was abolished in 1871) - whereby the prisoner 
was 'marked' with a letter 'D' for deserter or 'BC' for bad character. Analysis of 
punishments handed out by British courts-martial during the three years prior to the 





towards imprisonment at the expense of flogging (see figure 1).52 However, it is 
apparent that the army was still making wide use of flogging despite its imminent 
abolition. 
Figure 1: Punishments inflicted by British courts-martial 1865-186753 
0 
Interestingly, the practice of marking had increased. Possibly some men who would 
otherwise have been flogged found themselves marked instead, but the most likely 
explanation of the dramatic rise in marking soldiers is that this represented an attempt 
by the army to ensure that unwanted recruits did not re-enlist after flogging had been 
partially abolished in 1867. The commissioners unwittingly alluded to this when they 
attempted to justify the unpopular practice, stating 'the real object of marking is not 
52 Soldiers could be sentenced to imprisonment with or without hard labour. The court could also 
sentence them to solitary confinement, again with or without hard labour. The figures presented here 
are an aggregate of all these categories. Only a minority (just over 600 in each year) underwent solitary 
confinement. 




the punishment of the offender but the protection of the 
though, is the comparatively little use made of the power to discharge offenders: there 
were only 106, 122 and 184 discharges in each respective year,” reflecting ongoing 
concerns about poor manpower levels.56 The British army’s reluctance to give up 
corporal punishments contrasts with the French army where corporal punishment had 
long been interdicted, and the Austro-Hungarian army where the flogging of recruits 
was abolished in 1868.57 Istvin Deik has shown that a high proportion of courts- 
martial in the Habsburg army concerned cases of brutality against  subordinate^.^^ This 
I I might suggest a general move away from violent disciplinary punishment during this 
liberal era in the Dual-Monarchy. 
More striking, 
0 
This clinging to flogging. and the branding of offenders was not exclusive to the 
. _  
British. Russian courts-martial could order corporal punishments to be administered 
summarily in the presence of a soldier’s company or battalion.59 Elsewhere corporal 
punishments were less apparent: most armies only allowed for some form of restraint 
rather than flogging. The procedure adopted in the Dual Monarchy after 1868 was to 
fix prisoners to an object such as a post or a tree by way of rings attached to the 
ankles and wrists.60 
The Courts-Martial Commission concluded that existing punishments needed to be 
strengthened with more use being made of military prisons. Imprisonment, they 
The Second Report, p. x. See also Burroughs, ‘Crime and Punishment in the British army’, p. 570. 
Appendix to The Second Report, pp. 255-278. 
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5 5  
56 Edward M. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914 (Longman, London, 1980) p. 37. ’’ The Second Report, p. 212. 
5 8  Deik, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and political History of the Habsburg Oflcer Corps, p. 147. 
59 Report on the Various Methods of Punishment adopted by Foreign Armies in the Field (1879), PRO 
W032/6045, pp. 2-3. Hereafter referred to as The Ellice Report. 
The Ellice Report, p. 5.  60 
5 1  
suggested, 'should be made as severe and deterrent as a due regard for the health of 
the prisoner and the laws of humanity will permit'.6' Otherwise fines, which could be 
used to fund 'rewards to well conducted men' and greater use of the power to 
discharge men who were 'beyond the power of reformation' were proposed.62 
However, no immediate alterations were made to the manner in which the army 
was regulated and the Mutiny Act remained the key statute, continuing to reflect 
traditional ideas about discipline. For example, the 1876 version outlined a number of 
military offences for which the death penalty could be applied. These included 
mutiny, sedition, desertion, cowardice, sleeping at or leaving a post, striking or using 
, violence towards a superior officer and di~obedience.~~ It also established rules for the 
constitution of courts-martial and laid down procedures for the execution of 
sentences. The power of any court-martial to inflict corporal punishments was 
retained,64 but only during times of war and with an upper limit of fifty lashes.65 Such 
0 
I .  
1 t  
. a sentence could be commuted to not more than forty-two days imprisonment or 
twenty days and twenty-five lashes.66 Clearly corporal punishment continued to be 
considered an essential element in the maintenance of military discipline. 0 
The legislators had recognised that special powers were required in times of war 
and special provision was also included with regard to the death penalty. Only the 
highest form of court - the General Court-Martial - was granted the power to impose a 
sentence of death. This type of court was constituted of no fewer than nine 
The First Report, p. viii. 
The First Report, pp. ix-x. 
Mutiny Act, Section 15. 
Mutiny Act, Section 23. 
Mutiny Act, Section 22. 








commissioned officers (no upper limit), at least two-thirds of whom had to concur for 
a sentence of death to be 
transferred to a Detachment General Court-Martial during wartime with a reduced 
Provision was made for these powers to be 
constitution of at least three commissioned officers. To avoid any political 
involvement sentences had to be confirmed by the Monarch or, during active service, 
the Commander-in-Chief. There remained no right of appeal and, therefore, no appeal 
court. 
The Army Council re-considered military discipline in 1879, ordering another 
. report on punishments in other armies. Little had altered in the decade separating the. 
two reports, but one significant change had occurred in Germany. The Prussian code, 
so admired by British generals, had been replaced with an altogether more progressive 
German one in 1872.. The death penalty was retained, but soldiers received greater 
protection from the new code. The-administration of law was the responsibility of the 
Kriegsgerichtsrat (Judge-Advocate), under the jurisdiction of the Oberquartiermeister 
(Administrative Staff), attached to the General S taff.68 Furthermore, German soldiers 
were granted legal rights, Rechsstaatlichkeit, as protection from abuses of authority. e 
However, for some reason this information was not considered worthy of inclusion in 
the report. 
The report, compiled by General Sir Charles Ellice, largely confirmed the findings 
of the 1869 Inquiry, but had to take account of the new German code and the 
American one. Ellice identified twelve capital crimes in the German code including 
Mutiny Act, Section 8. 61 '* The Handbook of the German Army in War, January 191 7 (EP Publishing, Wakefield, 1973) pp. 30 - 
37. Also, Militarstrafgesetzbuchfir das Deutsche Reich vom 20. Juni 1872 (Berlin, 1912). 
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repeated desertion. A sole act of desertion, however, even if committed in the field, 
was punishable by a maximum of ten years impri~onment.~’ Curiously, he omitted the 
offence of leaving a watch, contained in the German code (a similar offence, 
abandoning a post was a capital crime in the French army only if it was committed in 
the presence of the enemy). Like its French equivalent the German code allowed for 
the removal of individual offenders to penal battalions, but unlike the British in 
neither the French nor the German armies was the offence of sleeping on post 
considered sufficiently serious to merit the death penalty. 
The existence and use of penal battalions remained an important feature of the 
codes of a number of continental armies during the war. The French and German 
armies made considerable use of them. But they were never re-introduced by the 
British, who preferred to allocate menial and dangerous tasks such as transportation, 
digging trenches and clearing ordnance to labourers recruited from Africa, India or 
China. Even black West Indian troops, who had volunteered to fight, found 
themselves more often than not allocated to these unpopular duties. It seems likely 
that ideas about ‘race’ had clouded the view of many in charge of organisation and the 
distribution of manpower in the British army.” Significantly, the British were unable 
to learn from their alliance partners. The Belgian army, which had executed thirteen 
soldiers during the first year of the war, introduced penal battalions to avoid the need 
to carry out more. 
The Ellice Report, p. 5. The twelve capital offences listed by Ellice are: treason, unjustifiable 69 
surrender, repeated desertion, instigating a conspiracy to desert, deserting a post in the presence of the 
enemy, cowardice, disobedience, assaulting a superior, instigating a mutiny, participating in a mutiny, 
plundering (only if accompanied by killing) and breach of parole by POWs. 
’O David Englander, ‘Manpower in the British Army, 1914-1918’ in Gerard Canini (ed.), Les Front 
Znvisibles (Presse Universitaires de Nancy, 1984), pp. 93- 102. 
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British policy, though, exhibited a cmtinuing faith in deterrence which pre-dated 
the war. General Ellice’s report of 1879 had drawn attention to Article 54 of the 1874 
American Articles of War, which prohibited both flogging and branding, adding with 
apparent satisfaction that previously the United States had been forced to re-introduce 
flogging for deserters. Although corporal punishment was finally abolished in the 
American army in 1861, Ellice drew attention to the Judge-Advocate-General’s 
remarks which allowed for other physical punishments: 
courts-martial must needs often draw upon the customs of the service for a 
penalty which shall insure the description of a corporal punishment. Thus, the 
accused may be adjudged to carry a loaded knapsack for a certain time, stand 
on a barrel, or suffer any other ignominy which would naturally result in a 
degree of bodily pain or fatigue, provided the same were not excessive and 
physically injurious.” 
American military law at this time can still be regarded as a direct descendant of 
the British code. As such it was not as tightly constructed as the German code. Wide- 
ranging powers were bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief in times of war. For 
example, capital punishment was permissible, but the restrictions imposed by Article 
47 could easily be bypassed: 
Ellice Report, p. 2. 71 
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No sentence of a Court-Martial or Military Commission, inflicting the 
punishment of death, shall be carried into execution until it shall have been 
confirmed by the President; except in the cases of persons convicted, in time 
of war, as spies, mutineers, deserters, or murderers, and in the cases of 
guerrilla marauders convicted in time of war, of robbery, burglary, arson, rape, 
assault with intent to commit rape, or of violation of the laws and customs of 
war; and in such excepted cases the sentence of death may be carried into 
execution upon confirmation of the Commanding General in the field, or the 
Commandertof the geographical division or department, as the case may be.72 
However, there were signs that the American code was detaching itself from its 
heredity. Unlike the British code, the American Articles did at least envisage a role 
for a political person such as the President. This represented the start of a movement 
away from. an old British tradition and towards a military code with a distinctly 
American identity - a process not completed until 1916 when a new military code was 
approved in time for America's entry into the First World War. Perhaps Ellice was 
unaware of this development or had attached no importance to it, but other 
'modernising' provisions were present in the 1874 Articles. As well as an allowance 
for adjournments there was an increased role for the Judge-Advocate-General who 
could be appointed to any court-martial. This direct role for a judicial rather than a 
military figure was a sure sign that the emphasis was beginning to shift from the 
disciplinary function of the court-martial to one of a dispenser of justice. David 
'* Ellice Report, p. 2. 
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Schleuter has remarked that these provisions ‘marked to some extent an increased 
realization [sic] by Congress that due process considerations should apply’.73 The 
exigencies of the war forced the British army belatedly to introduce similar 
provisions, but not by Act of Parliament. However, the Army Council’s creation of 
thirty-four Court-Martial-Offi~ers’~ (CMO) - legally trained personnel who could 
attend trials to ensure their legality - in 1916 had little impact: condemnations 
continued apace during 1916 and 1917.’’ Nor did the creation of the post appease 
critics in the Labour Party - arguably its true purpose. * 
Developments across the Atlantic passed-by the British legislators, who clung 
1 firmly to tradition. The Army Discipline and Regulation (Annual) Act of 1879, whch 
parliament had to approve annually, rationalised the disparate military law under one 
statute, but it was not until the 1881 version that flogging was finally abolished 
(Section 6). Other punishments - bearing an uncanny resemblance to those of the 
Austrian army - were introduced instead (Section 4), revealing the influence of other 
European models.76 These entailed handcuffing offenders to a cart or wagon or 
requiring them to carry extra weights known as ‘burdens’.77 However, here the army 
was clearly out of step with the criminal code where the use of irons or other 
mechanical restraints as punishments had been forbidden by the Prison Act, 1865, 
e 
l3 David A. Schleuter, ‘The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey’ in Military Law Review, Vol. 87 
(1980), p.154. 
p. 323. 
equivalent to a monthly average of 75. ’‘ Army Discipline and Regulation (Annual) Act 1881. 
77 Draft Rules as to Summary Punishments Proposed to be made by the Secretary of State under 
Section 4 of the Army Discipline and Regulation (Annual) Bill 1881-2. 
Gerald B. Hurst, ‘The Administration of Military Law’ in Contemporary Review, Vol. CXV (1919), 





except in exceptional circumstances - themselves the subject of further restrictions in 
1893.78 
OFFENCE 
iii) Laying the Foundations 1881-1914 
The Army Act, also passed in 1881 and renewable annually, was the culmination of 
the process of inquiry and was intended to reform and modernise British military law. 
Yet it bore a closer relationship to earlier British models and to those of the old 
empires in Eastern Europe than it did to the more progressive ones in Western 
Europe. The Act outlined a total of twenty-seven capital offences - twelve were 
e ' O  
4 (2) ' 
punishable by death at any time and fifteen were so punishable on active service only. 
Shamefully casting away arms in the presence of the enemy 
These are summarised in figures 2 and 3: 
4 (3) Corresponding with the enemy 
Abandohing post 
4 (4) Assisting the enemy 
4 ( 5 )  
4 (7) 
7 (1) 
Whilst a prisoner of war, serving with enemy forces 
Cowardice before the enemy 
Causing a mutiny 
7 (2) 
7 (3) 
Inciting others to mutiny 
Joining a mutiny 




Failing to inform C.O. of mutiny 
Striking or threatening to strike a senior officer 
9 (1) 
Figure 3: Offences only punishable by death if committed on active service 
Disobedience 
SECTION OFFENCE 
Commission of an act which imperils H. M. Forces 
Leaving C. 0. to go in search of plunder 
Leaving a guard, picquet, patrol or post 
Forcing a safeguard 
Striking a soldier acting as sentinel 
Impeding Provost Marshal 
Act of violence towards person bringing provisions ’ 
Housebreaking 
Causing false alarms 
Treacherously revealing the parole or watchword 
Misappropriation of provisions 
Whilst sentinel: sleeping or drunk on post 
5 (1) (k) (ii.) Whilst sentinel: leaving a post 
Desertion 
Inciting others to desert 
Capital punishment remained available for a wide range of offences, both military 
and criminal. Of particular interest here is the inclusion of certain criminal offences 
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such as housebreaking, which had ceased to be a capital crime in the criminal code 
some decades earlier. This is an unambiguous indication of the status ascribed to 
British troops and the nature of the concerns about their anticipated behaviour. 
Indeed, during the First World War there were a number of death sentences passed on 
British soldiers for housebreaking, robbery and even four (unlawfully) for being 
drunk.79 The Army Act also created a greater number of capital offences than existed 
in the French or German armies illustrating what is perhaps the most important 
difference between European military codes: the fundamental question of offences 
.and punishments. These varied more widely than is often thought by historians. 
Therefore, simple comparisons of death sentence statistics without some analysis of 
a 
the respective codes are wholly unsatisfactory. What was a capital offence in one 
army was not necessarily punishable by death in another: sleeping on post, 
, abandoning a post or single acts of desertion most notably. 
Furthermore, capital offences were variously constructed and defined in different 
armies. Take, for instance, the crime of desertion, which according to a British 
pamphlet of 1916, was 'at any time a serious one, but more especially so when the 
deserter's regiment is on active service'.'' In fact desertion accounted for 
approximately seventy-five per cent of the executions in the British army between 
1914 and 1920. A British soldier was guilty of desertion if he: 
0 
Oram, Death Sentences, p. 15. 79 
8o Captain Francis F. Grierson, The A.B.C. of Military Law: a concise guide for the use of oficers, 
N.C.O.3 and men (T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1916), p. 52. 
a) Deserts [that is intends to avoid a particular duty] or attempts to desert Her 
[or His] Majesty's service; or 
b) Persuades, endeavours to persuade, procures or attempts to procure, any 
person subject to military law to desert Her Majesty's service. 
And: 
if he committed such offence when on active service or under orders for active 
service, [he shall] be liable to suffer death, or such less punishment as is in this 
Act mentioned. * 
I 
The French code was not so straightforward and broke the offence into two types: 
dbertion ci Z'ennemie and dbertion u Z'inte'rieur. Only the former was punishable by 
death with the lesser offence of dkssertion ci I'inthieur attracting a maximum penalty 
of five years penal servitude even in time of war. The German code of 1872, as 
opposed to the Prussian code, also regarded desertion as a more complex affair than 
the British: in the German army offenders could only be sentenced to death in the case 
of recidivists who had previously been convicted of the offence.** Like the Italian 
code, British military law constructed the crime of desertion in very broad terms. Like 
e 
~ ~ ~~ ~ 
" Army Act 1881, Section 12.1 as published in The Public General Actspassed in the forty-jiourth and 
forty-fiflh years of the reign of Her Majesty Queen Victoria (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1881), p. 
209. '' Militarstrafgesetzbuch fur das Deutsche Reich von 20. Juni 1872 (Berlin, 1912). 
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the Italian army, British commanders took advantage of this in strictly enforcing 
discipline during the war. 
Paradoxically, therefore, Britain had adopted a harsher military code than the mass 
armies of its European neighbours with Germany and France legislating for a greater 
degree of tolerance, particularly in the case of desertion. The reasons for this are not 
so elusive as might appear. Britain had retained the voluntary principle as the basis for 
recruitment and with it came a crucial difference in attitudes towards absenteeism. In 
France and Germany a certain degree of desertion was tolerated, expected even, 
amongst soldiers who had been compelled to serve. This was reflected in the . 
separation of the different types of desertion identified by the French code and the 
corresponding leniency of sentence in the case of men convicted of dLsertion h 
I'inte'rieur and in the German principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit. For the British, 
* 
however, no such tolerance was considered necessary for men who had enlisted of 
their own volition. 
This relationship between the voluntary principle and the brutal nature of military 
punishments themselves was also the subject of parliamentary debate. Those 
responsible for army discipline argued for the efficacy of such punishments based on 
the assumption that deterrence was the most effective means of regulating working- 
class recruits - an assumption frequently challenged by those on the Left. On 10 April 
1912 Joseph King, Labour MP for Somerset North, told a House of Commons 
Committee: 
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Moreover, we practically alone among the nations of the world have volunteer 
forces, and by that means are guarded against possible dangerous offences 
which may be even common in other armies. In view of the state, not only of 
public opinion, but of our army in particular, I venture to say that offences 
under the Army Act might well be met by lighter penalties than at present. 83 
Colonel Seely's reply for the Government reflected traditional concerns about a 
standing army. He stated that severemeasures, although rarely applied, needed to be 
available because of 'the danger to the community that would occur from 
insubordination on the parts of any body in the army'. John Ward, Liberal MP for 
0 
Stoke-on-Trent and Chairman of the National Democratic League, added that the 
'death penalty was, perhaps, the only penalty for mutiny on active service' [my italics]. 
But according to Sir F. Banbury, Conservative MP for the City of London, it was not 
necessary to subject officers to such punishments. The threat of dismissal, he said, 
was sufficient for an officer because 'dismissal meant disgrace and ruin for the rest of 
his days'.84 Differentiation such as this reflected long-established military traditions 
and was reminiscent of the 'loss of nobility' sentence contained in the old Prussian 
code that had so impressed British observers decades earlier. 
Other traditions also influenced the nature of military law. In its criminal code 
Britain was consistently more reliant on capital punishment than most other European 
countries. During the period 1900 - 1914 there were on average twenty-seven death 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), vol. XXXVI, column 1286. Also reported in The Times (1 1 April 






sentences passed annually by criminal courts in England and Wales, with an average 
of fifteen executions carried out. By contrast, in France, where juries could accept 
mitigating circumstances in order to avoid the death penalty, the figures were twenty- 
three and five respectively. Capital punishment was not practised in nineteenth- 
century Prussia and in other German territories executions were rare although it was 
reintroduced by Bismarck in 1878. Despite the change during the Wilhelmine era, 
when clemency was generally refused as a matter of state policy,85 Britain remained 
exceptional. in its reliance on the death penalty. Even in Tsarist Russia the death 
penalty was rarely used in criminal cases - although continued use of the knout 
resulted in many deaths and little restraint was shown in the army. Nineteenth-century 
abolitionists castigated Britain as 'the most merciless of Christian countries' with a 
'backward and unsatisfactory' criminal law.86 In America too, many states had 
abolished the death 
practice reflected in its military code. In 1908 there was a significant alteration to the 
criminal law: those charged with murder and facing a possible capital sentence were 
granted a right of appeal. But there was no corresponding development in the military 
code where the power of life and death rested firmly in the hands of the Commander- 
in-Chief. 
0 
Britain, though, clung on to capital punishment - a 
0 
*' Figures based on comparative tables in Richard Evans, Rituals of Retribution, Capital Punishment in 
Germany 1600-1987 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), statistical appendix. See also L. 
Radzinowicz and R. Hood, A History of English Criminal Law, Volume 5, The emergence ofpenal '' Cited in Radzinowicz & Hood, A History of English Criminal Law, p. 672. 
"J. F. Galliher, G .  Ray & B. Cook, 'Abolition and Reinstatement of Capital Punishment during the 
Progressive Era and Early 20th Century' in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 83, No. 3 
olicy (Clarendon Press, London, 1986), pp. 67 1-677. 
(USA, 1992), pp. 538-578. 
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The concentration of power in the office of the Commander-in-Chief, although 
common in most European armies, was effectively unfettered in the British army. 
There is a parallel here with the role performed by the Home Office in the nineteenth- 
century, which acted to mitigate capital convictions especially where insanity was 
suspected. The process of assessing a condemned prisoner's sanity to prevent 
injustices and avoid adverse publicity, in spite of the assumption of adult 
responsibility established by Common Law,88 anticipated the role the Commander-in- 
Chief later performed in relation to soldiers suspected to be suffering from the 
condition known as shell-shock. What singled out military law, however, was-the 
absence of any appellate system: other officers and indeed the JAG made 
recommendations, but the Commander-in-Chief was the only authority who could set 
aside the sentence of the court. In the German army soldiers were protected to a 
certain extent by statutory rights and French soldiers had the theoretical protection of 
the President of the Republic.89 Even Russian and Austrian soldiers were not 
theoretically denied a right of appeal to a higher 
place their faith entirely in the hands of a Commander-in-Chief who was required to 
put discipline above justice. The Manual of Military Law was explicit that 'The object 
of military law is to maintain discipline among the troops and other persons forming 
0 
But British soldiers had to 
0 
Roger Chadwick, Bureaucratic Mercy: The Home OfSice and the Treatment of Capital Cases in 
Victorian Britain (Garland, New York, 1992), pp. 231-285. 
89 During the First World War the President was slow to exercise this power and the army commanders 
were unrestrained for the first year or so. However, the existence of this safeguard was an important 
feature of French military law. The same type of power was conferred on the President of the USA, 
who exercised it from the outset in the American army. 
were certainly not unprecedented. 
It should be noted that appeals remained problematic in both the Russian and Austrian armies, but 
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part of or following an army'.'' The role of the Commander-in-Chief has to be 
understood in this context. 
Most soldiers who appeared before British courts-martial were expected to defend 
themselves. During the First World War this was common practice, even in capital 
cases: prisoners had a right to be represented by a 'friend', but this was rarely taken 
up. Although this was also standard procedure for those appearing at so-called police 
courts, there was not really a criminal parallel because these courts did not preside 
over capital charges: This feature of military justice has already been the subject of 
much analysis.'* Here, it is sufficient to draw attention to it, but also to point to the 4 
resilience of military tradition. Just as the right of appeal in capital cases had passed I 
by the military code so too had the practice of representation. 
iv) The Impact of Modern Warfare 1914-1918 
By 1881 all the countries that would be at war in 1914 had formulated the rules that 
were to regulate their armies. Tradition had been a major factor. So too had varying 
attitudes towards crime and punishment. For these reasons the British army adopted a 
code more closely resembling those of the old authoritarian empires of Eastern 
Europe than those of Germany or France. The British code remained effectively 
unaltered during the war: the only changes made were procedural rather than legal or 
judicial. These procedural changes, which are further discussed in the following 
chapter, had little actual impact on the administration of discipline through the courts- 
Manual of Military Law, p. 6. 91 
92 This feature of capital cases during the First World War is a recurrent theme in Babington, For the 
Sake of Example and Putkowski and Sykes, Shot at Dawn. 
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martial. In other respects Britain was less progressive than other western European 
armies: in France the President's intervention, although not strictly a legal change, had 
a real impact and curbed the early excesses of French military justice. The most 
significant change, though, was in the German system. Already progressive by British 
standards, the German code was further liberalised during the war. It became 
increasingly difficult for German commanders to secure capital sentences as the rules 
of trials and evidence were gradually tightened and by 1917 field punishments had 
effectivelytbeen aband~ned.'~ That same year the British army carried out more a 0- 
executions than in any other year in its history - a total of 110, more than twice the 
German.tota1 for the entire war. It was only in 1918 - when conscripts filled the ranks 
, - that the number-of condemnations and executions in the British army was reduced, 
although the number in that single year was still more than the larger German army 
managed in over four years of war. 
In fact amendments made to the German code during the war warrant some 
attention here. The first significant alteration was actually made during the crisis 
,which followed the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. On 14 July - 0 
just a few days after Germany had affirmed its support for Austria - the code was 
modified to reduce minimum sentences for desertion and absence during peacetime.94 
The next important alteration occurred at a critical moment in the war - the spring of 
1917, which saw the collapse of the Tsarist armies and the failure of Nivelle's 
offensive on the Chemin des Dames. The new law,95 which made it possible 
93 Benjamin Ziemann, Front und Heimat: Liindliche Kriegserfahrungen im siidlichen Bayem 1914- 
1923 (Klartext, Leipzig, 1997), pp. 106-120. 
Cesetz betreffend die Aenderung der Paragraphen 66, 70 Militarstrafgesetzbuch ( 14 July 1914). 
95 Gesetz betreffend die Herabsetzung von Mindeststrafen (25 April 19 17). 
94 
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to pass considerably more lenient sentences in cases of desertion, absence, 
disobedience, striking of superior officers and mutiny than was previously the case, 
was frequently made use of. At this time it might have appeared to the German army 
that they retained the upper hand in the war. However, despite the optimism of the 
spring offensive, by the early summer months of 1918 hope had turned to despair. On 
18 July a French counter-attack at Villers-CotterCts not only threatened the German 
position on the Marne, but also propelled Ludendorff into a deep psychological crisis, 
which prevented him from performing his duties satisfactorily. This caused many 
senior Germanbofficers to consider Ludendorff's position no longer tenable.96 Yet just 
one week later the military code was further liberalised. The new law, which 
abolished restraint of prisoners,97 suggests that the military command did not possess 
the authority that is often supposed during this period. Attempts to liberalise the 
German code further still, however, were abandoned during the autumn of 19 18, as 
Germany's situation became more turbulent. After the war Ludendorff himself laid the 
blame for Germany's defeat partially on the modifications made to the military code, 
claiming that liberal politicians had undermined his authority and unnecessarily 




Verhangnisvoll wirkte es, da13 die militarische Rechtsprechung ganz unter dem 
EinflulS des unklaren Denkens der Heimat stand, die fortwahrend auf 
96 Hew Strachan, 'Ludendorff and Germany's Defeat', in Cecil & Liddle (eds), Facing Armageddon, 
(Leo Cooper, London, 1998), pp. 55-56. '' Gesetz betr. Milderung im Militarstrafgesetzbuch (25 July 19 18). 
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S traferlal3 drang und die Militargesetze milderte, wahrend sie der Feind 
verscharfte. Sie konnte sich nicht zu schweren Strafen, geschweige denn zur 
Verhangung der Todesstrafe ent~chliel3en.’~ 
[It was disastrous that military jurisdiction came totally under the influence of the blurred 
thinking in the homeland. Those in the homeland constantly pushed to liberalise military law 
while the enemy stiffened his. They simply couldn’t accept the necessity to inflict heavy 
sentences let alone the death ~ e n a l t y . 1 ~ ~  
It is a real paradox, therefore, that in Germany, which was effectively under 
military rule by 1917, the military code was liberalised seemingly in the face of 
objections from the High Command. Yet in Britain, where democratic traditions were 
arguably stronger than in Germany, the military code was left effectively unaltered. 
Given the relative severity of the respective codes at the beginning of the war this is 
even more surprising, The British Commander-in-Chief faced no challenge to his 
authority and position as sole arbiter in matters of military discipline: a situation that 
Ludendorff was envious of. In Germany it appears that politicians were able to 
moderate the power of the High Command even at critical moments of the war. This 
was in part, no doubt, thanks to the constitutional state - the Rechsstuut - which not 
only preserved rights of individuals but also led to a more restricted bureaucracy, 
which required the military to act within a judicial framework. This was not so in the 
98 Erich Ludendorff, Kriegfiihrung und Politik, (E. S .  Mittler u. Sohn, Berlin, 1922), p. 149. See also 
Christoph Jahr, Gewonliche Soldaten. Desertion und Deserteure im deutschen und britischen 
Heer1914-1918 (Vandenhoek & Rupprecht, Gottingen, 1998), p. 330. 
99 I am most grateful to Dr. Christoph Jahr for his assistance with this translation, but the responsibility 
for any error wrests solely with me. 
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British army, where senior commanders were able to manipulate proceedings in their 
attempt to enforce discipline.loO The judicial process amounted to little more than the 
legitimisation of the disciplinary authority of the Commander-in-Chief. 
Unwittingly, the legislators had laid down the very conditions which ensured that, 
in terms of capital punishment, the British soldier was more vulnerable than his 
French or German counterparts. This does not appear to have been the intentions of 
the legislators who, by removing the old practices of flogging and branding, were 
attempting to ring the changes to what had become the unacceptable face of military 
discipline. However, the new code reflected much of the criminal law, which itself 
placed enormous emphasis in the death penalty as ameans of deterring crime. During 
the. First World War most military commanders adopted just such an approach and the 






Why was military law so framed? For the answer we must again look to the 
criminal code. The parallels are not so elusive and tradition remained an important 
influence. Military law, as represented by the Army Act 1881, simply followed earlier 
British models and reflected traditional fears about control of the army and the quality 
of recruits. In fact it was highly unlikely that the British could have envisaged a 
military code such as existed across the Channel or the Atlantic. The result was a code 
that placed additional responsibility on the Commander-in-Chief during wartime. His 
function as the final arbiter in legal matters bore a marked similarity to the role of the 
Home Office: both were expected to mitigate condemnations from the courts to an 
0 
loo Gerald B. Hurst, 'The Administration of Military Law', cited cases where corps commanders 
required divisional commanders to account for acquittals as well as other instances of interference with 
the judicial process. See also following chapter. 
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acceptable level. One had to balance public opinion against public order, the other 
troop morale and discipline. Yet in practice this judicial role was not compatible with 
the Commander-in-Chief s overriding responsibility for army discipline. Unlike the 
French or American armies, which placed ultimate judicial responsibility on their 
respective Presidents, British tradition dictated that politicians were not be to be 
trusted with a modicum of control over the military. In peacetime the Crown fulfilled 
the role which was delegated to the Commander-in-Chief during wartime. No doubt 
his role was delegated further, but the important feature of the system was that British 
* soldiers had to rely on the benevolence of senior officers who were virtually. 
unaccountable, at least for the duration of the war. 
It seems likely that the army got what it wanted from the legislators: a code that . 
reflected army traditions. Like the Crown, the army was not as apolitical as it was 
usually painted. Despite the reforms the army retained its traditional approach to ., 
discipline in a code that remained immune from interference from civil servants such 
as the JAG or from politicians. The army's reputation as a non-political organisation is 
indeed mythical. As Hew Strachan has shown, the army, far from being apolitical, 
was capable of political intervention and not always was it subtle about its actions: the 
Curragh incident of 1914 was the most glaring example. 101 
French and German soldiers on the other hand had a legal apparatus constructed 
around them as protection from the excesses of military discipline. The law was 
framed in a manner that offered at least a degree of tolerance of desertion. It is no 
Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997). Chapter 5, 101 
pp. 92-1 17 is most relevant here, not only for its assessment of the Curragh incident, but for the 
analysis of the army's political activities during our period. 
71 
coincidence that such a view existed in Germany and France, but not in Britain where 
there was no tradition of compulsion and where it was not thought necessary to show 
leniency to men who had accepted the regulations when they volunteered. This is an 
important theme, which I have dealt with elsewhere. In short it is worthy of note at 
this point that shortly after British conscripts arrived in large numbers at the front 
there followed a sharp decline in the number of condemnations by courts-martial."* 
German soldiers also benefited from statutory rights whilst French poilus enjoyed the 
theoretical protection of their President, which although slow to be enacted doubtless 
saved many from the firing squads after 1915. Pre-war attitudes and traditional 
military practices were also markedly different in these continental armies with 
commanders accustomed to other forms of managing discipline such as the penal 
battalions. Alternatives were limited in the British code. 
British commanders were imbued with notions of authority rather than 
management. In this they were aided by the law, which was constructed around the 
concept of deterrence. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that when confronted by a 
stalemated war, British commanders invariably grasped at traditional ideas rather than 
exploring less well-trodden paths. This approach was epitomised by General Sir 
Horace Smith-Dorrien, commander of the 2"d Army, when reviewing a case in 1915: 
There is a serious prevalence of desertion to avoid duty in the trenches, 
especially in the gfh Brigade and I am sure that the only way to stop it is to 
carry out some death sentences [my italics].'03 
lo* See G. Oram, Death Sentences, p. 14 and Worthless Men, p. 42. 
lo3 Private Scotton, executed February 1915. PRO W071/396. 
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In short the British went to war in 1914 with a military code that allowed a 
proliferation of capital punishment to go unchecked. Paradoxically, the abolition of 
flogging - one of the few progressive features of the reforms - was a contributory 
factor. Lacking alternatives, British commanders were simply bereft of ideas short of 
capital punishment when it came to controlling the army during wartime. This had not 
proved to be a major problem in the minor wars at the end of the nineteenth-century - 
not even the war in South Africa. But the intensive nature of warfare on the Western 
front in particular cruelly exposed the inadequacies in the rules for management of the 
army. Commanders, fearful of losing control of a much-enlarged army, were 
encouraged, expected even, to resort to capital punishment. Complicit in all this were 6 
the legislators who followed draconian criminal as well as military traditions when 
they acquiesced and allowed the army to maintain its grip on such a harsh and rigid 







Military Discipline and the Nation at War 
Executions in the First World War were justified by that tenet of military discipline 
'pour encourager les autres'. It was a widely held belief in all the armies that 
examples were necessary to maintain discipline and to underpin soldiers' commitment 
to the war effort.' What little debate there has been among historians has centred on 
how the examples were selected rather than why.2 The maintenance of discipline was 
perhaps the most important factor in the Commander-in-Chief s considerations 
throughout World War One. This was based on the assumption that discipline was the 
keystone of military efficiency and its collapse meant military defeat. Writing in 
1967, John Baynes, himself a battalion commander during the Second World War, 
argued that the engagement of two highly disciplined armies (British and German) 
ensured that the First World War lasted as long as it did.3 Conveniently, he makes no 
mention of the French army, which survived a collapse in discipline. Typically, the 
French army's response to the crisis of 1917 was a re-imposition of military authority 
. e 
0 
' Commitment to the war effort was the fundamental feature of troop morale - the subject of the 
following chapter. 
The two principal published works, Anthony Babington, For the Sake of Example, revised edition 
(Leo Cooper, London, 1993), and Julian Putkowsh and Julian Sykes, Shot at Dawn (Leo Cooper, 
Barnsley, 1989) both focus on the issue of possible miscarriages of justice. Babington's premise that 
the troops were shot 'for the sake of example' is not disputed by Putkowski and Sykes. In my own 
previous work I have argued that the 'examples' were carefully selected; that Irish soldiers and those 
thought to be 'degenerate' made irresistible targets for demonstrations of military authority. 
Furthermore, I argued that a defence of 'shell-shock' was likely to have the exact opposite of the desired 
affect because it amounted to an admission that the soldier was of no further military value. See Gerard 
Oram, Worthless Men: race, eugenics and the death penalty in the British a m y  during the First World 
War (Francis Boutle, London, 1998). 
2 
John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage (Cassell, London, 1967), p. 181. 
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by carrying out a number of executions. Yet the relationship between discipline - or at 
least perceived acts or instances of indiscipline - and executions is surprisingly 
complex. 
In the next chapter we will consider troop morale; arguably an even more obscure 
concept than discipline. Here, though, it is necessary only to note that the relationship 
between military discipline and troop morale was never fixed and was constantly 
redefined according to the circumstances. Tim Travers has argued that the British 
Army was in a transitional stage during the First World War and that the exigencies of a 
the war exposed some of the faults of the old traditional army and facilitated the 
emergence of a 'modem' professional army and all that it entailed.4 As we will see, 
part of the modernisation and restructuring of the army entailed adopting new 
methods to monitor troop morale. 
Commanders were particularly conscious of potential charges of poor discipline in . 
their units. To be regarded as being soft on discipline was an especially serious charge 
with grave implications for the career soldier. Naturally, this concern was passed 
down the chain of command with the result that each rank was eager to avoid the 
censure of the one above it. This sense of being monitored was even felt by those who 
made up the courts-martial. Commanders of divisions were expected to exercise a 
certain amount of control over courts operating under their command. The barometers 
by which discipline was monitored were often vague and complex. Sickness returns 
undoubtedly played an important role here as did assessments of performance in 
battle, but the most tangible of criteria was often the dreaded visit of or inspection by 
Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British A m y ,  The Western Front and the Emergence of 4 
Modern Warfare 1900-1918 (Routledge, London, 1993). 
more senior commanders. In many cases the number of death sentences passed by 
courts-martial, and for that matter the number of executions, can be attributed directly 
to remarks made by senior officers on inspections. In other cases death sentences and 
executions resulted from concerns that adverse criticism might follow certain 
incidents or even the general state of a unit, normally a division. Far from acting 
independently, courts-martial often reflected the concerns of unit commanders, many 
of whom exercised a direct influence over trials in their divisions. 
. Assumptions about discipline also played a significant role. Different expectations - 
in terms of discipline and fighting ability - were made of regular soldiers as opposed 
to 'New Army' volunteers or conscripts: even after the regular army had ceased to 
exist in anything other than name, the disciplinary ethos in so-called 'regular divisions' 
remained stricter than in other units. Similarly, less was expected from soldiers from 
the Dominions, at least initially. The differing approach to discipline in various units 
owed much to the character of the pre-war Edwardian army. The regular army was a 
rigidly hierarchical institution and the men of the ranks, normally recruited from the 
lower echelons of society, had a harsh disciplinary code enforced upon them. By 
contrast men of the Territorial Force, established in 1908, and the other auxiliary units 
had to be handled with more respect to avoid them merely leaving. Therefore, a dual 
approach to discipline emerged. On the one hand strict control was achieved but 
individual initiative was stifled while on the other greater flexibility in leadership 
relied on the development of self-discipline on the part of the troops. Regular army 
commanders were suspicious of their auxiliary counterparts and of the New Army 
e 
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troops who succeeded them. Their different approach to discipline, it was often 
assumed, diminished their ability as soldiers? 
Such assumptions were not, however, limited to military background: the 
Edwardian preoccupation with inherited characteristics formed the basis of many 
disciplinary concerns and correspondingly much of the army's policy as applied at 
divisional level. Certain 'races', for instance, were believed to be in need of firmer 
control than others. This was certainly true of the treatment of Irish soldiers who, 
whilst considered natural warriors by the British, were generally thought to be 
indisciplined and in need of particularly firm handling. Colonial, or 'black', troops 
were also less disciplined in the minds of their British commanders. In many cases 
this was the result of traits ascribed to certain 'races', but it was also the result of , 
prevailing British attitudes, themselves sometimes shaped by particular incidents - 
such as the mutiny of the Indian Army in 1857. The same criteria were applied to 
native labourers, though in many instances with an even greater degree of severity. 
According to David Englander 'This Brutality, perhaps, represents - albeit in 
exaggerated form - the authoritarianism of class relations in Edwardian Britain. The 
traits ascribed to Oriental labour form an uncanny mirror image of the perceived 
social character of the working class sharpened by a rampant racism'.6 Consequently 
disciplinary measures varied from unit to unit, being defined by the type of unit and 
. "  
Gary Sheffield, 'Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army 1902-1922: PhD 
David Englander, 'Manpower in the British Army' in Gerard Canini (ed.), Les Front Znvisibles (Presse 
thesis, King's College, London, 1994. 
Universitaire de Nancy, 1984), p. 102. 
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by the ascribed character of the soldiers within it. Assumptions about 'race' were 
remarkably resilient and many were still evident during the Second World War? 
Active service - usually, though not exclusively, on foreign soil - brought with it 
extra demands. Supply and logistics were immediately a more complex matter than 
for an army on home soil. But it was the enormous expansion of the army after 1914 
that was the greatest challenge and raised most concerns. Uncertainty about the 
reliability of first the reservists, then the Territorial Force followed by the citizen 
soldiers of the New Army and the Derby scheme before they too were succeeded by 
the conscripts from 1916 onwards, centred on the issue of discipline. In its simplest 
form the term discipline referred to the maintenance of control of the army by its 
commanders - obedience to the will of the Commander-in-Chief. Clearly there were 
several aspects to the form this control took, but central to the concept of discipline 
was the notion that soldiers were expected to follow orders. This was reinforced in the 
soldier's small book, issued to every recruit, which stressed: 
a 
OBEDIENCE IS THE FIRST DUTY OF A SOLDIER [sic].' 
It was the adherence to this most valued military principle by the new soldiers that 
most concerned leaders of the old army. Brigadier-General Crozier recalled how he 
' See Bernard Waites, 'Black Men in White Men's Wars: 1914-18, 1939-45' in Peter Liddle, John 
Bourne and Ian Whitehead (eds), Lightning Strikes Twice - forthcoming. I am grateful to Dr. Waites for 
allowing me to see this paper prior to publication. 
Cited in Baynes, Morale, p. 265. 8 
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1)' 
instilled into the men of his New Army battalion that 'the wish expressed by the C.O. 
is tantamount to an order - no matter what it may be'.' 
The marriage of the old army to the new was not an entirely harmonious one. Most 
commanders believed that the best way to get obedience was through the threat of 
harsh punishments - the death penalty being the last resort, but nevertheless a very 
real threat." This was merely a continuation of centuries of British military tradition. 
Although most First World War commanders had joined the army after flogging had 
been abolished in 1881, traditional views on punishments were resilient. In the . 
absence of flogging only Field Punishments stood between imprisonment of offenders 
and the death penalty. This, it will be argued, resulted in an over-reliance on the 
extreme penalty when concerns about discipline were most heightened. New recruits, 
too, had their concerns. According to John Bourne, 'Kitchener's men, in particular, I I  . 
were acutely conscious that they had volunteered for military service. They were there . I 
of their own accord by deliberate choice. They were deeply resentful of the belief that 
they could only be kept to their duty by the threat of being shot by their own side for 
any dereliction of it'. 
The regulation of the army presented a number of problems. Firstly, by 1914 the 
main legislation was over thirty years old. This might not have been such a problem 
except that the nature of warfare and that of the British army had altered. Both France 
and Germany had older military codes, but were able to adapt them more readily to 
Brigadier-General F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land (Cedric Chivers, Bath, 1930), p. 38. 
Thirty-seven executions had been carried out by the British army between 1865 and 1898 with a 
further four during the war in South Africa. See Edward Spiers, The Lute Victorian A m y  1868-1902 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992), p. 73. Also Gerard Oram, "A serious example is 
necessary': The British Army and the Death Penalty 1900-1918: forthcoming article. 
" John M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (Edward Arnold, London, 19891, p. 217. 
10 
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the exigencies of modern warfare. This was at least partly because, unlike the British 
code, theirs catered for large conscript armies. Whilst the British Army Act 1881 
anticipated some of the potential problems - and these were reflected by its content - it 
had never been intended to form the basis of discipline for an army the size of the 
British Expeditionary Force which, by 19 17, numbered approximately two million. 
The legislation, drawn-up with colonial policing in mind and never seriously altered, 
was adapted to the changing needs of an ever-expanding army by practitioners in the 
field. This process was not always a smooth one. 
Discipline was variously defined according to its context. In terms of the general 
control and command of the army, senior officers were expected to exercise authority 
backed up by punishment for those who disobeyed. Commanders were expected not 
to shirk from ordering the death penalty should it be necessary to impose that 
authority. Baynes has argued that the death penalty was a necessary disciplinary tool 
as it was by carrying out executions that the High Command was able to demonstrate 
its resolve that indiscipline would not be tolerated.I2 With few exceptions, there was a 
widespread acceptance of the deterrent value of the death penalty amongst the higher 
echelons of the army. At the other end of the scale men of the ranks were expected to 
conform and to carry out orders without failure. In other words they were expected to 
fight regardless of the apparent dangers. The inability or unwillingness of men to face 
these dangers was met with little tolerance by the army, which initially clung rigidly 
onto old disciplinary structures designed for the regular army of the nineteenth 




Baynes, Morale, p. 190. 12 
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591 (49) 
soldiers' of the Kitchener armies and the conscripts who followed them were subject 
to the same code as those who had gone before. This had serious implications for 
army discipline, which needed to be modified to cater for the different type of soldier 
now in the ranks. The code itself was not altered during the war, but the manner of its 
application gradually changed and in 1918 a shift in attitudes towards discipline in 
general and the death penalty in particular can be detected. In the final year of the war 
there was a substantial fall in the number of condemnations by courts-martial and 
55 ( 5 )  
consequently 'in the number of executions carried out. 







Condemnations Executions I 
Monthly average in brackets Monthly average in brackets 
85 (17) 
856 (71) I95 (8) 
904 (75) I 104(9) 
515 (47) I 46 (4) 
The emergence of a mass army, and eventually a conscript army, did not pose the 
sole threat to the traditional approach to discipline. Modern warfare brought with it 
new problems or at least it magnified pre-existing ones. Notable amongst these was 
l 3  Figures compiled from courts-martial registers. See also G. Oram, Death Sentences. 
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the condition known as shellshock. Probably not experienced for the first time in 
World War One the incidence of war neuroses became a major issue because of the 
sheer numbers affected by it. This was largely due to the development of long-range, 
quick-firing artillery which fired ever increasing calibre shells of high explosive. It 
might also have owed much to the 'de-skilling' of the role of the infantryman, the 
sheer inertia of the front-line and the appalling conditions that soldiers had to 
endure.14 From a disciplinary point of view, however, shellshock presented a major 
cause for concern. Commanders were never truly comfortable about recognising a 
condition that actually excused soldiers who fled the line. To its credit the British 
e 
1 
Army did absorb some of the ideas of psychologists such as Charles Myers. There is 
also evidence to suggest that the army was prepared to use shellshock as an acceptable 
form of escape from duty in extreme cases - the poet Siegfried Sassoon providing a 
good example. Overall though shellshock remained a disciplinary rather than a 
medical matter in the eyes of those who led the army. 
Finally, military-style discipline began to creep into British society as the war 
a continued. The military took on roles that did not come under its peacetime remit. In a 
few extreme instances there was even the threat of the military death penalty. Ireland 
and the cases of conscientious objectors are obvious examples of this, but military 
discipline infiltrated much deeper into society. 
Peter J. Lynch, 'The Exploitation of Courage: Psychiatric Care in the British Army, 1914-1918', 14 
MPhil thesis, University College, London, 1977. 
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i) Regulating Crime in the Army 
It was recognised in the Army Act that discipline did not only apply to the 
battlefield. As well as ensuring the efficient maintenance of the army by legislating 
against such acts as 'interfering with supplies', the Act sought to protect the civilian 
inhabitants of the area occupied and, therefore, the relationship between the army and 
the local populace. When the legislators drew up the Act they probably had some 
colony in mind, but during World War One the land occupied by the British Army 
was in most instances that of anially, France. Such massive occupation of allied 
territory had certainly not been anticipated and the Act did not stipulate a preference 
for allied (presumably therefore friendly) or enemy (and therefore hostiIe) civilians. 
Theoretically, behaviour towards both was expected to be of the same standard. The 
courts-martial enforced this code convicting 1,709 officers, men and civilians attached 
to the British Army for an 'offence against an inhabitant'.'' Although no record has 
survived to indicate precisely what each offence was, it is clear from the courts- 
martial registers that the type of crime covered by this charge tended to be the more 
serious type of criminal offence such as robbery or rape.16 Twenty-three of these 
crimes were considered serious enough to warrant a sentence of death, three of which 
were carried out. A further five men were condemned for crimes specified as robbery 
and another for rape. Three civilians were executed in Egypt for armed robbery. l7  A 
small number of death sentences can also be traced for relatively minor crimes such as 
theft and housebreaking but these too usually refer to convictions of civilians in 
. 
. 
l 5  Statistics of the Military Effort, p. 667. 
l 6  Courts-Martial Registers 1914-1920, PRO WO213/1-34, WO86/62-90, WO90/6-8 & WO92/3-4. 
Oram, Death Sentences, p. 15. 17 
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occupied territory." Remarkably few convictions were recorded against British 
soldiers for crimes against what we might term 'hostile' civilians: of the twenty-three 
condemnations for crimes against inhabitants twenty-two were on the Western Front, 
the location of the other cannot be traced." It is quite possible, therefore, that no 
soldier was convicted of crimes against civilians elsewhere suggesting that all the 
victims of these particular crimes were almost certainly nationals of an allied country. 
A similar trend can be detected in cases involving the murder of civilians, where 
charged as such (see below). It is unlikely that there was an absence of crime by the 
army whilst occupying enemy territory and it is possible that different standards were 
applied to unlawful acts against hostile civilians. 
There was of course a precedent here. Not only did the military authorities 
implement a very aggressive policy towards supposedly hostile civilians during the 
wars in South Africa, but there was also a history of tolerance towards certain - , I  
unlawful acts committed by British soldiers, and this in spite of the army's tough line 
on discipline backed up by harsh punishments. The army's reluctance to take action 
against troops in certain circumstances occasionally resulted in local police having to 
restore order. During the Zulu War in 1879, William Russell, special correspondent of 
The Times, wrote: 
I think the military authorities have been culpably remiss and negligent in the 
discharge of their bounden obligation to maintain discipline and to protect the 
'* Oram, Death Sentences, p. 15. 
Oram, Death Sentences. 
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property and secure the peace of well-disposed loyal [?I citizens2'. What the 
reasons or motive for their indifference may be I do not pretend to surmise, 
but I am sure they are pursuing a course which must lead to most serious 
consequences if they gloss over or pretend to ignore the excesses which in 
Natal and the Transvaal are covering the army with odium and disgrace. It is 
not of drunken frolics or of robbing henroosts or poultry yards that I complain 
- no, nor of orgies and street brawls which bring the soldiery into contempt in 
the eyes of Boer and Kaffir - but of housebreaking, burglary, assault and 
. robbery, of a condition of things which fills the minds of dwellers in stations 
* 
up-country with alarm and indignation, and the gaols and scenes of convict 
labour with men wearing the uniform of the queen. There is not a house in 
Heidelberg, close at hand, which has not been broken into, with two or three 
exceptions, and other stations are nearly as bad. Women are flying to the large 
towns, where there are some guarantees of safety in the shape of police, as 
though they were hunted out by Zulus or Swazies.21 
Section 41 of the Army Act allowed for the trial of criminal offences by courts- 
martial.22 Unfortunately, it is unclear from the official records whether the victims of 
2o It is, however, debatable whether Afrikaner settlers in the province of Transvaal could be considered 
loyal. Britain had annexed the territory in 1877 in the face of opposition led by Paul Kruger. Given the 
circumstances it is more likely that the occupying British forces regarded the Boer people as hostile. 
Only one year after this report was written the British were at war with the Boers in Transvaal: the First 
South African War 1880-8 1. 
2' William Russell, 'The Zulu War' in Roger Hudson (ed.), William Russell Special Correspondent of 
The Times (Folio Society, London, 1995), pp. 378-379. 
The Act refers to them as civil offences when the acts to which they refer were actually covered by 
criminal law rather than civil law (contract, torts etc). Whilst it is appreciated that a differentiation 
between military and civilian law was sought by the legislators it is more satisfactory for the purpose of 
this study to remove the ambiguity and refer to offences against military or criminal law. 
22 
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criminal acts such as theft (4,604 cases) were other soldiers or civilians. The 
implication is that it refers to the former and that all offences against inhabitants are 
accounted for by the figure of 1,709 recorded as such together with a further 1,960 
recorded simply as 'miscellaneous civil offences' (probably including the death 
sentences passed for housebreaking etc). This makes the total number of recorded 
crimes against the civilian populace 3,669 which, if it is to be believed represents a 
remarkably low crime rate given the size of the army and the period of 'occupation' - 
approximately four years - or fewer than 1,000 crimes a year. This would have been 
equivalent to an annual crime rate of approximately one crime for every two thousand 
people. It is perhaps more likely that only the more serious cases such as robbery and 
rape were actually dealt with by courts-martial, other crime being dealt with by other 
means, if at all. 
Behind the lines the army's two greatest concerns were drunkenness and murder;. 
the former for its prevalence and its effect on discipline; the latter for its seriousness 
and the impact on relations with local communities and agencies. These problems 
were not mutually exclusive: most murders it seems were carried out by drunken 
soldiers. Once again, the evidence is sketchy, but the little that has survived suggests 
that the impact on discipline rather than concerns about a possible deterioration of 
relations with the locals was paramount to British commanders. This was consistent 
with pre-war attitudes in the army. Drunkenness, it will be remembered, was a 
persistent and major pre-occupation of those commanders who examined army 
discipline before 1914. Significantly, in one case in February 1915 a soldier's 
execution for desertion was justified because of a perceived drunkenness problem. 
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According to Brigadier-General Congreve, commander of 1 tIth Brigade (6‘h Division): 
‘There is a great deal of drunkenness and absence resulting from it in this battalion 
more than 2/3rds of it being composed of special re~ervists’ .~~ The connection 
ascribed to drunkenness and absence could not be more explicit. Furthermore, the 
offence of drunkenness appears to have been associated in particular with the pre-war 
veterans who made up the special reserve and had been recalled to the colours at the 
outbreak of war. 
The death penalty was obviously not available to courts-martial for offences of e 
drunkenness but other foIms of punishment were, including the dreaded Field 
Punishment Number One. The rules of Field Punishment were set out in the Munual 
ofMilitury Law. The 1914 edition stipulated that the prisoner could be kept in irons 
(or tied with straps or ropes if irons were not available) to prevent escape. He could 
then be attached to a fixed object, normally a cart-wheel or a post, for up to two hours 
daily. The maximum period allowed was twenty-eight days, but tying the prisoner to a 
fixed object was not permitted for more than three consecutive days out of any 
Therefore, a prisoner could be tied to an object for a maximum of twenty-one days 
over a twenty-eight day period. The punishment had been introduced to fill the 
vacuum left by the abolition of flogging and, in common with other military 
punishments, the nature of Field Punishments reflected the lowly status of British 
troops. Baynes justified its use on the grounds that the pre-1914 soldiers were tough 
individuals capable of savage acts when drunk, adding that ‘one cannot believe that 
0 
23 Case of Private Kirk, PRO W071/403. 
24 Manual ofMiZitary Law (HMSO, London, 1914). 
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a 
tying them [regular soldiers] up for two hours to a gun-wheel did them very much 
harm' .25 
There is little evidence to support Baynes' other assertion that many commanding 
officers dispensed with attaching the man to a fixed object because 'they felt that it 
was degrading and bad for morale'.26 It was clearly a common practice even for minor 
offences throughout the war. Robert Graves' servant was one of many thousands of 
troops sentenced to 'crucifixion' for being drunk.27 Drunkenness, considered a blight 
on the character of the pre-war British soldier, continued to be a major concern for the 
army between 1914 and 1918, attracting harsh punishments. On four occasions 
courts-martial passed unlawful sentences of death on men charged with nothing more 
than being drunk, although none of them was confirmed by the Commander-in- 
Chief.28 This was an indication of how far some officers were prepared to go in order 
to eradicate drunkenness. It also reveals the inadequacy of some courts-martial that 
pas sed unlawful sentences . 
There were over 35,000 convictions overseas for drunkenne~s.~~ Yet this, it could 
be argued, is low given the numbers and period of time involved and does little to 
support my earlier assertion that drunkenness was one of the army's major problems 
in respect of its relationship with the civilian populace. The figure probably obscures 
the true picture, which can be glimpsed by referring to trials for other offences, 
25 Baynes, Morale, pp. 189-190. 
Baynes, Morale, p. 189. 
Graves, Goodbye To All That (Penguin, London, 1960), p. 147. 
26 
21 
28 There appears to be a Celtic bias here. Those concerned were as follows: Private Stevenson, Scottish 
Rifles on 26Ih December 1914 (PRO W0213/3)1, Private Taggart, North Staffs. On 26'h February 1915 
(PRO W0213/3), Private Lynch, Inniskillings on 1" July 1917 (PRO W0213/16), Private Bell, 
Highland Light Infantry on 17Ih September 1917 (PRO W0213/18). The first three cases occurred on 
the Western Front, the last one in Egypt. 
Sfafisfics of the Military Effort, p. 667. 29 
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especially murder. In common with English criminal law, murder was punishable by 
death and the death penalty was mandatory. Courts-martial convicted sixty-four men 
of murder, mostly against other soldiers - usually a NCO - but some involved the 
killing of civilians, Drink appears to have been a common feature in both instances. In 
approximately half the trials for murder evidence was produced which suggested the 
offenders were drunk at the time of the crime.30 It seems quite possible that 
drunkenness played a part in the other cases but is not explicit in the evidence. 
Another important trend can be identified. In the ten cases where the murder 
victims can be conclusively identified as civilians they were, without exception, 
~ o m e n . ~ '  In fact in nine cases, all on the Western Front, the victims were identified as 
prostitutes, itself suggestive of a sexual motive. However, it is more likely that this 
was a reflection of the demographic impact of the war on French society with few 
men remaining in the villages and towns and those who hoped to profit from the 
presence of the British Army, such as prostitutes, moving in. This also shows that the 
.! 
civilian populace with which the British Army had closest contact was far from a 
e normal one, and this partially explains the low opinion that many soldiers held of 
French civilians. Mail censorship had revealed that a common feeling about the 
French was that they were viewed as racketeers and crooks eager to 'rip-off British 
troops at every opportunity. The humorous suggestion made by one censor that a 
common sentiment in the letters sent home was that there would be no shortage of 
See Putkowski and Sykes, Shot at Dawn, in particular the cases of Dale, Skone, Morgan, Price, 
Knight, Moore and Reid all of whom it was alleged were intoxicated at the time of their offences. To 
this list we can add the names of Private Murray (PRO W071/504) and Sapper Oyns (PRO 
W071/613) who both killed other soldiers whilst drunk. 
sixteen cases involved the murder of fellow soldiers or labourers and at least nine cases involved the 
murder of civilians. 
30 
Unfortunately the surviving records are incomplete. What does survive, however, shows that at least 31 
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volunteers for any future war provided that the enemy was France was not without an 
element of truth.32 A similar sentiment was later extended towards the Italians, 
presumably for the same reasons.33 
In England and Wales during this period there was an annual average of 
approximately twenty-five death sentences passed by criminal courts. On average 
roughly thirteen of these were carried out.34 Given the comparative differences in the 
size of the civilian population of England and Wales and the British Army during this 
period, the army obviously made greater use of the death penalty than did British 
criminal courts. However, the. two do not bear close comparison. Circumstances were 
entirely different. Not *only were soldiers under fire but they also existed in,a false 
community which virtually excluded women and where relationships between 
themselves and the civilian populace were far from normal. It must also be said that 
soldiers were armed and the stakes had been raised considerably when it came to 
sorting out their differences. These are obvious points but it should be emphasised 
that the evidence does not suggest that drunken British soldiers were running amok 
across northern France or other theatres of the war. Nor does it suggest that the High 
Command made more liberal use of the death penalty than would have been the case 
in British society: the Commander-in-Chief actually commuted a greater proportion of 
cases than did the Home Secretary. 
- 0  
e 
What is perhaps more significant is that with just one exception those executed for 
murdering prostitutes were all Colonial (Le. 'black) troops or labourers from China 
32 See papers of Captain Hardie, Imperial War Museum, 84/64/1, report dated May 1916. 
33 Hardie papers, report dated October 19 18. 
34 See the comparative tables in the Statistical Appendix of Richard Evans, Rituals of Retribution: 
Capital Punishment in Germany 1600-1987 (Oxford IUniversity Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 934. 
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and Egypt. The only case involving a British soldier occurred in Le Havre. Corporal 
Wickens of the Rifle Brigade who had strangled a prostitute in her room was executed 
on 7 March 1918.35 Unfortunately, detailed records of all trials where death sentences 
were later commuted have not survived and it is therefore difficult to make any 
meaningful and sustainable comparison between cases involving British soldiers and 
those involving Colonial troops. What can be asserted with confidence, however, is 
that of the ten executions where the victims can be identified as civilians (all women) 
,only one offender (Corporal Wickens) was white. This suggests that assumptions 
about 'race' and women might have influenced sentencing but in the absence of more 
complete information such an argument remains tenuous. Certainly the proportion of 
j death sentences confirmed and carried out against 'black' Colonial troops and 
labourers is only slightly higher than that of the 'white' British and Dominion troops 
(68% and 61% respectively). It should be noted, however, that the same number of 
0 
. murder cases were brought against each of these two groups which, given the 
respective overall size of the army (5,955,51436) and the foreign labour corps 
(approximately 500,000), is indicative of a problem whether real or perceived. 0 
The most dramatic example was the case of three Chinese labourers who killed a 
prostitute and also her three children near Amiens. They all admitted their guilt and it 
is hardly surprising that the mandatory death sentence was confirmed. Two were 
executed and the other committed suicide to avoid the firing squad.37 Elsewhere on 
the Western Front, two men of the Cape Coloured Labour Corps were executed at 
35 PRO W07 1/636. 
3h All British and Dominion recruits totalledmgether. Statistics ofthe Military Eflort, p. 363. 
37 PRO W071/676. 
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Lille for the murder of two Belgian ~ros t i tu tes .~~ The only case that does not appear to 
involve a prostitute occurred in Palestine. The motive though was clearly sexual. 
Private James Mitchell, a 'black' soldier of the British West Indies Regiment, was 
executed on 22 December 1917 for murdering the husband of a woman he had 
attempted to rape.39 
ii) Discipline on the Battlefield 
A more obvious, and arguably overriding, disciplinary concern centred on the 
1 battlefield. The central feature-of what may be termed battlefield discipline was that 
e 
I 
the troops would carry out the orders of the commanders, moving as and where 
ordered, taking up positions as ordered and holding the ground as required. As we I. 
have already discussed obedience was highly valued. Yet there was little point in 
commanders producing strategies or tactics that the troops .would not carry out and 
herein lies the key to battlefield discipline. A degree of consent was required to 7 . 
control an army such as Britain put together during the war years. Discipline, 
especially at the warfront, was a two-way affair. Senior officers could not produce 
grand schemes based on battlefield maps or Staff College courses without giving 
some attention to what level of discipline could be expected from their troops. True, 
the threat of the death penalty and other forms of punishment could and were 
employed to subjugate the men to the authority of the generals but even this was not a 
sufficiently strong weapon to allow for the complete domination of the men. The 
image of the deferential British soldier was not, and is not, consistent with reality. 
38 Privates Harris and Davids, PRO W071/684 & 685. 
39 PRO W071/629. 
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Plans for battles, even the big offensives such as the Somme in 1916, were made 
within the confines of what level of discipline could be expected rather than the level 
desired.40 The balance between these two positions, the achievable against the 
desirable, was not always accomplished. Perhaps it would be fair to say that a 
satisfactory balance was rarely accomplished, but a major mutiny such as most other 
armies experienced was nevertheless avoided. The arrny slowly adapted its pre-war 
position, whereby troops were treated as unintelligent loafers, to one which 
accommodated the citizen soldiers upon whom it came to rely, and this was no doubt 
an important development. The army was still wrangling with the same problem 
during the Second World War, as expressed by Lord Moran: 
Everywhere men are asking whether a system of discipline and training 
designed for the illiterate has been modified to meet the needs of an educated 
rank and file.41 
But it was during the First World War when it had first recruited citizen soldiers that 
the army had been forced to reappraise its practices. One of the innovators in this 
respect was General Ivor Maxse, who taught greater trust and respect for the average 
soldier than was traditionally exercised. The mood of the troops was another 
important factor in defining this relationship and the army went to great lengths in 
40 See for example the comments of Tim Travers concerning the preparations for the Battle of the 
Somme. Travers, The Killing Ground, chapter 6, especially pp. 144-146. 
Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 2nd edition (Constable, London, 1966), p. 163. 41 
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assessing it and producing regular reports on morale, a subject dealt with in the 
following chapter. 
The key to unit discipline was widely believed to be the development of a strong 
esprit de corps. This was built into the structure of the pre-war British Army. 
Regiments were recruited on a local basis, adopting the county names to give them a 
sense of identity and battle honours from previous campaigns adorned regimental 
colours. Rather than undermining this system those who rushed to the colours in 1914 
and 1915 were absorbed into the old regiments. These new lservice' battalions, 
therefore, adopted the same identity and, it was hoped, the esprit de corps of the - 
regular m y .  It was only after the introduction of conscription, by which time the 
disastrous effects on communities of the Battle of the Somme was realised that this 
system was altered.42 Even then the regiments kept their county names, their battle 
# honours and the paraphernalia which tied them to the perceived glories of the past. 
Esprit de corps, however, was not simply a matter of identification with a locality 
or with the past. It was actively engendered through day to day practices. Drill, it was 
thought, developed both teamwork and obedience which would then be transplanted 
onto the battlefield. According to Baynes, even though his unit, 2"d Scottish Rifles, 
did not emphasise drill as much as some other units, it was still held to be 'an 
important part of military training' and when out of the line 'everyone was put to 
drilling'.43 Traditional forms of discipline such as these proved to be resilient to the 
changing demands of the war itself. In a pamphlet on training written in February 
42 Peter Simkins, 'The Four Armies' in David Chandler and Ian Beckett (eds), The Oxford History of the 
British A m y  (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), pp.235-255. 
Baynes, Morale, p. 193. 43 
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1918 and based on 'no less than 30 British missions in 1917', General Ivor Maxse 
placed the emphasis on what might be termed traditional discipline. He cited 
marching, regular billet inspection and saluting as being essential to the maintenance 
of discipline. This was achieved, he argued, by inculcating pride in each unit.44 The 
concerns engendered by the thought of a collapse of discipline were clearly spelt out 
by Maxse: 
We are in for a long strain and must all pull together in 1918. The greater the 
strain, the more apparent becomes the need for discipline. Officers should tell 
their men what has happened in Russia through indiscipline, and the men will 
respond right well.45 
0 . '  
The association between military defeat and the collapse of discipline is consistent 
with pre-war Clauswitzian ideas about army structure and authority. However, 
Maxse's suggestion that discipline might be a two-way affair and that the men should 
be trusted more represents a departure from the traditional view. This in itself was 
symptomatic of a general change in attitudes in the army towards disciplinary matters 
by 1918. The recruitment of men whose background was not that of the traditional 
infantryman and the absorption into the officer corps of men with experience, 
possibly of a managerial type, gained in commerce and industry had resulted in subtle 




'Notes and Hints on Training' in Maxse Papers. IWM 69/53/13. 
45 'Notes and Hints on Training' in Maxse Papers. IWh4 69/53/13. 
44 
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One fault is that our Officers do not take their men sufficiently into their 
confidence, but leave them at th'e mercy of false rumour and untruthful 
statements. The British soldier has never failed those who have really trusted 
him, and he will not do so now. But we must trust him and tell him the truth: 
we cannot drive him and ignore him too. We should in fact deal with him as 
an intelligent and patriotic man, which is just what he is.46 
It is unlikely. that sentiments such as these could have been expressed earlier in the - 
war and it is salutary to compare them with Travers' argument that British generals 
did not trust their own troops when planning for the Battle of the Somme the year 
before.47 
. There was a limited degree of continuity here with the pre-war army. Gary 
Sheffield has argued that, before 1914, regular soldiers were viewed with mistrust by 
their officers. Traditionally, he argues, the regular soldier was a poorly educated man 
of poor physique and 'urban pr~venance ' .~~  In common with ideas prevalent in 
Edwardian society, such men were often regarded as degenerates and viewed with 
0 
great suspicion by social commentators and their commanders alike.49 The troops, 
Sheffield continues, were treated as if they were unruly children and punished if they 
stepped out of line. Men of the Territorial Force and other auxiliary formations 
46 'Notes and Hints on Training' in Maxse Papers. IWM 69/53/13. 
47 Fourth Army 'Tactical Notes', Rawlinson Papers, National Army Museum. See also Travers, The 
Killing Ground, pp. 144-146. 
48 Gary Sheffield, 'Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army 1902-22', PhD 
thesis, King's College, London, 1994, p. 2. 
49 G. Oram, Worthless Men, especially Chapter 4. 
enjoyed a wholly different relationship with their officers. Consequently, discipline 
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was less formal and men were treated more as citizens than as children. This model 
was normally adopted in the New Armies, but regular style discipline often crept in. 
Although the British Army during the Great War was a mixture of the old and the 
new, by 1918 the old regular army had long ceased to exist except in name and the 
dominance of the New Armies was apparently assured. But the idea that there was no 
attempt to modernise the army until the exigencies of war forced the issue should be 
resisted. There were signs of a significant change in attitudes towards discipline early 
in the twentieth century: the military theorist, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, argued for 
the development of 'intelligent' rather than 'mechanical' discipline following the 
embarrassment of the Boer War." 
0 
Henderson embraced the lessons learnt from foreign generals, even French ones. 
He published works on the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War and was 
greatly influenced by the ideas of the generals of antiquity, by 'Stonewall' Jackson, 
Von Moltke and Napoleon, whom he described as 'the greatest general of them all'.51 
In his writings he placed the emphasis on training, leadership and troop morale rather 
than blind obedience. His work was part of a general debate about military practices 
that can be attributed to the period between the Boer War and the First World War. 
a 
There is other evidence to suggest that attitudes in the British army were changing 
prior to 1914. In 1913 the army had examined the system of special training for sous 
officiers in the French army who were considered suitable candidates for a 
50 Sheffield, 'Officer-Man Relations', pp. 5 1-53. 
'' Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, The Science of War: the Author's Essays from 1891-1903, edited by 
Colonel Niell Malcolm (Longmans, London, 1919), p. 173. 
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commission, with a view to adopting a similar scheme for British NCOs. Major Earle 
was sent to France to study the scheme and report back. Whilst his final report did not 
dismiss the idea of a special officers' school for NCOs, he did identify a number of 
potential obstacles, most notably the differing traditions and the legacy of the 
revolution that, he argued, rendered it difficult to learn anything from the French 
system. A more fruitful comparison, he argued, could be found in the system adopted 
by the Royal Navy for promotions from the lower deck. 52 The report is evidence of a 
lingering suspicion of the qualities of the French army and a reluctance to embrace its 
practices, but also of an increasing awareness in the British army of the need to 
modernise the selection procedure for officers. 
0 
The roles of various arms of the military were also debated during the pre-war era. 
Of particular note was the co-operation between artillery and infantry and the role of 
the ma~hine-gun.'~ More mundane issues such as deployment and training of 
relatively new nnits were also seen as needing to be addressed. In 1909 it was 
recommended that the Medical Corps should be integrated into the army's war-games 
and that RAMC officers should be trained in supply and transport duties.54 All were 
signs of an army slowly coming to terms with the changing nature of war before 
1914: discipline was but one issue in this process. 
0 
Nevertheless, significant changes in disciplinary practice were forced upon the 
army by the experiences of the First World War. For example, the number of death 
5 2  Report on Training of NCOs, PRO W032/8386, pp. 15-16. 
See, for example, T. H. E. Travers, 'Technology, Tactics and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, 
and British Military Theory, 1900-1914' in Journal of Military History, Vol. 51 (June 1979), pp. 264- 
286. 
54 Report of the Committee on Military Training of the Royal Army Medical Corps 1909, PRO 
W03216940, p. 5. 
53 
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sentences passed in 1918 was approximately forty per cent lower than the total for 
1917, which was itself merely a continuation of the trend started in 1915 and carried 
through 1916.55 In other words the British Army had changed course and far fewer 
men were condemned in 1918 than in earlier years. The introduction of Court-Martial 
Officers (CMOS) and a greater understanding of shellshock might have played a small 
part in this development, but it was a general change in attitude towards matters of 
discipline that had by far the greatest impact. The emergence of a citizen army, 
anticipated by Henderson after his study of American Civil War armies, initially made 
up of volunteers but latterly of conscripts had crucially altered the nature of 
command. Most significant of all were the changing perceptions of the rankers by 
senior officers, as epitomised by Maxse, and a realignment of the relationship 
between officers and men. This latter development was an inevitable outcome of both 
the changing basis for recruitment into the army and the altered composition of the 
officer corps. The limited acceptance of the ethos prevalent in the pre-war auxiliary 
formations as the model for the citizen army probably ensured that discipline was not 
so inflexible that it would collapse. It is worth noting that Baynes, whose argument 
often appears to be at odds with this notion of command by (limited) consent, was 




Whilst it is important to view the death sentence in the context of these changes to 
the structure of the army, it cannot be overstated that the most important decisions 
regarding individual condemnations were usually made by pre-war commanders 
whose ideas had been shaped by tradition rather than by post 1914 developments. The 
s5 See Oram, Death Sentences, p. 14 and also Oram, Worthless Men. 
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ratio of executions to condemnations remained stable at roughly ten per cent: it was 
the number of condemnations by courts-martial that had fallen. Concerns about the 
quality of recruits and suspicions about the nature of discipline in Territorial as well 
as New Army and Dominion units were paramount and determined many an outcome. 
Assumptions concerning the fighting abilities of these troops coupled with pre-war 
notions of ineffective discipline in such units can be detected in many commanders' 
recommendations. For example, in reviewing a death sentence passed on a young 
Irish soldier, one brigade commander noted 'the discipline of the 9th R.I. Rifles is 
good for a sewice battalion' [my italics] .56 The implication that discipline in service 
battalions was generally poor is a misleading one. Of necessity discipline was 
different in pre-war auxiliary units to their regular counterparts, but it remained 
effective.57 New Army formations shaped their own approach to discipline and there 
is no substantive evidence to suggest that they were universally blighted by 
indiscipline. During the war the auxiliary battalions and their ancestor units 
maintained a similarly effective discipline, but the pre-war assumptions of the regular 
army commanders lingered. During the Battle of the Somme General Henry 
Rawlinson expressed surprise that both the New Army and Dominion units had 
'fought with a bravery and determination which one had never dared to hope for'.58 
These notions persisted beyond the war. Writing in 1945 Lord Moran stated: 
0 '  
0 
56 Case of Rifleman James Crozier, who was executed for desertion on 22"d February 1916. PRO 
W 0 7  1/450. 
57 G. Sheffield, 'Officer-Man Relations', p. 38. 
5 8  Rawlinson papers. 'Notes on Operations between 14'h September and 3"' October 1916, p. 13. NAM 
5201-33-69. 
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The difference between a battali'on of the professional army of 1914 and a 
Kitchener unit was not that years of training had made the actions of the 
regular soldier automatic, but that they had implanted in the very marrow of 
the men the creed of the Regiment which blossomed into a living faith till 
nothing else mattered.59 
Commanders were expected to take a close interest in matters of discipline 
including the courts-martial. This did not change between 1914 and 1918 regardless 
of any transition the army was undergoing and commanders remained responsible, 
and therefore answerable, for both the discipline and performance of their troops. In 
any case.the latter was generally held to be inseparable from the former. 
There was a fine line between the natural desire of a senior commander to oversee 
matters of discipline and interference in judicial decisions which undermined the 
independence of courts-martial. After all, the courts-martial were designed as an 
adjunct to discipline rather than overseers of justice. Regardless of their theoretical 
status, courts-martial were not independent. They were convened by commanders to 
try cases which for some reason were beyond the scope of disciplinary measures 
available to more immediate superiors such as N.C.0.s. In effect then courts-martial 
were intended only to try more serious cases or cases which it was deemed desirable 
to be tried rather than dealt with summarily. One such reason was that the commander 
wished to make an example of a soldier or group of soldiers to deter others under his 
command. Executions were published in Routine Orders and circulated throughout 
59 Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 2"d edition (Constable, London, 1966), p. 17 1. 
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the army. Wide circulation of sentences imposed by courts-martial would achieve the 
aim of deterrence far better than any summary punishment, the impact of which 
would be more localised. Furthermore, if there was a concern about discipline in any 
unit a court-martial could be convened as a display of remedial action, perhaps to 
satisfy a higher commander. In many ways then courts-martial can be regarded as 
overt statements of military authority rather than judicial hearings. The trappings of 
legal processes merely served to present an acceptable face to what was in effect a 
tool of military authority. 
The application of this tool was most common before and during planned 
offensives. There is an obvious relationship between the number of death sentences 
passed and British offensives. Put simply, the number of death sentences handed out 
by courts-martial increased as zero-hour approached. A marked increase in 
condemnations for roughly one month prior to any of the big offences can be 
detected.60 This was both a result of an increased desertion rate as tension mounted I 
close to the battle front and a general tightening of discipline as the High Command 
0 ,. stamped its authority on the ranks in readiness for the offensive. Cecil Lewis, a pilot 
during the Battle of the Somme, noticed how ‘the initial tension that preceded the 
offensive relaxed as day after day the pressure on the enemy was sustained’. 
Whether harsher discipline at this time acted as a deterrent or not is unclear: it seems 
unlikely that soldiers who lost their nerves would think rationally about the 
consequences. Furthermore, approximately one third of those executed had been 
previously sentenced to death, but been reprieved. Clearly, the threat of death for men 
For a more detailed discussion of this see G .  Oram, Worrhless Men, pp. 37-41. 
Cecil Lewis, Sagitarius Rising (Folio Society, London, 1998), p. 86. 61 
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who, as Sassoon put it, were 'provisionally sentenced to deathf6* did little to deter. Yet 
the strong belief amongst senior army officers that this atmosphere of fear would 
maintain discipline in the ranks remained a strong one. 
The argument that executions were a lottery6' is not entirely accurate. It is true that 
the confirmation of a death sentence did not always follow concerns about unit 
discipline - though some certainly did - but more immediate concerns about the 
general state of the BEF were seemingly of greater importance to the Commander-in- 
Chief. Yet the process of confirming a sentence was a very deliberate and considered 
one that consumed a great amount of very senior officers' time. Many of the decisions 
to execute men were-made on the grounds of a soldier's character and whether he 
remained of any value to the army. Those who were considered degenerate or were 
tainted hereditarily were castigated as worthless.64 In the search for examples many of 
these supposedly worthless men were shot. Those who were of little further use to the 
army such as the shell-shocked were also in danger of facing a firing squad. It is 
noteworthy that the example used by Gary Sheffield to show that executions were a 
lottery, Private Skilton of 22 Royal Fusiliers, was himself quite possibly suffering 
from ~hel lshock.~~ These signs of weakness only increased the probability of 
execution. Executions were not entirely a lottery. However, Sheffield is correct to 
assert that to regard an execution as a barometer of poor discipline or morale in a 
particular formation is over-simplistic and unreliable. 
0 
.. 
6 2  Siegfried Sassoon, The Complete Memoirs of George Sherston (Faber, London, 1937), p. 257. 
argument. So too does Sheffield, 'Officer-Man Relations', p. 70. 
64 See Oram, Worthless Men, pp. 84 - 101. 
65 PRO W07 1/531. 
Babington, For the Sake of Example, Putkowski and Sykes, Shot at Dawn, all follow this line of 
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The deterrent principle so dominant in ideas about discipline throughout the war 
demanded that examples were made of men at certain moments of the war - usually 
preceding large offensives. On the other hand too many executions could have an 
adverse effect on the regiments. Broadly speaking approximately one in every ten 
men condemned by courts-martial had their sentences confirmed. There are many 
features of this process that suggest a consistent approach. For instance, taken 
annually or by theatre of the war, the ratio of executions to condemnations does not 
vary significantly from the ten per cent mean. Even if the regiments are broken down 
by country of origin a similar confirmation rate can be detected.66 This suggests that, 
far from being a lottery, there was an implicit policy on the confirmation of death 
sentences that amounted to a form of 'bureaucratic decimation'. Ultimate judicial 
power rested with the Commander-in-Chief during the war, but the enormity of the 
task surely forced the role to be considerably delegated. Major-General Wyndham 
Childs claimed that Sir John French agonised over capital cases for many hours.67 Yet 
this seems highly unlikely. Is it feasible that, given his other commitments, the 
Commander-in-Chief personally considered the fate of over 3,000 men sentenced to 
be shot, not to mention the cases of another 309,5 11 British soldiers convicted by 
courts-martial?68 French considered the fate of 676 men condemned by courts-martial: 
an average of approximately forty for each month of his tenure as Commander-in- 
Chief (for Haig the number was considerably greater averaging more than 70 a month 
66 There are some notable exceptions to these trends, but each can be explained. Analysis of this aspect 
of military executions is beyond the scope of this thesis - the author's own assessment can be found 
elsewhere - but it is important to note the existence of a remarkable consistency in confirmation of 
death sentences. See Oram, Worthless Men. 
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throughout 1916 and 1917). If we are to believe Childs’ assertion then the 
Commander-in-Chief had little time for his many other duties. In reality this function 
was delegated - probably to Childs himself and later to the Personal Services Branch, 
headed by Brigadier-General Wroughton, a career soldier who was also a qualified 
barrister.69 
Commanders often had to account for incidents in the front-line, especially those 
involving military reverses. Occasionally this necessitated an outline of action taken 
as a cdnsequence. For example, General Ivor Maxse, GOC 18‘h Division, submitted a 
report about an incident that occurred in December 1915 during which a German 
wiring party had entered a British trench and captured nineteen men of the 
Northamptonshire Regiment. The report exonerated the officer in charge of the unit 
and laid the blame on two N.C.O.s, Lance-Sergeant Barford and Corporal Tibble, who 
were subsequently tried for cowardice. On 30 December 1915 Maxse wrote: ‘I am 
therefore using the incident to illustrate to all battalions the necessity of never 
surrendering without a fight, even when caught in a hole [my italics]’.70 The wide 
exposure that Maxse desired from this case was only achievable by using the court as 
a forum and he was able to demonstrate both to those above him and to those under 
his command simultaneously his readiness to take positive steps to firm up discipline 
in his division. Summary punishment would not achieve either aim. 
69 Wroughton had entered the army in 1893 and was commissioned in the Royal Sussex Regiment and 
served in the South African War. A Staff Captain at the outbreak of war, he was appointed Deputy- 
Adjutant-General and Assistant-Quartermaster-General in 1914 and headed the Personal Services 
Branch from February 1916 with the nominal rank of Brigadier-General; a rank made substantive on 10 
November 1917. 
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This case also highlights how disciplinary concerns often varied according to rank 
and it is interesting that the N.C.0.s had been singled out as blameworthy. This was 
consistent with the general trend throughout the war: N.C.0.s were more likely to 
have a death sentence against them carried out than were private soldiers. Twenty- 
four of the 134 N.C.0.s sentenced to death had their sentences carried out compared 
to 316 out of 2,938 privates71 (fifteen and eleven per cent respectively) indicating that 
the Commander-in-Chief placed a greater emphasis on making examples of N.C.0.s. 
There is further evidence that higher standards of discipline were expected of N.C.0.s 
in Maxse's comments of 3 January 1916 in which he stated: 
By making examples of Sergeant Barford and Corporal Tibble this lesson will 
be further brought home to N.C.0.s. It is thus hoped that the incident may be 
turned to ultimate advantage.72 
On 11 January 1916 Corporal Tibble was sentenced to death by court-martial. 
Curiously, Sergeant Barford was sentenced to 5 years penal servitude.73 However, 
Tibble's conviction was subsequently quashed by the Commander-in-Chief although 
the reason for this also remains obscure. 
Fear of accusations of being soft on discipline caused some commanders to 
interfere more directly with courts-martial. Writing after the was-, Gerald Hurst, a 
former court-martial officer, remarked how commanders would often censure officers 
Oram, Death Sentences, p. 15. 




who sat on courts-martial as being unnecessarily lenient. A Brigadier, he stated, 
reported two officers because they were 'too kind-hearted to be efficient 
 disciplinarian^'.'^ Elsewhere, generals were prepared to challenge the findings of 
courts-martial. Hurst cited one such example where, he alleged, the president of a 
court was required to 'furnish in writing a full explanation of his conduct in allowing 
the acquittals [of two men charged with plundering a shop] to take place' [my 
italic~1.7~ The court, it appears, was regarded by some as no more than an arm of the 
disciplinary machine and failure to arrive at the expected decision by a court could be 
viewed as an act of disciplinary sabotage. 
' 0  
When the Army Council Committee of Enquiry into the Rules and Procedures of 
Courts-Martial, chaired by the Right Honourable Sir Charles Darling, reported in 
. 1919, they too raised concerns that some commanders had interfered with the 
I independence of the courts. However, the Committee appears to have been concerned 
with the nature of interference rather than with the principle itself. In fact it was 
implicit in the report that a certain degree of interference was not only acceptable but 
was expected. In particular the Committee recognised that the requirements of 
discipline often necessitated the court taking a view wider than that of the accused's 
own unit. Consideration, it was suggested, should be given to the prevalence of a 
particular offence in the brigade or division and the severity of the punishment should 
reflect this wider view. This clearly presented the courts-martial with a problem in 
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assessing these wider disciplinary demands. The Committee, however, recognised a 
de facto solution: 
It is, therefore, in our opinion, necessary and right that a superior officer, who 
alone can know the state of discipline generally in the force under his 
command, should be at liberty to publish in Orders notices to the effect that 
certain offences are becoming common, and that persons who commit them in 
future must expect to be dealt with more severely than in the past.76 
. 
- 
The Committee did lend credence to Hurst's allegations that more direct interference 
had occurred when they reported that: 
We are satisfied that during the present war officers have, in one or two 
instances, issued circulars upon the subject of sentences in terms which cannot 
be justified. . . . [We recommend] that the Army Council deal severely with 
any attempted interference with the judicial discretion of Courts which may be 
brought to their notice.77 
Evidently, a fine line existed between what constituted proper concern and directives 
on discipline and what amounted to improper interference. Despite their recognition 
of the 'judicial discretion of the Courts', it is clear that the Committee acknowledged 
that the requirements of discipline overrode all other considerations. It was accepted 
l6 The Darling Report, p. 8 .  
The Darling Report, p. 8. 77 
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that individual cases should be dealt with not according to the merits of the case but 
according to the wider disciplinary needs of the brigade or division. This often 
provided a justification for executions during the war and partly explains why some 
cases that resulted in execution appear to be less serious, on the basis of the evidence, 
than others which were commuted to lesser punishments. In most instances the 
decision whether to carry out an execution or not was reached on the basis of the 
seriousness of the individual's crime balanced against the state of discipline in the 
unit, brigade or division. Undoubtedly, however, there were many cases where one or 
other of these two criteria was considered sufficiently serious in its own right to 
justify the confirmation of a death sentence. 
0 
Two cases in early 1915, both in the 6ith Division, illustrate these differing 
approaches. The first was that of Private Hope, 2"d Eeinster Regiment, who had 
deserted his unit whilst in trenches at LEpiniette in December 1914. He was arrested 
nearby at Armentikres the following February. His crime was compounded by his 
actions: he was wearing a stolen military police uniform and gave false particulars 
when challenged. He later claimed to have been captured by the enemy only to escape 
and return to the British lines. The court rejected his version of events and sentenced 
him to death. The brigade commander, Brigadier-General Harper, and the divisional 
commander, Major-General Keir, both recommended confirmation adding simply 'I 
see no reason why the sentence should not be carried The corps commander, 
Lieutenant-General Pulteney concurred and it was referred to General Smith-Dorrien, 
0 
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GOC 2"d Army, who cited wider disciplinary concerns as sufficient justification for 
the execution: 
The Brigade discipline is second worst and the Battn [sic] discipline is also the 
second worst in the army. The case is a very bad one indeed and I recommend 
that the extreme penalty be carried 
This reasoning obviously impressed the Commander-in-Chief, John French, who duly 
confirmed the sentence. Hope, who also had two previous convictions for absence, 
was executed on 2 March 1915. 
It is unclear whether Field-Marshal French was influenced most by the individual 
circumstances of the Hope case or whether wider disciplinary concerns were 
paramount in forming his decision. It is possible that either might have been sufficient 
to secure a confirmation of the sentence but a combination of both considerations 
appears to be the most likely explanation. There can be no doubt, however, in another 
case, also in the 6th Division, which French had to consider just a few days later. 
Private Atkinson, lst West Yorkshire Regiment, was convicted in March 1915 of 
deserting his unit in January. There was nothing unusual or particularly bad about the 
case - courts must have considered hundreds of worse cases around the same time. 
Furthermore, Atkinson's battalion commander, Major Barrington, stated that the 
defendant was 'a good soldier'.*' The brigade, divisional and corps commanders 
argued that it was a particularly bad case when in truth there was nothing in the 
79 PRO W071/401. 
PRO W071/402. 
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evidence to support such a view. Again, however, it was Smith-Dorrien who, on 23 
February 1915, provided the justification for executing the man: 
The discipline of this Brigade is the worst of the army and the discipline of the 
lSt West Yorkshire is the worst in that Brigade this month - the seriousness of 
the offence of desertion to avoid duty in the trenches is not appreciated for no 
capital punishment has been carried out in the 6'h Division [Hope was not 
executed until March 19151 - An example in the Division is very necessary 
and as this is a very bad one in itself merits the capital punishment [sic]. I . 
a 
recommend that it be carried out." 
Although Smith-Dorrien remarked that Atkinson's was a bad case this was probably - 
. to show consistency with his other generals., In any case Smith-Dorrien's reasoning 
. hinges on his contention that the needs of discipline would be best served by an 
execution in the division. 
0 In fact three men of the 6'h Division were executed in early March 1915: Hope, 
Atkinson and another man from lst West Yorkshire Regiment, Private Kirk who was 
described as an 'average Private' with a good record.'' There was a similarity between 
the cases of Privates Hope and Kirk: both had presented a challenge to the authority 
of the army. Hope had donned none other than a military policeman's uniform and 
given false information. Kirk, it appeared, deserted to avoid a Field Punishment 
imposed by court-martial for an offence of drunkenness. Such a challenge to the 
PRO W071/402. 
PRO WO 71/403. 
111 
authority of the army and in particular the court-martial was likely to have grave 
consequences for the individual. Significantly, the brigade commander recommended 
Kirk's execution on the grounds that 'it is a bad case and there is far too much crime 
[drunkenness and absence] in the battalion'.83 Major-General Keir, GOC 6'h Division, 
agreed that 'the amount of crime in this battalion is e x c e ~ s i v e ' . ~ ~  Kirk's was the third 
execution in the division within a few days; another followed within a month in what 
appears to have been a concerted effort to tighten up discipline. Eleven more 
executions were carried out in the 6'h Division during the war, a very high number 
when compared with other divisions. 
0 
There was little alteration in this dual approach to formulating the final decision 
throughout the war with one important exception. It is evident that concerns existed 
from 1914 onwards about the quality of recruits. The soldier's character as well as his 
physique was generally thought to be the product of his heredity. It was widely 
believed that 'degenerate' soldiers had an adverse effect on unit discipline and while 
these concerns were less evident whilst the army remained a regular force issues such 
as eugenics became more and more important as the recruiting net was cast wider. In 
the rninds of some the army was reaching further down towards the bottom of the 
barrel and from 1916 onwards 'degeneracy' became more important in the decision 
malung pro~ess. '~ Coupled with this - and closely related to it - was an increasing 
concern about the effects on discipline of the condition known as shellshock. Indeed, 
many believed that shellshock was a disciplinary matter rather than a medical one and 
0 
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that even acknowledging the condition would undermine the fighting mettle of the 
army, as Lord Moran explained: 
When the name shell-shock was coined the number of men leaving the 
trenches with no bodily wound leapt up. The pressure of opinion in the 
battalion - the idea stronger than fear - was eased by giving fear a respectable 
name. When the social slur was removed and the military risks were abolished 
the weaklings may have decided in cold blood to malinger, or perhaps when 
an alternative was held out the suggestion of safety was too much for their 
feeble 
0 -  
The solution for some was to combat shellshock with tighter discipline. 
iii) Shellshock - A Matter of Discipline 
British soldiers, it has been argued, were especially vulnerable to shellshock during I 
0 the First World War because of their ignorance of modem war and because their 
idealism was constantly frustrated by incompetent  general^.'^ But we should treat this 
view with caution. Most British troops were urban working-class volunteers or 
conscripts who were surprisingly well adapted for the monotony and danger of war 
because of their pre-war experience in industry. Rather than idealistic - a trend 
86 Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, p. 174. 
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perhaps more identifiable with First World War poetry - most workers had low 
expectations. According to one historian: 
Tedium, regimentation, subordination and physical hardship were the 
common lot of the British working man. Industrial accidents were 
commonplace. Those in mining could produce casualty figures almost on a 
military scale. During the war the British worker merely substituted one set of 
hardships for another.89 
In truth, the army's perception of shellshock and the treatment it used was most 
influenced by its own immediate concerns. The sole purpose of treatment, from a 
military point of view, was to return as many men to the fighting line as quickly as 
possible. This was as true of other armies as it was of the British. For example, the 
approach to the problem in the German army bore remarkable similarities to that of 
the British" and reflected all armies' preoccupation with discipline. The practice of 
psychology, and in particular the ideas of Freud, were to benefit enormously from the 0 
experience of the wary' but broadly speaking this was a development that took place 
despite the army's requirements and not because of them. Nevertheless, psychologists 
and others responsible for the treatment of men suffering from war neuroses did find 
some common ground with the military leadership. It has been suggested that the 
89 John Bourne, 'The British Working Man in Arms', p. 345. 
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treatment of ‘anti-military’ behaviour was analogous with ‘anti-social’ behaviour in so 
far as the purpose of treatment was concerned, namely to eradicate deviance.’* There 
can be little doubt that some of the treatment used was intended to act as a deterrent. 
Certain individuals were subjected to particularly brutal treatment. Often these 
reflected pre-existing ideas about ‘outsiders’ who, prior to 1914, were thought to 
represent a danger to society. During the war a threat to military discipline was 
perceived. The distinction between the normal and so-called abnormal dated back to 
the eighteen century, but exerted a strong influence in the diagnosis and treatment of 
shellshock after 1914.93 Especially vulnerable in this were the Irish, who, it was 
widely believed, were pre-disposed to lunacy, and those deemed degenerate. Normal 
men, it was thought, were capable of killing, but those who could not were deemed 
“’childish and infantile” and needed to regain their manhood’.94 It has been suggested 
that ‘so-called “emotional Irishmen” and “weak privates” were given progressively - 
more painful electric shocks in an attempt to compel “cure . This was not unique to 
the British; in other armies Jews and Gypsies were similarly singled 
British army, though, it was the Irish and troops deemed ‘degenerate’ who also were 
most vulnerable to the death penalty.97 
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In the 
To prevent the feared shellshock epidemic, the army employed a number of 
strategies. Firstly, it sought to deter through the military code and with harsh 
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punishments. Secondly, deterrence could be achieved through the form of treatment. 
Finally, there was an overt reluctance to recognise the condition. Partly the result of a 
misunderstanding of the origins and causes of war neurosis, but increasingly to avoid 
legitimising what it saw as malingering, the army divided the condition into two 
categories: commotional and emotional shellshock. The former was characterised by 
its having a physical cause such as being buried by a shell explosion and was 
classified as a wound whilst emotional shellshock was not. After 1918 this had 
profound implications for those seeking pensions.98 During the war, though, this was 
a management ploy rooted in wider concerns about discipline. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between discipline and shellshock was a complex 
one. Some military commanders, like Lieutenant-General Goodwin, told the 
Southborough Committee of Enquiry into Shell-shock that 'well trained and 
disciplined troops were less liable to suffer from chese troubles [war neu r~ses ] ' .~~  
Others such as Dr. Gordon Holmes, a consultant neurologist to the BEF, agreed with 
Lord Moran and stated that 'the great increase in these cases [of shellshock] coincided 
with the knowledge that such a condition of 'shell-shock' existed.'00 By far the 
greatest concern during the war was that shellshock was infectious, causing mass 
hysteria, and destroying discipline in even the best units if not checked. Once again 
individual circumstances became less important than the wider disciplinary concerns, 
a view expressed to the Committee by Lord Gort: 
98 Peter J. Leese, 'A Social and Cultural History of Shellshock, with particular reference to the 
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I think 'shell-shock,' like measles, is so infectious that you cannot afford to run 
risks with it at all and in war the individual is of small account [my italics]. If 
one or two go by the board it is extremely unfortunate and sad but it cannot be 
helped. A large proportion must be wounded or killed. It must be looked upon 
as a form of disgrace to the soldier. A certain class of men are alright out of 
the line but as soon as they know they are to go back they start getting 'shell- 
shock' and so forth. 
It is not clear what Lord Gort meant when he used the word 'class' in this context. If 
he meant it as a comment on the working class troops, who made up most of the rank 
and file, then we should view his opinion as yet more evidence of ascribed traits based 
on ideas about social status and the influence of eugenics in matters of military 
discipline and individual character. But it also is possible that he was referring to a 
'type' of soldier rather than an identifiable social group. If so then his view was 
consistent with many who sat in judgement on the courts-martial and indeed by those - 
whose recommendations influenced the final outcome. After the war a memorandum 
was prepared by the Judge-Advocate-General's office based on statistics extracted 
from capital cases. Thirty-two cases of minors who had been executed were examined 
and in ten instances it was found that shellshock had been used as a defence at trial 
only to be rejected by both the court and the Commander-in-Chief.'" This was a very 
high percentage, which might suggest that shellshock featured in approximately a 
third of cases tried. 
PROW093/49. 
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In another report, written by Major Barnes, D.A.A.G., it was found that in three of 
the eighteen executions for cowardice, courts-martial had rejected a shell-shock 
defence.'02 This reflected the widely held belief in the army that it was pernicious to 
take claims of shellshock too seriously to prevent what they believed would be a 
potential shellshock epidemic. This was succinctly, though unwittingly, expressed by 
Douglas Haig when he appended the remark 'how can we ever win if this plea is 
allowed?' in response to a recommendation for mercy in the case of a nerve-shaken 
soldier during the Battle of the Somme.lo3 a 
Throughout the war shellshock remained a major factor in the army's preoccupation 
with a possible breakdown of discipline. On the other hand, as well as being 
considered a cause of poor discipline, shell-shock was regarded by some as a 
symptom of a lack of discipline brought on by a character defect, as illustrated by 
Lord Moran's comments: 
Good fellows in the line did not believe in shell-shock, they did not want to 
believe in it. Perhaps in their hearts, knowing what lay ahead, they could not 
altogether approve too sensitive men. 
a 
Others viewed the effects of battle on the mind in a different manner. W. H. R. 
Rivers, best known for his treatment of the poet Siegfried Sassoon, was influenced by 
the ideas of Sigmund Freud. According to Rivers, shellshock was brought on by the 
"*PRO W093/49. 
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repression of the natural instinct to flee the battlefield. The consequent neurosis, he 
argued, was the result of a conflict between that instinct and a sense of duty, which 
weighed most heavily on officers who bore'a greater burden because of the nature of 
public school ed~cation.''~ Rivers elaborated on his theory to the Southborough 
Committee: 
The explanation I give [for the causes of shellshock] involves my special 
theoretical position that man's normal reaction to danger is what I call 
manipulative activity. Every animal has a natural reaction to danger, perhaps 
more than one, and man's is manipulation of such a kind to get him out of the 
dangerous situation. . . . If he cannot have that, or if it is restricted in any way, 
you have a prominent condition for the occurrence of neurosis in one form or 
another. 
@ 
' But this view was ndt as unique or as original as Rivers suggested. Nor was it 
radically different to the beliefs of some military theorists. Writing at the turn of the 
century, Colonel Henderson - military historian, theorist and instquctor - remarked: 
0 
The truth is, when bullets are whacking against tree trunks and solid shot are 
cracking skulls like egg shells, the consuming passion in the heart of the 
average man is to get out of the way. Between the physical fear of going 
forward, and the moral fear of turning back, there is a predicament of 
'Os W. H. R. Rivers, Instinct and the Unconscious (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1922), 
especially Chapter IV 'Suppression and Inhibition'. 
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exceptional awkwardness, from which a hidden hole in the ground would be a 
wonderfully welcome outlet. lo6 
This was hardly an endorsement of Freudian theory, but the recognition by some pre- 
war army commanders of a conflict between instinct and duty is significant. The army 
remained a conservative institution at this time, but care should be taken not to ignore 
such modernising influences as did exist. 
Similar views were expressed by some former officers in their evidence to the 
Southborough Committee, but theirs was the minority opinion. Generally, shellshock 
was seen as the result of poor discipline and it was widely held that shellshock did not 
occur in the best or well-disciplined divisions - the final report was most explicit on 
this point."' Soldiers who attempted to defend their actions by citing shellshock were, 
in practical terms, confessing both to the court and to the reviewing officers that they 
lacked discipline. In many cases the exact opposite of the desired effect was achieved. 
This, combined with. the feeling that shellshocked soldiers were of little further value 
to the army, was likely to result in the confirmation of a death sentence. This appears 
to have happened in the cases of Sub-Lieutenant Edwin Dyett and 2"d Lieutenant Eric 
Skeffington Poole - the only two officers to be executed for purely military offences - 
as well as in countless cases involving men of the ranks. 
Dyett and Poole were both represented at their respective trials - in this respect, 
therefore, their cases are unusual - and both presented a sophisticated defence based 
IO6 Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, The Science of War: the author's essays from 1891 to 1903, edited by 
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on long histories of diagnosed, and therefore medically substantiated, shellshock. 
Dyett, a subaltern in the Royal Naval Division, had even requested a transfer to sea 
duties because his nerves could not stand the strain of trench warfare. Poole, who had 
been promoted from the ranks, had been treated for shellshock in July 1916 after 
being hit by clods of earth caused by a shell explosion near Contalmaison. Evacuated 
to a convalescent home, but returned to duty after a medical examination, even his 
comrades acknowledged that he was especially prone to shellshock.lo8 He deserted 
again, which confirmed.in the minds of his commanders the belief that his presence in 
the front line had a detrimental affect on the men in his charge and on discipline in 
general. He was executed on 10 December 1916, the first officer to face a firing 
squad.log 
a '  
Similar case histories can be found amongst the men of the ranks. For example, 
Private Harry .Poole, 7fh Yorkshire Regiment, had been diagnosed as suffering from 
shellshock in July 1915. During the Battle of the Somme in 1916 he left the front line 
trench to which he was posted. He was tried and sentenced to death for desertion. 
However, it was widely known in his unit that he was especially nervous under fire 
and this was recognised by the court and a recommendation to mercy was made 'on 
the grounds of his nervous condition'."' The battalion commander and brigade 
commander agreed and recommended commutation of the sentence. Major-General 
Robertson, GOC 17th Division, recommended that the sentence be commuted and 
Poole transferred to a labour battalion because 'his fervour under fire is such as to 
9 
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render him quite incapable of reason or self-control'." A medical examination 
proved inconclusive and disregarding all the recommendations Douglas Haig 
confirmed the sentence. It seems likely that the overriding concern of the 
Commander-in-Chief was that discipline would collapse if those who broke down 
under fire were transferred to less dangerous duties and this undoubtedly influenced 
his decision. Individuals were indeed 'of small account' when balanced against wider 
concerns of discipline. 
Shellshock weighed heavily on the minds of those responsible for maintaining 
discipline in the British Army, but rarely in a compassionate sense. It seems highly 
unlikely that a condemned soldier was spared the execution post because he was 
suffering from the condition. Indeed, as I have argued, it might even have acted as a 
factor in singling out some of those who were made examples. There was a clear 
rejection of war neuroses as an excuse for failure. What the army most needed to 
avoid was a general belief amongst those in the ranks that condemned men had been 
reprieved because of the state of their nerves. The treatment of shellshock cases 
certainly improved as the war progressed but there is no evidence of a change in 
attitude towards the condition by those responsible for the implementation of military 
justice: they simply could not afford to be seen to allow such a plea. One witness told 
the Southborough Committee that increased understanding of the condition meant that 
one man in particular, whose case he was familiar with, who had been executed in 
1915 would not have faced the same fate in 1917 or 1918.lI2 The evidence simply 
e 
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does not bear out this interpretation. In I917 men were sentenced to death and 
executed in greater numbers than at any other moment in the war - or in British 
military history for that matter. The reduction of death sentences passed in 1918 owed 
more to the altered state of the army and a growing reluctance to use the death penalty 
on conscripted troops than it did to increased awareness of war neuroses. In any case 
many of the executions of 1918 involved men who put forward defences based on 
shellshock but which had been rejected both by the courts and the Commander-in- 
Chief. 
Use of the death penalty on the war fronts was often the subject of debate in 
Britain. There was widespread unease at the thought of the execution of soldiers for 
military crimes such as desertion. Inevitably, concerns that executed men were 
suffering from shellshocksurfaced in parliament and in the newspapers. The Times 
frequently linked the condition with the army's disciplinary practices in articles that 
carried titles such as 'The Death Penalty in the Army' and 'Shell Shock and 
Desertion'.'I3 Early on in the war Lord Knutsford, Chairman of the London Hospital, 
had identified the medical shortcomings of the army: 0 
There are a number of our gallant soldiers for whom at present no proper 
provision is obtained, but is sorely needed. They are men suffering from 
severe mental and nervous shock due to exposure, excessive strain and 
tension. They can be cured if only they can receive the proper attention. If not 
The Times, 1 October 1917 (p. 8) and 20 February 1918 (p. 8). 
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cured they will drift back into the world as miserable wrecks for the rest of 
their lives.' l4 
The army, though, was more concerned with the disciplinary implications of the 
condition. Even Charles Myers, who resigned as consultant to the BEF in 1917 in 
protest at the lack of understanding of such cases, was inclined to consider shellshock 
in the context of discipline.' l5 But as Freud observed: 
The physician himself was under military command and had his own personal 
dangers - loss of seniority or a charge of neglecting his duty - if he allowed 
himself to be led by considerations other than those prescribed for him."6 
iv) The Home Front 
As the army expanded and the burden of the war impacted more on British society 
so too did calls for the imposition on the population of military-style discipline. This 
was not merely a reaction to the introduction of conscription, but can be detected 
during the earliest period of the war. Usually, the death penalty was omitted from 
such calls, but not always. Writing in 1915, Sir Martin Conway - Director-General of 
the Imperial War Museum in 1917 and Independent MP for the combined English 
Universities from 1918 to 1931 - suggested that British workers should dedicate 
themselves to the service of the nation. Conway further suggested that 'If he will not 
' I 4  'Lord Knutsford's Appeal' in The Times, 4 November 1914, p. 5. 
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thus act voluntarily he must thus act under compulsion, and subject to the same 
penalty as awaits a deserter in the field'.'17 Not surprisingly, there appears to have 
been little support for this view and punishments contained in measures aimed at the 
civilian population such as DORA cannot be compared with those in the military 
code. 
Nevertheless, military style discipline did creep into civilian life. The organisation 
and control of the workforce was identified as essential to military success early in the 
war and legislation soon followed. The Asquith government created The Ministry of 
Munitions (which had its own intelligence system) in 1915,with Lloyd George as its 
! 0 
Minister. A National Register, which contained details of everyone between the ages 
of fifteen and sixty-five, became law in July 1915 and formed the basis not only of 
military conscription, 'but conscription for all aspects of the war effort'.''' Britain 
increasingly resembled a military state with 'the military in the ascendant' as the 
' 
country was divided into 'special administrative areas each under the direction of an 
Authorised Competent Military Authority who was answerable to General I 
Headquarters'.' l9 
The realities of total war had dawned on the British and liberalism was an early 
victim. According to Conway: 
'I7 Sir Martin Conway, The Crowd in Peace and War (Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1915), p. 
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In former days it was impossible to co-ordinate for war purposes more than a 
small part of a nation; but modem conditions have altered all that. Now, by aid 
of developed means of communication, the complete co-ordination of all has 
been rendered possible, and those countries which have devoted themselves 
scientifically to preparation for war have learnt how to organise all of the 
forces of a nation to the purpose of fighting. If one combatant [Germany] is 
thus organised its enemy [Britain] must submit to a like discipline. If in one 
country individual liberty is entirely done away with, in the interests of the 
crowd's collective power, its opponents must submit to a like suspension of 
freedom, or the cannot expect to be victorious. Citizens, whose individualism 
is so strong that they will not submit themselves to such restraint, must either 
be compelled to submit to it, or should sacrifice their citizenship. This does 
not necessarily mean that all citizens must fight. Some are weaklings; some 
are cowards; some can do better work at home than at the front; these and a 
good many others are better suited for the various kinds of work that need to 
be done outside the fighting line. But all must be ready to perform the function 
indicated for them by the hierarchies of authority that war should install.'20 
I 
Although the government symbolically clung to some of its liberal values it was 
increasingly obvious that measures such as those espoused by Conway were 
necessary. Lord Derby's compromise scheme for recruitment into the armed forces, 
which unsuccessfully sought to avoid compulsion, typified the Liberals government's 
Conway, The Crowd in Peace and War, p. 299. 120 
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dilemma. Mirroring this process was the increasing role of the State, and, in 
particular, the Munitions of War Act and the various amendments to the Defence of 
the Realm Act, which placed many factories under the control of the Admiralty and 
the War Office. The role of the military gradually expanded and by the end of 19 17 
the army was also ‘responsible for monitoring and managing “industrial and 
revolutionary unrest in the United Kingdom”’, a role it maintained until 1920.12’ The 
marriage of the military and British society was hardly natural and conflict did 
occasionally arise. Insensitive military authorities were partly responsible for the 
unrest of 1917, though the main causes lay e1~ewhere.l~~ The military for its part had ~ 
little understanding of the populace and even less sympathy for workers who, it , ?  
believed, had it easy by escaping militmy service. Consequently, it was not unusual 
for striking workers to be conscripted into the army as happened in Rochdale 
following a dispute about illegal dilution of the workforce.’23 It is interesting that in 
this case although the firm was in the wrong and was fined by the government for its 
actions, the response entailed handing over to the military potential ringleaders of 
0 future disputes. It appears that military punishments, including the threat of death 
penalty, could be indirectly applied to troublesome workers. 
Nor were such measures confined to Britain. Elsewhere in the Empire similar views 
prevailed in the ever-changing relationship between State and worker. In Canada, 
where military conscription became law on 29 August 19 17, political exigencies had 
forced Prime-Minister Borden to pledge respect for religious beliefs and to disrupt 
”’ Englander, ‘Military Intelligence and defence of the realm’, p. 24. 
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farming, family life and business as little as possible. In agrarian British Columbia 
objections to military service were most usually based on the impact enforced military 
service of the most able would have on family farms. But, following an appeal by 
forty-nine coal miners, exemption from military service was granted to thirty-five of 
them because of the essential nature of their work. In his judgement, however, Judge 
Thompson, warned the miners: 
These appellants must understand they are now soldiers. And where 
exemption is granted to them it is so granted because the Court is of the 
opinion they are of greater value to the nation by remaining coal miners than 
by becoming soldiers. And the only way they can continue to be of greater 
value as coal miners than as soldiers is by producing coal. . . . they must work 
as steadily and continuously as though they had donned khaki.'24 
0 
Judge Thompson also laid down a set of military style rules under which the coal 
miners could continue to work. These included continuous employment at the mine 
and an obligation to ensure that no strike - including those by other workers - 
interfered with their work. The penalty for failure in this last instance was harsh: 
0 
In the event of a strike or cessation of work by workmen other tha[n] 
exempted men whereby the latter are prevented from working, exemptions 
124 Findings of Appeal Tribunal No. 12, convened at Fernie, B. C., Canada on 26 January 1918. British 
Columbia Records Office, Victoria, B. C., Canada, ref. 274686-2 (hereafter referred to as Fernie 
Miners' Judgement), pp. 2-3. 
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shall cease, subject however, to the provisions in rules 9 [arrest by military 
authorities] and 10 [future judicial orders]. 
This may seem a harsh ruling but it must be remembered that this appeal has 
been made by the United Mine Workers of America, and it will be the duty of 
the officials of the brotherhood to ensure that no such strikes or cessations of 
work occur.125 
The relationship between the military and the civilian workforce had been realigned. 
Standards of discipline amongst the workers did not necessarily equate to those of the 
army and punishments were certainly less harsh, but for those who did not attain the 
expected standard the alternative was often conscription and, therefore, exposure to 
the death penalty. 
0 
For some the threat of the death penalty became a reality. After the introduction of 
conscription in Britain, tribunals heard applications for exemption based on grounds 
of conscience. Approximately 16,000 men registered their objections to military 
service, of which approximately 3,300 accepted service in the Non-Combatant Corps 
on the Western Front. Others perfonned additional essential work, but more than 
6,000 refused to assist the war effort and went to prison. About 1,500 of these proved 
to be intractable cases, the others being employed under a Home Office scheme.'26 
The challenge to authority offered by these few men baffled the military authorities, 
whose responsibility they had become, and resolution of the problem was sought in 
0 
the traditional military manner - deterrence. Three groups of conscientious objectors 
Fernie Miners' Judgement, pp. 3-4. 




were smuggled out to the Western Front and there thirty-four of them were convicted 
of the military offence of disobedience and sentenced to death by courts-martial in 
June 1916. The death sentences were eventually commuted by the Commander-in- 
Chief to ten years penal servitude, but only after the direct intervention of the Prime- 
Minister. The Commander-in-Chief did not confirm condemnations on four more 
men.12’ Coming only weeks after military courts had so rigidly applied the law in 
Ireland following the Easter Rising, this was a clear example of how military law 
could be applied to the civilian populace as well as to troops. 0 
v) Summation 
The outcome of only a very few capital cases appears to have been decided on the 
basis of its own merits. Disciplinary concerns were a major feature of the decision 
making process in most instances and the major factor in many of those cases. 
However, a survey of all the confirmed sentences in 1914 and 1915 (fifty-eight in 
total) reveals that in the majority of instances unit, brigade and divisional 
commanders stated that discipline was good. Criticism of the state of discipline 
normally crept in at corps and army There is an obvious explanation for this: 
commanders were unwilling to admit to poor discipline in their own units as this was 
tantamount to self-criticism. What this reveals is that the army placed such value on 
good discipline that commanders were too afraid to face the consequences of 
appearing to be poor disciplinarians. It also reveals that the term was sufficiently 
vague to be interpreted differently at various levels of command: no-one appears to 
0 
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have been concerned with the contradictions contained in the comments attached to 
each case file. 
Of greater concern to those in a position to influence the bureaucratic process of 
confirmation was the perceived effect of regular examples. Executions assumed 
enormous importance in the rationale that underpinned the army's disciplinary 
approach. This was partly because of existing traditions - the British army had carried 
out a surprisingly high number of executions throughout the nineteenth century - but 
the reformation of the military code prior to the passing of the Army Act in 1881 had 
also impacted on disciplinary practice. In particular, the abolition of flogging (also 
1881) had significant implications for soldiers during the First World War. The army 
had traditionally placed such emphasis on harsh deterrent-orientated punishments that 
the abolition of flogging had left a vacuum. Alternatives had simply not been 
developed with the result that from 1914 until 1917 the army became increasingly 
dependent on capital punishment, which some commanders regarded as the only 
effective measure to combat desertion in particular. 
0 
0 Imprisonment, it was thought, only rewarded the coward by removing him from the 
trenches. The Army Suspension of Sentences Act of 1915 was designed to retain men 
in the trenches 'with the sentence hanging over his head' rather than 'reward' offenders 
with prison  sentence^.'^^ In the field, extensive use was made of the increasingly 
unpopular Field Punishment: 80,989 men were sentenced to field punishments by 
courts-martial - officers were not similarly p~nished.'~' But the absence of traditional 
forms of corporal punishment and their inability to develop alternative strategies to 
Childs, Episodes and Re4flections, p. 137. 
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maintain discipline increasingly forced British commanders to regard capital 
punishment as the solution, at least until the end of 1917. In one of the first capital 
cases the commander of the 12'h Infantry Brigade remarked that 'a serious example is 
necessary' to prevent absence from the front line.'31 Similar sentiments were 
expressed in other cases, but General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, commander of the 
Yd ~ r m y ,  was more explicit: 
There is a serious prevalence of desertion to avoid duty in the trenches, 
especially in the sth Brigade and I am sure that the only way to stop it is to 
carry out some death sentences [my italics].'32 
0 
Identical views were expressed in another case the following year: 'there are still a 
few cases of this desertion and the full penalty is the only means by which it can [be] 
stopped'. '33 
The steady increase in the number of condemnations - 85 in 1914; 591 in 1915; 856 
in 1916 and 904 in 1917 - reflected not only the enlarged size of the army, but also the 
increasing reliance on capital punishments in the absence of viable alternatives. In 
1918, however, the number of death sentences passed by courts-martial fell to a mere 
515. This dramatic fall was the result of changes within the army as it modernised. 
Not only were conscripts, who by 1918 made up the bulk of the army, handled with 
greater caution than were their volunteer predecessors, but an alteration in strategic 
a 
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thought - resulting from the disappointments of 1916 and 1917 - brought with it a 
subtle shift in views about the role of individual soldiers. Fully discussed in the 
following chapter, the basic feature of ths argument is that at the end of 1917 the 
British High Command abandoned as the basis for victory its reliance on the 
perceived moral superiority of the British soldier over his German adversary. 
Thereafter, the emphasis shifted away from nineteenth-century ideas of individualism. 
Discipline, whether individual or collective, remained the focus of military 
leadership. Throughout the war the relationship between leaders and led was 
redefined as it increasingly absorbed men from all sections of society. As John 
Bourne points out: 'The new citizen army was never completely docile in the face of 
military authority even on first a~quaintance'. '~~ But the High Command clung on to 
ultimate control over the mechanisms of justice and discipline. Primarily concerned 
with defeating the enemy, thewmy cared little for individual soldiers. Military law 
merely served to legitimate this authority, which was usually handled with a 
surprising degree of caution, but which on occasions was applied in a most oppressive 
and brutal manner. 
Soldiers in the German army were protected by the principle of the Rechtsstuut, 
French troops had the theoretical protection of the President of the Republic. Troops 
in other armies were allowed a right of appeal, but British soldiers enjoyed no such 
legal protection. Instead, British troops relied on the benevolence of the Commander- 
in-Chief or more likely the head of Personal Services Branch acting on his behalf. It is 
remarkable, therefore, that fewer British troops were executed than in the Austro- 
134 John Bourne, 'The British Working Man in Arms', p. 345. 
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Hungarian and Russian armies where the right of appeal was preserved. Despite the 
lack of any clearly defined legal protection against miscarriages of justice it appears 
that considerable restraint was exercised during the confirmation process. But the 
British soldier was far more at risk than the Frenchpoilu and even more so than his 
German counterpart. Restraint there most certainly was, but in an army where 
traditional punishments had been so dominated by the principle of deterrent the death 
penalty was viewed for much of the war as the most efficient means of preserving 
discipline. The army's dilemma was best summed up by Childs' rhetorical question 
'what alternative punishment is there, when troops are facing the enemy?'135 
a 
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Chapter 3 
Military Theory and Redefining Troop Morale 
The concept of 'morale' is vague. In a recent study Gary Sheffield called it 'an 
imprecise term',' echoing J. G. Fuller's 1990 evaluation that it is 'an elusive subject'.2 
Earlier commentators also struggled to define it. Even the influential military theorist, 
Clausewitz, whose writings were valued by European military commanders, including 
the British, was deliberately vague on the matter: 
0 
We prefer, therefore, to remain here more than usually incomplete and 
rhapsodical, content to have drawn attention to the importance of the subject 
in a general way. 3 
Yet this vague term assumed an enormous importance in British military thought and 
during much of the war it formed an essential element of strategic planning. Napoleon 
and Clausewitz remained the most influential writers for those who tried to define 
morale. Pre-war military theorists believed that human nature and, more importantly, 
human character shaped the fighting qualities of their troops. Likewise, other armies 
relied on similar qualities amongst their own troops. Undermining the enemy's morale 
a 
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was as important as sustaining one's own. According to Colonel Henderson, an 
instructor at Sandhurst and the Staff College from 1890-1899 whose writings were 
widely studied in the years leading up to the First World War: 
Human nature must be the basis of every leader's calculations. To sustain the 
moraZ[e] of his own men; to break down the moral[e] of his enemy - these are 
the great objects which, if he be ambitious of success, he must always keep in 
view.4 
In common with other theorists writing at the turn of the century, Henderson used the 
word moral rather than morale in his writings. This can be confusing to the modern 
student but, as we will see, the terms are virtually interchangeable. The initial 
question then, is, what was this quality, what were its origins and how was it 
understood by commanders during World War One? 
In his evidence to the Southborough Committee inquiring into shellshock, Colonel 
a J. F. C. Fuller, had defined morale as 'the acquired quality which in highly-trained 
troops counterbalances the influence of the instinct of self-preservati~n'.~ This is 
remarkably close to Henderson's own pre-war evaluation, except Henderson saw the 
suppression of this instinct as 'the moral fear of turning back, indicating that a strong 
sense of duty and purpose underpinned what was in effect a willingness to continue 
fighting.6 It is interesting that Henderson values the moral fear - a sense of duty - 
Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, The Science of War: Author's Essays from 1891 to 1903, edited by 
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more so than an actual fear of, say, the death penalty, implying, perhaps, that the 
consent of the troops was necessary and that it took more than mere deterrent to 
maintain control of an army. Despite its authoritarian nature, the British, like all other 
armies, had to mobilise a mixture of strategies just to keep men in the field of battle. 
In practice a certain degree of negotiation was essential to the process, but this was 
backed-up by a disciplinary system that could be rigidly applied. One historian has 
recently observed that 'sticks' could be used if the 'carrots' appeared to faiL7 Military 
theorists on the other hadregarded motivation as the key to morale. Good leadership 
and a belief in the justness of the cause, which to pre-war British observers usually 
meant the preservation of the Empire, were essential factors in building this 
commitment to the war effort. These ideas broadly reflected perceived Clausewitzian 
wisdom. According to Clausewitz there were three factors, which he termed 'The 
Chief Moral Powers', that impacted on troop morale: 'The Talents of the Commander; 
The Military Virtue of the Army; Its National Feeling l8 Able generals, he argued, 
engendered 'a spirit of boldness' in their troops, which acted to counter 'effeminacy of 
feeling' and 'degeneracy in a people rising in prosperity and immersed in an extremely 
busy commerce'.' This was itself an extension of Napoleon's own ideas. In 1806 the 
Emperor had accused one of his generals of being 'dishonourable' by leaving his 
troops with the result that 'the army is becoming effeminate'.'' A corporate identity, or 
esprit de corps, the result of expert training, fostered the army's military virtue - 
Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (Allen Lane, London, 1998), pp. 342-356. 
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Clauswitz's second determining factor. But national spirit, which resulted in 
'enthusiasm, fanatical zeal, faith, opinion', was the bedrock of troop morale in the 
Clausewitzian sense." Most of these concepts were reflected in the 1914 War Office 
booklet Infantry Training, which encouraged officers to instil in their troops 'a sense 
of personal honour, duty, patriotism and esprit de 
importance was placed on good leadership, the emphasis being firmly on the efficacy 
of British imperialism. 
It appears that less 
It.was this last feature that most linked notions of morality to morale. In Britain the e 
preservation of the Empire was often portrayed as a moral duty. Conquered peoples 
were referred to as savages and the British colonists portrayed as civilizers. This was 
particularly so in the case of India where perceptions of Indian immorality helped to 
define the rationale that underpinned British rule. The most potent of moralistic 
weaponry - sexuality and sexual degeneracy - was often used to demonstrate why 
India could not be trusted to rule i t~e1f.I~ This rationale, which emerged during the 
nineteenth century, endured until after the First World War. General Dyer told an 
enquiry into the massacre at Amritsar in 1919 that he had ordered troops to open fire 
on the crowd because 'it would be doing a jolly lot of good and they [Indians] would 
realise that they were not to be wicked [by resisting British rule]'. The justification, he 
claimed, was not 'a question of merely dispersing the crowd, but one of producing a 
sufficient moral effect, from a military point of view, not only on those who were 
present but more specially throughout the Punjab'.I4 But it was the spirit of the moral 
0 
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cause and the morale of British troops that were seemingly inseparable. The Times 
reported in 1912 that the ‘Moral of the British Force in Egypt’ was ‘the same 
irresistible force, generated by phlegmatic, patient, obstinate British Infantry, that has 
built the Empire’.’’ Henderson cited ‘long centuries of free government and individual 
liberty’ as the greatest factor in sustaining British soldiers’ morale, adding that: 
It was not to strict discipline, not to enterprise of war, nor even to native 
hardiness, that Sir William Napier [a highly regarded military theorist and 
historian of the Napoleonic wars] attributed the military virtues of the British 
soldier, but to the British constitution.16 
a 
This thinly veiled reference to liberalism was consistent with Henderson’s stance 
on conscription. Despite growing calls for the introduction of compulsory military 
service around the turn of the century, Henderson was not convinced. Significantly, it 
was the commitment - the morale - of conscripts that most concerned him. Following 
the Boer War he had defended the principle of voluntary service, adding that ‘the 
moral of conscript armies has always been their weakest point’.” Other commentators 
had also called into question the reliability of troops not fighting for a national cause. 
In fact this particular line of thought dates back at least as far as Machiavelli who had 
advised against employing foreign auxiliary or mercenary troops whom he variously 
described as cowards and as being useless. Machiavelli, like Clausewitz some three 
0 
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centuries later, advised the use of a citizen army, bound by its very nature to be more 
committed to the fight.'* 
After the war it was suggested by some that there existed a relationship between a 
lack of patriotic spirit and war neurosis. According to Dr. E. Mapother of the 
Maudsley Neurological Hospital this was mostly manifested in those defective in 
intelligence. 'The intellectually defective', he argued, 'is incapable of endurable 
patriotism', which often resulted in psycho~is.'~ George Mosse has argued that 'the 
nation reflected and supported the stereotypes of normative society'. Shell-shocked 
soldiers who were unable to fight, he argues, were viewed as unpatriotic. The 
condition was regarded as 'a mental state which mirrored a social disease and national 
degeneration'.20 It was no coincidence that the same groups of men - the Irish and so- 
called degenerate city dwellers - who were thought to be pre-disposed to suffering 
from shell-shock, had been considered a threat to society itself before the war, 
especially in matters relating to crime. Patriotism, it was thought,. underpinned morale 
and contributed to the lack of crime, especially military crime. Speaking of the Union 
army during the American Civil War, Henderson noted that 'the moral of the armies 
. . . was necessarily good. Crime was practically unknown; of insubordination there 
was very little'. This, he observed, was achieved in spite of low standards of discipline 
because of 'the presence of men of intelligence and high principle'.2' 
~~ ~ 
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The suggestion that morale was the product of social and political as well as 
military tradition was a refinement of Clausewitz's ideas. It placed the emphasis on 
long-term factors and, therefore, away from Napoleon's assertion that poor morale 
was solely the fault of bad officers. Napoleon frequently complained of poor 
standards in his officer corps, and often blamed them for indiscipline or inefficiency 
amongst his troops: 'when troops are demoralised', he told General de Wrede, 'it is for 
their Commanders and officers to restore their morale, or to die in the attempt'.22 After 
inspecting the 37'h Light Infantry in 1813, he complained.to his Minister of War that 
'it would be impossible to see a finer body of men - or a worse set of officers'.23 
Napoleon, it seems, rarely had poor troops, but frequently had poor officers. Despite 
the influence of Napoleonic thought it appears that this doctrine had limited impact on 
the British army during the Great War. The problem was simply that while British 
tactics often anticipated the collapse of German morale, little account was taken of. 
deteriorating morale in the British army. There existed no centralised office, no 
uniform policy and no co-ordinated approach to the issue of t ro~p-morale .~~ 
Consequently, commanders were able to interpret indicators in their own preferred 
manner, taking action as they thought fit. Needless to say, few of them viewed poor 
morale as the fault of inadequate generalship because that was tantamount to 
professional suicide. Instead, problems could be ignored by vague interpretation of 
the data or the fault was laid at the feet of the troops. But complaints about troops 
were seemingly rare before offensives: at least one British commander subsequently 
0 
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suggested that 'it was common talk that no Divisional Commander dared say his 
Infantry were unfit to attack for fear of being sent home'.25 Travers has indicated that 
many British commanders focused on perceived deficiencies amongst their troops to 
account for failures in their units rather than issues of leadership and tactics, 
particularly following the shambles at Loos in 1915 and again during the Somme 
campaign.26 Furthermore, concerns about the poor quality of troops appear to have 
been heightened in formations where discipline was believed to be suspect. In at least 
one division, a number of executions were carried out in response to criticism of the 
formation from senior commanders during 19 16. Significantly, the executions were 
justified on the grounds of the generally poor quality of troops in the division - the 
evaluation of its commander who retained his command in spite of colicems over 
poor discipline in his division.27 Generals were, however, often removed from their 
commands: a process known as 'degumming'.28 It was probably through fear of this 
that many commanders sought to shift the blame for failure away from themselves 
and onto their troops. Despite the teaching of theorists such as Henderson and the 
intentions of the High Command it seems that Napoleon's ideas were not always 
adhered to by every British commander. 
0 
Q 
Clausewitz listed the talents of the commander first of his three factors that 
determined morale. In Britain, by the turn of the century, these immediate causes had 
assumed less importance and the emphasis in military thought focused on the essential 
25 Cited in T. H. E. Travers, The Killing Ground The British Army, the Westem Front and the 
Emergence of Modem Warfare, 1900-1918 (Routledge, London, 1990),, p. 20. 
26 Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 17 & pp. 127-146. 
*' The case of the 35Ih Division; see extended discussion in chapter 4. See also, G. Oram, "'A serious 
example is necessary": The Death Penalty and the British Army 1900-1918: forthcoming article. 
** A most extreme case of this occurred in December 1916 when the commander of 81h Division and his 
staff officer were sacked in response to concerns of poor discipline. 
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role the army played in preserving the Empire. During the First World War this took a 
more specific form that inextricably linked it to the defeat of Prussian militarism. 
Both the preservation of the Empire and the defeat of Prussian militarism were 
invariably portrayed in moralistic terms. The increasing portrayal of the enemy as 
immoral was a vital ingredient to raising the morale of the country and, more 
specifically, of troops in the field. The main function of propaganda was to maintain 
the war effort of soldiers and civilians alike and the Government capitalised on 
incidents such as German atrocities in Belgium, the sinking of the Lusitania and 
unrestricted submarine warfare. Many of the stories concerning German atrocities 1 
committed against the civilian population of Belgium were factually correct, but 
others such as the baby with severed hands were clearly an exaggeration.*’ The 
importance of these stories to the army, and to British society, was that it underpinned 
the notion of a ‘moral war’ and bolstered the nation’s commitment to the war effort - 
its morale. As Jay Winter has asserted ‘consent was an essential element of mass 
war fare’. O 
1/ 
, 
Brigadier-General Crozier was not averse to ‘doping the minds of all with 
propagandic poison’ to inculcate ‘the brute-like bestiality which is so necessary for 
victory’.31 Other forms were more subtle. Troops of all armies at the front were 
inundated with correspondence that mixed patriotic and sacred images. The morality 
*’ More than 6,500 Belgian and French civilians were executed by German firing squads in the first 
months of the war. In most cases this appears to have been a case of an over-reaction by the army units 
concerned: a ‘great fear’ of a Franc-tirreur type resistance had taken hold in the invading forces. John 
Horne, ‘German War-Crimes in Belgium and France, August-October 19 14’, conference paper given at 
the Unquiet Graves Conference at Ieper, Belgium on 20 May 2000. 
30 Jay M. Winter, ‘Propaganda and the Mobilization of Consent‘ in Hew Strachan (ed.), The Oxford 
Zllustrated History ofthe First World War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), p. 216. 
31 Brigadier-General F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land (Cedric Chivers, Bath, 1930), p. 42. 
143 
of one's own cause and the immorality of the enemy was a simple juxtaposition all 
could comprehend even if the message was differently constructed on either side of 
the barbed wire. Germany denounced the allies for bringing uncivilised black troops 
to a European theatre whilst the allies concentrated on vilifying a militaristic culture 
that had inflicted 'the disease of 'Prussimism" on the 
troop morale, therefore, was an enduring belief in both the cause for which men were 
fighting and in the superiority of their national character. Morale was synonymous 
A basic ingredient of 
with morality. 
This relationship between morality and troop morale was a key feature of 
contemporary military thought. But ideas about the nature of these qualities came 
from a much earlier time, and there is evidence that it was little understood by those 
who were expected to apply such theories in the field. Henderson suggested that: 
'Moral force,' says Napoleon, .'is to the physical,' that is, to numbers, armament 
and training, as 'three to one.' Clausewitz, the most profound of all writers on 
war, says that everyone understands what this moral force is and how it is 
applied. But Clausewitz was a genius, and geniuses and clever men have a 
distressing habit of assuming that everyone understands what is perfectly clear 
to themselves. They often forget that they are speaking to or writing for men 
of average intelligence, who do not reflect deeply, and have to be told 
important truths instead of discovering them for themselves. Referring to my 
own experience, I am convinced that the young officer of average intelligence 
32 Winter, 'Propaganda and Mobilization of Consent', pp. 219-220. 
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but seld m grasps the m aning of Napoleon's maxim. He acc pts it, as soldiers 
accept the words of the greatest soldier of them all, without question. But he 
gets no further. His text-books repeat the maxim, but being concerned with 
minor tactics only, he does not discuss it; and there is no treatise, so far as I 
am aware, which explains what the nature of this moral force is or how it has 
been utilised in the field. Nothing is more difficult than to drive into men's 
heads the fact that the great generals took this moral force into account in all 
their plans of battles, that the effects they expected from their combinations 
were based upon moral considerations, and that it was because of this that we 
call them 'great'. To those, therefore, who find themselves in the same 
predicament as I certainly was once myself - accepting the maxim without in 
the least understanding it - I venture to add a few words which may enlighten 
them. 
Such enlightenment may prove of no immediate benefit. But no general, no 
commander of an independent force, can hope for great and decisive success 
without grasping Napoleon's meaning so thoroughly that he is always trying to 
express it in action; and the sooner officers gain this knowledge the more 
familiar will it become - the more likely to be utilised when their time for 
command arrives. Moreover, when they read of war, when they hear of war, or 
when they criticise generals and operations, as young officers sometimes do, 
they will see things from a new point of view, listen to them with a more 
145 
intelligent interest, and perhaps be more judicious in the way in which they 
apportion praise or blame.33 
It appears, therefore, that even the most valued military writings available at the turn 
of the century, whilst they referred to the value of moral(e) qualities, were unable to 
provide a precise definition. Henderson, in trying to analyse Napoleon's writings, 
placed the emphasis on human nature and drew attention to the importance of 
competent leadership and the welfare of troops: '0 
The first thing is to realise that in war we have to do not so much with 
numbers, arms, and manoeuvres, as with human nature. 
What did Napoleon find in the history of the campaigns of Alexander the 
Creat, Hannibal and Julius Caesar? Not merely a record of marches and 
manoeuvres, of the use of entrenchments, or of the general principles of attack 
and defence. This is the mechanical part - the elementary part - of the science 
of command. 
No; he found in those campaigns a complete study of human nature under the 
conditions that exist in war; human nature affected by discipline, by fear, by 
the need of food, by want of confidence, by over-confidence, by the weight of 
responsibility, by political interests, by patriotism, by distrust, and by many 
other things. The lessons he learned from the campaigns he studied so 
carefully were not mechanical movements and stereotyped combinations. He 
33 Henderson, The Science of War, pp. 173-174. 
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was not merely an imitator. Not one of his campaigns has its exact prototype 
in history - but he learned from history the immense value of the moral 
element in war; to utilise it to the utmost became instinctive, and he played 
upon the hearts of his enemies and of his own men with a skill which has 
never been 
But the importance of the Napoleonic lessons, as seen through the eyes of 
Clausewitz, remained a staple for early twentieth-century military theorists. 
Particularly impressive to these later observers, was Napoleon's grasp of the human 
dimension of war. Understanding human nature, and the impact of battle on human 
behaviour, increasingly concerned those writing about modern warfare. In his 
introduction to the 1908 edition of Clausewitz's On War, the British commander, 
Colonel Maude, cited this as an essential feature of military command: 
Death, wounds, suffering, and privation remain the same, whatever the 
weapons employed, and their reaction on the ultimate nature of man is the 
same now as in the struggle a century ago. It is this reaction that the Great 
Commander has to understand and prepare himself to control.35 
Similar views can be detected during the early part of the war. Brigadier-General R. 
J. Kentish told officers at the Third Army training course in France in November 1915 
Henderson, The Science of War, p. 174. 34 
35 Colonel F. N. Maude, 'Introduction' to Clausewitz, On War (Penguin. London, 1982), p. 89. 
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that 'Students of human nature are the most fertile producers of Moral'. He too implied 
that troop welfare was of great importance: 
Provided the mind is in the proper mood, provided the individual is satisfied 
and contented with his lot, he will be prepared to endure and to face every 
form of hardship and danger which may from time to time confront him. 
. 
Kentish echoed many of Henderson's remarks concerning the kind of factors required 
to sustain morale: 
Moral force in modern war preponderates over physical force as greatly as 
formerly. Of the many factors which may create moral force, some of the most 
powerful - such as success in battle, a great leader, a popular cause - cannot 
form part of training in peace. 
Others disagreed and placed the emphasis on more traditional ideas linking morale 
to firm discipline. Lord Moran, for whom morale was defined by courage, regarded 
them as inseparable: 
If discipline is relaxed when it has not been replaced by a high morale, you get 
a mob who will obey their own primitive instincts [self-preservation?] like 
animals. 36 
36 Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 2nd Edition (Constable, London, 1966), p. 166. 
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John Baynes argued that morale was defined by battlefield efficiency. He suggested 
that five factors were crucial to the preservation of morale. These were: regimental 
loyalty rooted by community; confidence in the leadership; strong discipline; a sense 
of duty that reduced shirking; and sound administration that ensured a steady supply 
of rations and amm~nition.~' This is a traditional view of morale - placing an 
emphasis on localised recruiting, strong rather than equitable discipline and 
expressing concerns about shirking - fused with lessons drawn from the war 
experience - concerns about the quality of leadership and the importance of logistics. 
Writing in eugenist tones, Lord Moran placed character, shaped by 'stock' as the 
most important determinant of morale. He saw in some soldiers 'a natural unfitness 
for war'38 adding 'it is only bad stock that brings defeat',39 Morale, he argued, was 
produced from within rather than imposed through discipline by others: 'A man with 
high morale does things because in his own mind he has decided to do them without 
any suggestion from outside sources'.4o Yet for both Moran and Baynes, morale 
entailed a purely military evaluation rooted in discipline. The former anticipated self- 
discipline and the latter an imposed form, but both regarded it in a purely military 
sense. The impact of civilian life and the home front was of little consideration here. 
As we will see, however, civilian contact and the maintenance of community ties was 
at least of equal importance to troop morale. 
e 
0 
John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage (Cassell, London, 1967), p. 253. 37 
38 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, p. 175. 
39 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, p. 178. 
40 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, p. 166. 
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However much these various accounts differ in their approach, all focus on the 
willingness of troops to continue fighting. This, therefore, best defines what 
constitutes morale - a willingness to continue fighting under whatever conditions 
prevail at the time. In his analysis of the subject, Gary Sheffield agrees. He also refers 
to the mood and spirit of the men. The mood, he argues was 'transient and subject to 
frequent change', but fighting spirit - a Clausewitzian concept - 'was concerned with 
the ultimate willingness of individuals or groups to engage in combat'.41 It was to this 
willingness to fight that wartime commanders referred when they spoke of moral 
qualities or morale. Yet this willingness to sustain the fight, it seems, was dependent 
upon other factors and here there is much common ground. Factors such as 
confidence in the generals, belief in the justness of the cause, success in battle and 
loyalty to the unit or formation - what is often referred to as esprit de corps - were all 
important to contemporary commentators. 
a 
It was the two of the earliest twentieth-century military thinkers who placed least 
emphasis on discipline, perhaps suggesting a break from traditional military thought. 
Henderson (1903) and Kentish (1915) focused rather on positive factors to sustain 
morale and did not consider how the length of the war could erode the troops' 
willingness to continue fighting. Furthermore, neither author appears to have 
envisaged a situation in which confidence in the leadership and a lack of success in 
battle had depleted the men's willingness to fight for a cause, which no longer seemed 
a just one to many. In short, those factors deemed necessary to troop-morale were not 
in place for much of World War One and this was the situation with which British 
e 
Sheffield, 'Officer-Men Relations', p. 65. 41 
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commanders had to cope. Writing after the war both Baynes and Moran appear to 
have recognised that morale had not been sustained throughout the war and favoured 
more traditional views that blamed poor morale on weak discipline. The link between 
morale and discipline appeared an obvious one to many. Poor performance in battle 
suggested 'a lack of offensive spirit', another term for poor morale, to some 
commanders. The remedy was often believed to be firmer discipline. 
This confusion about how best to sustain the morale of the troops characterised 
practice during the war. In the same way that many commanders, lacking confidence 
in alternatives; fell back on traditional forms of punishments, so too did manysapply a 
rigid disciplinary regime, including frequent executions, when the morale of their 
troops appeared suspect. The equation here was simple; some commanders believed 
that the best way of dealing with those who displayed little willingness to fight was 
the threat of brutal punishments. For example, it has been suggested that General 
Gough wanted to shoot two officers to restore an offensive spirit in his 5'h Army 
during 19 1 8.42 Crozier believed ,that morale needed to be supported by deterrence: 
The question of ability to 'stick it' or to do the right thing in the right way, in 
action, is largely one of morale; but the fact cannot be overlooked that fear of 
the consequences undoubtedly plays an important part in the reasoning powers 
of men distracted by fear, cold, hunger, thirst or complete loss of morale and 
42 Brigadier -General Edmonds in a letter to G. C. Wynne, 17 February 1944. Cited by Travers, The 
Killing Ground, p, 20. This account should, however, be treated with caution. Not only was there some 
antipathy between Edmonds and Gough, but he also suggests that two executions of officers were 
carried out in 1918. This is patently untrue; the only officers executed for military offences were both 
shot in early 1917. 
. 
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staying power. I should be very sorry to command the finest army in the world 
without the power behind me which the fear of execution brings.43 
But the link between morale and traditional military discipline was not always 
clear. According to Henderson 'the discipline of the mass is insufficient. The man 
must be animated by something more than the spirit of unthinking ~ b e d i e n c e ' . ~ ~  This 
seems to imply that a certain amount of consent was sought so that men would 
continue fighting, This consent also had to be retained and it was clear to many that 
harsh punishments could erode that consent if not handled sensitively. In a 1915 
memorandum on Field Punishments, Lieutenant-Colonel S. V. Riddell - an Assistant- 
Adjutant and Quarter-Master-General with General Maxse's 1 €fh Division - advised 
other commanders that 'the reason for these punishments should be explained . . . and 
thus we shall carry the public opinion of our men with us'.45 This was certainly no 
rejection of harsh punishments, but advice to ensure that such practice could be 
maintained. 
0 .  
. 
0 The army did develop a complex alternative system to sustain the men's willingness 
to fight. Much of this represented a continuation of pre-war practice, but the 
emergence of a mass army also demanded new methods and ideas. Many of these 
reflected wider changes and developments in society. The emergence of mass 
entertainment media such as the cinema and music hall type concerts were an 
important feature of this process. The army, following its own instincts based on 
43 Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, p. 47. 
45 Leiutenant-Colonel S .  V. Riddell, Memorandum on Field Punishments, 9 November 1915 (p. 2) in 
Maxse Papers, IWM, 6915316, File 14/1. 
Henderson, The Science of War, p. 41 2. 44 
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military tradition, encouraged sports and horse trials, but the new mass army brought 
with it a strong demand for mass entertainment. J. G. Fuller has shown how 'British 
and Dominion troops in the First World War carried over from civilian life many 
institutions and attitudes which helped them to adjust to, and to humanize, the new 
world in which they found themselves'?6 But if, as Fuller asserts, these activities were 
initiated not by the commanders or the officers, but by the troops themselves, then 
they were nevertheless sanctioned by the army, often at the expense of more 
traditional training. In accommodating the demands of the citizen-soldiers, the army 
was modernising. This casts doubt on the view of the army merely as an oppressive 
and authoritarian institution and of British soldiers as deferential and down trodden. 
Yet oppression there certainly was; the frequency of harsh military punishments is 
evidence that the army could act in a most brutal manner. In truth there were great 
variations between units and, as we will see, in different theatres of the war. 
Commanders adopted differing techniques according to their own ideas and 
circumstances. Some favoured a disciplinary approach, others less so. No doubt many 
were prepared to try a combination of techniques to maintain troop-morale. 
a 
0 
There was also confusion about the state of the enemy's morale. In keeping with 
Napoleon's teachings, as interpreted through Clausewitz and Henderson, the British 
army invested a large amount of time and energy in evaluating the morale of the 
German army with a view to undermining it. Brigadier-General John Charteris, who 
was responsible for intelligence, compiled reports on German morale usually based on 
46 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, p. 175. 
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interrogations of prisoners. During the offensive at Vimy in 1917 Charteris was 
puzzled by what he took to be contradictory evidence: 
At some parts whole battalions threw their hands in with hardly any resistance, 
while alongside of them a group of ten or twelve would hold out with the 
utmost determination until the whole lot were killed. On the whole, I think 
there is a lowering of their [German] morale, but there were very marked 
exceptions, and one cannot draw any definite  conclusion^.^^ 0 
Morale, whether British or German, was a complex issue that defied attempts to 
assess it. Charteris' reports were suspected of being unreliable and over-optimistic 
during the Battle of the S ~ m m e . ~ ~  Then, in October 1917 his assessment of German 
morale was rejected by the War Office, which believed it to be more resilient than * 
Charteris had suggested.49 This was partly the result of the emphasis placed on morale 
in contemporary military thought. Charteris merely reflected the accepted view that 
the war would be won by the side displaying superior morale and discipline5' and the 
faintest signs of a collapse in German morale was seized upon. But the problem was 
not just one of military theory. Interpretation was enormously problematic as General 
Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, acknowledged in a letter to General 
Plumer on 10 December 1917: 
\ * 
~ ~ ~~ 
47 Brigadier-General John Charteris, At G. H. Q. (Cassell, London, 1931), p. 214. Charteris was another 
British general who was fond of quoting Napoleon; see pp. 237 & 274. 
48 It appears that Charteris and Lieutenant-General Sir George MacDonogh, Director of Military 
Intelligence, did not agree about the state of German morale during 1916-17. See Travers, The Killing 
Ground, pp. 115-1 18. 
49 Charteris, At G.H.Q., p. 260. 
50 See, for instance, Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 96. 
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The diminution of German morale has been greatly overdone [by Charteris] at 
General Headquarters. My opinion is that German morale will remain good 
until the war is over. In any case it is largely a matter of opinion and it varies 
from day to day and between different units. It is no sort of basis upon which 
to form plans so far as the Germans are ~oncerned.~' 
Following the failure of the campaign in Flanders to bring an end to the war, strategic 
emphasis shifted away from traditional military doctrine that had focused on 'moral 
superiority' to orie of technical and numerical superiority. Charteris was amongst the 
victims as Robertson rang the changes.'* It is not that morale ceased to be a major 
factor in military planning - far from it - but the emphasis shifted from the destruction 
of the enemy's morale onto the maintenance of one's own. The French mutinies and 
Russian Resolution had also brought home to the High Command the importance of 
troop morale and the army was no longer recognisable as the pre-war model, with 
conscripts filling the ranks. This development particularly concerned military leaders, 
who were unsure about the commitment of conscripted soldiers. In February 1918, 
Haig ordered that troops should be taught citizenship so that they were aware of 
exactly what they were fighting for. Similar developments can be detected in other 
armies around this time, suggesting that it was not simply a matter of concern at the 
a 
e 
5 1  David R. Woodward (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 
Chief Imperial General Staff December 1915-February 1918 (Army Records Society, The Bodley 
Head, Chatham, 1989), p. 265. 
5 2  Letter from Robertson to General Sir Henry Wilson, 16 December 1917 in Woodward (ed.), The 
Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, p. 268. 
. . I.. .” 
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p. 139. 
A significant reduction in the number of condemnations followed closely on the heels 
of the introduction of citizenship classes, changes in strategy and heightened concerns 
about recruits. For the British at least, morale - the determination to fight - had 
worth of conscripted troops. The German army, for example, had a long tradition of 
compulsion but here too a programme of ‘patriotic instruction’ was introduced in July 
1917. This, it has been argued, was to counter the negative influences of socialists and 
pacifists who were by this time entering the army in greater numbers than ever 
before.53 An education programme was also introduced in the Italian army in 1917 to 
counter anti-militarism amongst its peasant soldiers.54 What bound these 
developments together, though, was the impact on military thinking of the Russian 
Revolution and an increasing concern about the type of recruit entering the respective 
armies towards the end of 1917. But fear of bolshevism was less important to British 
commanders who remained preoccupied with the quality of recruits. According to 
Major-General Sir John Wyndham Childs: 
, 
The First Hundred Thousand, as they have been called, were the pick of armed 
I manhood, but later, especially when the operations of the Military Service Act 
began to be felt in the form of producing recruits, crime became more 
prevalent, especially that of d e ~ e r t i o n . ~ ~  
53 Hew Strachan, ‘The Morale of the German Army, 1917-18’ in Peter Liddle and Hugh Cecil (eds), 
Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced (Leo Cooper, London, 1997), pp. 386-387. 
John Gooch, ‘Morale and Discipline in the Italian Army, 1915-1918’ in Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle 
(eds), Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced (Leo Cooper, London, 1997), p. 435. 
55 Major-General Sir John Wyndham Childs, Episodes and Reflections (Cassell & Co., London, 1930), 
54 
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ceased to be regarded in purely individualist terms. That it occurred at the same 
moment as the effective end of coercion in the army was no coincidence. The British 
army had entered a new phase. John Bourne has correctly identified this as 'a 
significant moment in the history of the British army'.56 It is, therefore, not surprising 
that wholesale changes should occur, including a significant shift in the army's 
approach to discipline: the death penalty ceased to be applied with such regularity 
after 1917.57 
i) Assessing Morale 
. Given that there was considerable confusion about what was meant by the term 
troop-morale, how was it assessed? Problems in assessing German morale had 
focused attention on a strategy which itself had depended on an unreliable 
methodology. Likewise, the method of assessing the morale of British troops had been 
revised in an attempt to cope with the exigencies of modern warfare. The traditional 
method of assessing morale in the British army was by a loose, unofficial method 
known as 'grousing'. Grousing allowed the men to vent their displeasure about senior 0 
officers, food, accommodation, the weather or the war. During the war the men's 
grousing was not limited to the spoken word, but the proliferation of trench magazines 
and songs performed the same f~nction.~' Rudyard Kipling noticed this traditional 
system take an instant hold in the New Armies, accurately describing it as an 
~~ ~~ ~ 
56 John Bourne, 'The British Working Man in Arms' in Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (eds), Facing 
Armageddon: The First World War Experienced (Leo Cooper, London, 1997), p. 340. 
57 G. Oram, Death Sentences, p. 14 and Worthless Men, pp. 37-5 1. 
5 8  Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture. 
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unofficial network whereby soldiers could air their  grievance^.^' Senior officers 
usually took a keen interest in the nature of the men's grousing and by monitoring the 
complaints of the men the army was able to gauge their mood, but it is questionable 
whether this was sufficient to form a realistic assessment of morale. 
Clausewitz had warned about mistaking the mood of the men for an indicator of 
their spirit: 'Beware then of confusing the spirit of an Army with its temper', he 
informed his readers. 6o The army's fighting spirit - its morale - might be influenced 
by the mood of the troops,)but they remained separate concepts. As Gary Sheffield 
has shown, 'it was perfectly possible for a soldier's mood to be poor but his military 
spirit [morale] to be sound'.61 Mood was subject to wild shifts dependent on weather, 
food and other mundane factors. Morale on the other hand was more resilient. The 
mood shifts have been detected in the British army, according to Sheffield, 'the BEFs 
mood fluctuated [throughout the war] but its spirit remained unbroken'.62 Sheffield 
notes that unlike the US and French armies, the British did not plan any system to 
sustain men's morale, preferring instead to concentrate on the destruction of that of 
the enemy.63 This, though, was largely the result of a continuing faith in traditional 
methods. However flawed it now appears, the army's continuing reliance on 
complaints being passed up from the ranks via subalterns is suggestive of its 
perceived ongoing value. Monitoring men's grousing might have provided an informal 
network by which the army could assess the mood of its troops, but as an indicator of 
0 
0 
59 Rudyard Kipling, The New A m y  in Training (MacMillan, London, 1915), p. 62. 
6o Clausewitz, On War, p. 258. 
6' Sheffield, 'Officer-Men Relation', p. 65. 
Sheffield, 'Officer-Men Relations', p. 66. 
63 Sheffield, 'Officer-Men Relations', p. 68. 
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morale it was wholly unreliable. Yet its eventual replacement - reports and 
assessments of troop-morale based on mail censorship - amounted to little more than a 
formalisation of the existing system. 
Success in battle was considered an essential element in improving and sustaining 
troop-morale. Clausewitz cited 'a succession of campaigns and great victories' as 
invaluable to an army.64 Little attention, though, was paid to how an army's morale 
could be retrieved following defeat. Travers has argued that in the British army 'the 
cult of the offensive' predominated. This, he suggests, was based on a pessimistic 
evaluation of society whereby the quality of troops was thought to be poor and the 
only way to sustain both discipline and morale was through offensive action, 
capturing ground from the enemy and interpreting that as success in battle.65 Older 
precedents suggest a more doctrinaire explanation for this practice. Close engagement 
of the enemy, a relic of pre-modern warfare, remained a powerful symbol of what 
pundits understood as fighting spirit. In his account of the Boer War, Winston 
Churchill stated: 
. , 0 
Battles now-a-days are fought mainly with firearms, but no troops, however 
brave, however well directed, can enjoy the full advantage of their successes if 
they exclude the possibilities of cold steel and are not prepared to maintain 
what they have won, if necessary with their fists. The moral strength of an 
army which welcomes the closest personal encounter must exceed that of an 
army which depends for its victories only on being able to kill its foes at a 
Clausewitz, On War, p. 257. 64 
65 Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 55. 
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distance. The bayonet is the most powerful weapon we possess out here. 
Firearms kill many of the enemy, but it is the white weapon that makes them 
run away. Rifles can inflict the Loss, but victory depends, for us at least, on the 
bayonets.66 
The impact of a weapon of terror, as Churchill regarded the bayonet, could have a 
devastating effect on mora1e:Gas was the terror-weapon of the First World War and I 
j the fear it caused amongst troops subject to gas attacks, certainly lowered morale, at 
least temporarily, whenever it was used; so too did the tank, at least initially. But this 
new weapon did not always have the same appeal as weapons with a more romantic 
history. The association of morale with the chivalric ideals of an earlier age remained 
a potent one during the war. The reluctance of many senior commanders to abandon 
cavalry as well as close engagement with the enemy owes more to the expected effect 
such action would have on the enemy's morale than it does to pessimistic assumptions 
about society as Travers would have us believe. 
0 Success in battle was also taken as an indicator of good morale and, therefore, 
failure was regarded as a symptom of poor morale. This has proved to be an enduring 
assumption. In a recent article Gary Sheffield suggested that 'the ultimate test of 
morale is combat effectiveness', adding that a good combat record was evidence of 
good morale in a unit.67 This line of argument ignores the impact of other factors such 
66 Winston S .  Churchill, The Boer War: London to Ladysmith via Pretoria and Ian Hamilton's March 
(Leo Cooper, London, 1989), p. 110. 
Relations and Discipline in the 22"d Royal Fusiliers, 1914-18' in Brian Bond et al, 'Look to Your Front': 
Studies in the First World War (Spellmount, Staplehurst, 1999), p. 145. 
Gary Sheffield, "A very good type of Londoner and a very good type of colonial': Officer-Man 61 
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as the action and effectiveness of the enemy, but it was common amongst officers 
such as Baynes during and immediately after the war. Nor was this unique to the 
British army. In his evidence to the Southborough Committee, Professor G. Roussy, 
who had acted as Consultant Neurologist to the French Army, stated that: 'When a 
certain regiment was found to have a greater number of 'shellshock' cases than another 
it was considered that they were inferior troops'?' 
Another barometer of unit morale was the sick parade. Medical Officers played a 
key role in the construction of this and Captain J. C. Dunn for one viewed it as a test 
of the MO's prestige.69 This, though, was essentially a logistical issue unlike 
perceived poor performance in battle by a particular unit, which was often cited as a 
justification for carrying out  execution^.^' Some conditions such as shellshock and 
'trench-foot' presented a serious threat to manpower if left unchecked. Accordingly, 
they were often regarded as matters of discipline and not purely medical problems. 
The Director-General-Medical-Services of 3rd Army noted in December 1915 how 
trench-foot cases occurred less when the temperature fell below freezing. In 3'd Army, 
he noted, there were as many as forty-three new cases in a single day (1 December 
1915) and that no day had passed throughout November without at least one new case 
being reported. There had been 426 new cases diagnosed in the month 3 November to 
4 December 1915 in 3'd Army a10ne.~' The link between the condition and troop 




Southborough Report, p. 2 1. 
h9 Nick Bosanquet, 'Health Systems in Khaki: The British and American Medical Experience' in Hugh 
Cecil and Peter Liddle (eds), Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced (Leo Cooper, 
London, 1997), p. 457. 
70 See for example the execution of three men of the Durham Light Infantry whose unit 'has not done 
well in the fighting line'. PRO W071/534. 
71 War Diary - Director-General-Medical-Services, 3rd Army, PRO W095/38 1. 
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The fight against the condition known as ‘trench-feet’ had been incessant and 
an uphill game. However, science and discipline had conquered, and now we 
seldom have a case, and if we do there is trouble.72 
What is interesting here is that, rather like shellshock cases, the solution was regarded 
to be not only a medical one, but also one of discipline. Crozier himself linked the 
incidence of trench-foot with self-inflicted wounds by comparing his unit with others j ,  0 
where ‘men have taken to blowing off their fingers to escape service in the line’, 
implying that the condition was not usually a genuine one. This reference to an 
incident during 1915 suggests that morale was fragile early on in the war. Robert 
Graves also saw the link between the condition, morale and discipline. ‘”Trench 
feet”’, he stated, ‘seemed to be almost entirely a matter of morale, in spite of the 
lecture formula that N.C.0.s and officers used to repeat time after time to the 
In the absence of any co-ordinated approach, the improvement of morale, like the 
maintenance of discipline, remained the responsibility of unit commanders. Nor was it 
generally believed that either was achieved from the ranks, rather that it was 
manufactured from the top downwards. General Maxse, in his pamphlet on training, 
told commanders that they ‘cannot pay too much attention to raising esprit de corps 
and morale of the troops serving under them to the highest standard’. This, he 
suggested, could be achieved by ‘encouraging healthy rivalry between units under 
a 
l2  Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land, p. 7 7 .  
R. Graves, Goodbye to All That (Penguin, London, 1960), pp. 144-145. 73 
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their The assumption that morale could not be maintained or improved 
by those in the ranks was based on pre-war beliefs about leadership, paternalism, the 
working class and social hierarchy. Yet the majority of the most beneficial morale 
boosting measures adopted by the army were actually responses to grousing in the 
ranks or initiatives by the men themse l~es .~~  
Trench magazines, of which there were many, were usually the initiatives of 
subalterns. Humorous and popular, they could hardly be considered subversive and 
the High Command tolerated them; They often conveyed messages from the unit’s 
own commanders. The magazine produced by the Mth battalion, Gloucestershire 
Regiment, for example, .published a series of articles entitled ‘The Battle Honours of I 
the Gloucestershire Regiment’ in the December 1916, February 1917 and April 1917 
issues.76 The timing of this initiative was most significant, coming as it did 
immediately after the battalion had seen action in the Battle of the Somme. As if to 
emphasise the point photographs of members of the battalion, killed in the battle, 
were included in the February 1917 issue on pages adjoining the article. This was 
obviously intended to bolster the unit’s morale after it had suffered considerable 
casualties in the fighting by reminding the men of their martial ancestry. 
. 
The magazines could also perpetuate the image of the ‘cheerful tommy’. This view 
of soldiering, which is mostly found in accounts by officers, reinforced the value of 
‘moral force . . . military discipline and example, and the impersonal acceptance of 
Maxse papers. IWM 691531 13. 14 
l5 Fuller, Troop-Morale and Popular Culture,p. 175 & pp. 7-20. Both entertainments and sport often 
reflected humbler preferences, see below. 
l6 The Fifth Glo’ster Gazette 1915-1919:A Trench Magazine of the First World War (Sutton, Stroud, 
1993), pp. 131, 153-155 & 169-173. 
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casualties as part of the 
quite common. In the November 1917 edition of the magazine of the 1/5th Gloucesters 
a cartoon entitled ‘Our “Tommies” are always cheerful’ and said to be ‘From the 
“Daily Liar”’ showed a disgruntled soldier gazing scornfully at the reader.78 However, 
But accounts and cartoons mocking these views were 
the enemy was invariably shown to be even worse off. For example, in the April 1917 
edition the same magazine featured a cartoon purporting to show an ‘Enemy ration 
party seen on the skyline at 5-15 p.m.’ which showed German troops carrying off 
three rats and a cat.79 Such images, although humorous, carried an important message 
to the men and formed an essential function in the maintenance of morale. 
r l  ,e 
On the other hand, what was actually understood by the term morale often reflected 
the concerns of the senior<officers - usually tactical considerations - rather than those 
of the men whose main objectives were survival and a more bearable existence in the 
trenches. The rivalry to which the usually forward-thinking Maxse referred actually 
centred on existing military, and therefore disciplinary, necessities. For instance, he 
suggested that individual troops should be encouraged to ‘compare his unit’s guard 
with the guard of the next unit’.80 Furthermore, he urged competitiveness and rewards 
for snipers, adding that ‘it must be considered an honour to be picked as a company 
sniper. Sniper’s badges may be used and fatigues may be excused’.81 Although all 
portrayed as measures to improve morale it is clear that each has its origins in 
discipline, the assumed relationship between the two could not be more plainly stated. 
e 
S. Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to Modem War (Pimlico, London, 1998), p. 37. 77 
78 The Fifth Glo’ster Gazette, p. 234. 
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Awarding medals to the troops was another method employed by the army to 
maintain their morale. The names of medal recipients were widely disseminated 
through official and unofficial means. Citations appeared in the press and in army 
orders, but awards and promotions were a regular feature of trench magazines such as 
The Fifth Glo'ster Gazette.82 This was not confined to British troops. In May 1918 
Douglas Haig sent a note to Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, requesting him to 'send me as soon as possible [sic] the following [ 100 
D.S.O.s, 200 Military Crosses and 500 Military Medals] for the French Troops 
fighting under Plumer to encourage them [sic]'.83 It was usualafor the French army to 
make similar awards to troops in British, Belgian and American armies. 
. 
Medals, like sniper's badges, encouraged competition between units. In many ways 
this was a logical progression from the prestige building identified with the county 
regiment system, itself intended to build esprit de corps. The inculcation of 
regimental pride by association with its history and traditions was highly valued and 
when the Kitchener 'New Army' recruits arrived they were absorbed into this system 
as 'service' battalions rather than forming new units of their own. Comparisons of 
guards, marksmanship or marching, as recommended by Maxse, were one way of 
building on unit rivalry. Another was sport. But J. G. Fuller has shown that the 
development of sport as a recreational pursuit behind the front line owed more to 
those in the ranks than it did to their officers. This was reflected, he has argued, in the 
preference for football over rugby or ~ricket. '~ Other diversions focused on 
~~ 
** The Fifrh Glo'ster Gazette. Almost every edition featured a list of awards and promotions. 
83 Jeffrey, K. (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson 1918-1922 (The 
Bodley Head, London, 1985), p. 42. 
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entertainment and commanders certainly recognised the importance of keeping their 
troops amused. Maxse advised others to organise sports and theatre to improve the 
morale of the men in their charge. Perhaps reflecting ideas of paternalism towards his 
troops, Maxse believed that the theatre 'can also be used for educating the men and 
elevating the men in the ranks, as well ills for amusing them and counter-acting the 
strain of war'.85 But here too Fuller has identified the predominance of the music-hall 
~ style over supposedly higher forms of entertainment. The cinema in particular proved 
to be popular.86 , .  . . .. . . i  ,. .  * .  . .  
' 8  Troop morale relied on muchimore than unit rivalry. The strains of modern warfare 
required that greater attention be paid to the more basic considerations such as leave I 
and supplies. Much has been written on the effects of grievances felt by French troops 
and the resulting mutinies in 1917.87 The British Army did not escape the disturbances 
. 
that swept through the armies in 1917. War weariness played a part in the serious I 
disturbances at Etaples and a general increase in disobedience during 1917. It is most . 
significant that principal amongst the grievances raised by the mutinous French 
divisions were leave and rations. In the British Army, however, leave was a much 
scarcer commodity than it was for the French and iniquities in its allocation was the 
0 
source of much complaint. The mail censor for Third Army commented in November 
1916: 
85 Maxse papers. IWM 69/53/13. 
86 Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture, pp. 175-180. 
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The most frequent complaint, or plaint more often than complaint, is in regard 
to LEAVE [sic]; its frequency and uneven distribution. . . . leave is the 
commonest topic of correspondence: mention of leave, past or future, occurs 
in almost every letter.88 
This is clear evidence of a continued attachment between the home and war fronts. 
Contact with family dominated soldiers' thoughts. Most significant is the importance 
attached to reminiscing about previous leave. If the pre-eminence of leave as the 
major topic had been limited to the prospect of future leave, then it could be argued 
that this represented a simple desire to escape the fighting, but the importance 
attached to past leave suggests that there was little sense of isolation from a home 
front that continued to form a part of the mental landscape of those in the trenches. 
The importance for morale of a good supply of food to the troops cannot be 
overstated. The experiences of other armies suggests that without it morale would 
undoubtedly have collapsed, but the British army proved to be more able to feed its 
men sufficiently than many others. Bully beef might not have been popular - next to 
leave, it was probably the largest single cause of complaint according to the mail 
censor of Third Army89 - but at least it arrived regularly. Furthermore, army rations 
were regularly supplemented by food parcels sent from Britain. This fulfilled two 
roles: as well as providing some much needed variety for the troops it was also a vital 
link with family and communities left behind. The mail censor for Third Army 
commented in his report of November 19 16: 
88 Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report on morale, November 1916, p. 4. 
Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1 89 
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Complaints of food are remarkably rare. . . . There is a large clamour for 
parcels of food from home, resulting in a large import of tomatoes, cheese, 
kippers, cake, pork-pies, 'sausages and mash', 'fish and chips', and other 
commodities. . . . Continual Bully Beef and Jam, however good and sustaining, 
tend to become monotonous. 90 
Two months later the censor was able to report that complaints 'have an ulterior 
purpose, as a preface to a request for a parcel'.'' Although this indicates that some of 
the complaints regarding food might not have been entirely genuine, there can be little 
doubt that contact with those at home was vital to sustaining the morale of the troops. 
In a letter sent from France to his family in October 1915, Private E. C. Perham, a 
pre-war< territorial, described his involvement in the fighting: 'we have seen some 
fighting my rifle was that hot that I could not hold it all the wood was steaming with 
the heat'. Yet the majority of space is taken up by concerns about the well-being of 
those at home, a shopping list and most importantly news from his native St. 
A l b a n ~ . ~ ~  In another letter, written during the Battle of the Somme, there is barely a 
mention of the fighting, but the arrival of a food parcel is the first item mentioned.93 
Contact with those at home was crucial to the morale of the troops, but also it was the 





9o Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report on morale, November 1916, p. 3. 
91 Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report on morale, January 1917, p. 5. 
92 Letter of Private E. C. Perham, 22"d London Regiment, dated gth October 1915. Private collection. 
93 Letter of Private E. C. Perham, 22nd London Regiment, dated 6h July 1916. Private collection. 
Private Perham was killed in action eleven days after writing this letter. 
168 
. ”  
to the troops that they were not isolated from their families. Significantly, in early 
1918 news of food shortages at home had a seriously adverse effect on morale, 
according to Captain Hardie?4 
The problems of food production, transportation and supply were most severe on 
the Eastern Front and were a major factor in the disintegration of the Austrian Army 
and the mass disaffection of Russian soldiers. Germany too experienced severe 
problems feeding its army and morale suffered partly as a con~equence.’~ Rather like 
1 the British economy proved to be more adaptable than that of many of the other 
belligerents so too did British army logistics. The building of railways and roads was 
crucial to both the movement of troops and to keeping them adequately supplied. 
Clearly, the further from Britain soldiers were the less likely they were to receive the 
eagerly awaited food supplements from home and there is evidence that food 
shortages caused a downturn in troop morale in the Italian Expeditionary Force during 
late 1917 and early 1918.96 Generally speaking though, the time and effort expended 
by the army to ensure that this aspect of the war was not overlooked was invested 
well, a view shared by Niall Ferguson who has remarked that ‘morale was heavily . 
dependent on good rations’.97 Regular food supplies ensured that morale in the British 
Army remained comparatively solid, at least until the end of hostilities. 
Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report on morale for period February to July 19 18, p. 1. 
95 According to Hew Strachan, ‘Morale and Discipline in the German Army, 1917-18’, ‘One of the 
principal grouses of the German soldier was food’ (p. 390). It appears that the realisation of impending 
defeat was also a major factor in the collapse in German morale in the autumn of 1918. See Benjamin 
Ziemann, ‘Fahnenflucht im deutschen Heer 1914-1918’ in Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen 55 
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Concerns about conditions at home were often the final straw for soldiers in the 
trenches, causing some to desert. For example, Private William Nelson, 14'h Durham 
Light Infantry, the sole provider for his family, received news of the termination of 
the arrangements made for the care of his nine-year-old sister immediately before his 
desertion from the front line in the summer of 1916.98 A soldier of the Somerset Light 
Infantry, Private Phillips, told a court-martial in August 1915 that he had 'lost my 
head through worry having not heard from home for some time'?9 In another case 
Private Albert Ingham, who had joined the Salford Pals (lFfh Manchester) in 1914, 
told a court martial 'I was worrying at the time [of his desertion] through the loss of 
my chums [in the Battle of the Like Privates Nelson and Phillips, 
thoughts about the home front were uppennost in Ingham's mind and he told the court 
that he was worried 'about my mother at home, being upset, through hearing bad news 
.of two of my comrades'.101 We shall return to this case when the Battle of the Somme 
is subjected to a closer scrutiny in a later chapter, 
Cases such as those of Privates Nelson, Phillips and Ingham and the impact that 
news of food shortages had on morale are clear evidence of a solid and continued 
attachment between the trenches and home. Few things were as likely to heighten a 
soldier's desire to return home than a deepening concern that all was not well at home. 
The absence of news or contact with home played on the minds of the men in the 
98 PRO W071/488. The case of Private Nelson is particularly tragic. His father was a prisoner of war in 
Germany and he was about to embark for the Western Front when he was given news of his mother's 
death, leaving the young soldier the sole provider for his young siblings. His neighbour had arranged to 
care for his sister, but had clearly found the task too difficult and wrote to Nelson informing him of the 
termination of the arrangements. 
99 Case of Private Phillips, PRO W07 1/430. 
loo PRO W07 1626. 
lo' PROW071/526. 
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trenches often causing an irrational supposition that something was wrong. For some 
the fear that something was amiss at home overwhelmed the fear engendered by the 
threat of the death penalty and excited an instinct to return home. 
The impact on local communities of huge losses in one single action was a major 
factor in the abandonment of the regional system of recruitment,’” but its impact on 
the army itself is less obvious. Certainly the army continued to execute soldiers, 
paying greater attention to disciplinary needs than to morale, and the details of those 
executed continued to be widely promulgated. Objections to the executions as + 
expressed by soldiers who witnessed or carried out the task were based on the 
unpleasantness of their role rather than any ethical stance. This is hardly surprising 
given that officers censored their mail. The effects on morale of an execution within a 
I unit are, therefore, scarcely documented. Even the army overlooked this aspect of the 
1 . 
application of harsh discipline, which is surprising given that unit pride was 
considered so important a feature of morale. That stated, there were fewer executions 
carried out in elite regiments such as the guards than in the infantry of the line, and 
none in the cavalry. Baynes justified executions on the grounds that they were 
essential to the maintenance of discipline and that strong discipline was one of the 
five factors essential for preserving morale in a unit: 
However barbaric the firing squad may have been it brought home to those 
who had knowledge of its existence a realisation of the lengths to which their 
superiors would go to ensure their orders were obeyed. One will never know 
~~ 
lo* Simkins, ‘The Four Armies’, in Chandler, D. (ed.), The Oxford History ofthe British Army (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1994), pp. 235-255. 
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how many men were frightened into or out of various courses of action by the 
threat of execution, but it was certainly a threat that was not trifled with.'03 
Yet there is no evidence that the disgrace which must have accompanied every 
execution was considered by those who ordered the executions. The impact on loyalty 
to a unit that shot one of its own (and probably made comrades carry out the 
execution), or on confidence in the commanders who ordered such an act can hardly 
have been good for morale. There is evidence to suggest that morale was badly 
affected by either .witnessing or carrying out an execution. Lord Moran expressed 
regret at some of the 'poor wretches' who as a medical officer he had effectively 
~ondemned."~ He was equally troubled by the case of a man who was examined by a 
fellow medical officer prior to being shot, describing such verdicts as 'guesses with a 
bullet behind one of them'.'05 His own morale was clearly shaken by-such thoughts 
and he recognised that 'a sense of injustice eats away the soldier's purpose'!06 Given 
the emphasis placed,on morality this had serious implications. Unfortunately, the 
scarcity of records allows us only limited analysis of this important issue. 
e 
Although there appears to have been no official response at all an idea of the 
impact an execution had on unit morale can be pieced together from diary entries and 
letters home. Accounts of executions vary little. One diarist described the execution of 
Rifleman Bellamy (Kings Royal Rifle Corps) in July 1915 as 'a pathetic incident'.''' 
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Another barely literate diarist recorded the last moments of Private Briggs of the 
Border Regiment: 
We fell in at 6-50 a.m. and marched up to Regt. HQ Depond [Depot?] were 
one of our men paid the penilty of his life for cowdice when on A.S. [active 
service] The Regt. fell in to see him shot by 12 of his own Regt. This is a sad 
sight to see but it must be done. [my italics] I must say he mote have been a 
, coward but he marched to his death with soldier hart.'08 [sic] 
Executions, it seems, were accepted by most but with considerable reluctance and I 
allocating men to firing squad duty proved particularly problematic for the 
unfortunate subalterns upon whom the task fell. Furthermore, the high incidence of 
officers having to administer a coup de grace suggests that many firing squads, 
perhaps formed from the condemned man's own unit, must have deliberately shot 
wide of the target. 
After the war the nature of criticism altered. Of course it was difficult for soldiers 
to express themselves during the war when their mail was censored and the keeping of 
diaries was discouraged. That notwithstanding it has been noted that criticism of 
military justice took on a much harsher tone in the 1920s in both Britain and 
France.log In Britain witnesses vented their anger through the Labour MP, Ernest 
Thurtle who reproduced some of their accounts in his pamphlet Shootings at Dawn. 
lo* Diary of unidentified soldier. IWM, Misc. 550. 
'09 This is one of the central themes identified by Nicolas Offenstadt in Les Fusille's de la Grunde 
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Although anecdotal in character there can be no mistaking the angry tone in these 
statements, a stark contrast to surviving war-time versions. One of Thurtle's witnesses 
recalled the execution of a private of the Royal Berkshire Regiment in 1914 who can 
now be identified as Private Ward. The witness claimed to be 'the only man that saw 
what happened, and yet I was never called'.' lo If this account is true then the sense of 
injustice felt by the men in Ward's unit must have been enormous. There was also a 
profound sense of injustice felt by troops who were increasingly aware that executions 
were carried out against rankers only. In an unpublished diary Leading-Seaman 
MacMillan, a clerk in the Royal Naval Division, described the reaction when the 
papers arrived confirming that Sub-Lieutenant Dyett was to be shot. Dyett was in fact 
the second officer to be shot. Second-Lieutenant Eric Poole was executed 
approximately three weeks earlier, but this was unknown to MacMillan who wrote: 
was he, I wondered, to be the first martyr to the clamour from the ranks for an 
example to be made of an officer for desertion or cowardice? 'How is it', the 
men were asking and rightly so, 'that only rankers are being shot for 
cowardice? How many officers have been guilty of this offence and why have 
they not been made to answer for it with their lives, as we have to do?' The 
Higher Command must have heard this grouse grow louder and could not fail 
to admit the justness of it. If however, they were forced to act, why did they 
select a mere boy for their first victim?' l 1  
' l o  Thurtle, Shootings at Dawn, p. 4. 
Leading-Seaman T. MacMillan, unpublished diary, pp. 169- 170. IWM. 111 
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This is evidence that a strong sense of injustice about executions existed in the ranks. 
It is also clear that the impact of Dyett's execution on his unit was a negative one. 
Another of Thurtle's witnesses recalled how men fainted at the sight of an execution, 
and other executions were invariably described by witnesses as horrible and shameful 
experiences. 112 
A memoir, written by Private John McCauley of the Border Regiment and 
published in a local newspaper in 1920, gives a grim account of the execution of 
Private Briggs immediately prior to the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. The author,.so it 
seems, was one of fifteen ordered to,make up the firing squad but was not one of the 
twelve who carried out the task. There was considerable unease in the battalion, all of 
whom were paraded to witness the execution. Worse still, men from the condemned 
soldier's own town were among those ordered to fire the fatal shots. The author's I 
description of the execution as .'cold-blooded murder' is consistent with other 
accounts. The impact on the witnesses was obviously harrowing: 
I 0 
3 
Many of those who stood on this strange parade on that cold morning in 
March [1915] were men who had seen death in a hundred hideous forms since 
the days of Mons. They had faced death a hundred times, too, laughing, 
cheering, shouting and cursing as they leaped to meet it. But this was 
something different, They just stood in solemn silence."3 
Thurtle, Shootings at Dawn. 




Although it seems the prisoner was kilhed outright by the volley - thereby avoiding the 
need for a coup de grdce - some of the firing squad apparently hesitated before firing. 
During the build-up to the execution many of the witnesses were openly weeping and 
afterwards: 
It was a mournful body of men that tramped silently back to billets. Even the 
birds seem to be stilled that morning. We were all unnerved and disconsolate. 
The firing party filed back into the barn where we were quartered, and several 
flung themselves down and cried openly and bitterly. We could thoroughly 
understand their feelings. Very little food was eaten in our billet that day. It 
was not easy to shake off the thoughts of the early morning death parade.*l4 
The oppressive nature of military authority and discipline could indeed have a 
devastating effect on morale. 
There is also evidence that the harshness of military discipline drove some men to 
violent protest. Men of the loth (Irish) Division in Salonika were said to have rioted 
after the execution of Private Downey, who was shot for disobedience in December 
1915.115 At Blargies prison on the Western Front, general disturbances during August 
1916, themselves a result of grievances about military punishments, escalated when a 
large crowd overpowered a Provost Staff-Sergeant in order to release a man sentenced 
to Field Punishment.' l6 The incident resulted in six death sentences being handed out 
McCauley, 'A Manxman's Diary', p. 32. 
Putkowski and Sykes, Shot at Dawn, p. 59. 
I I4 
1 I5 
' I6 Babington, For the Sake of Example, pp. 88-89. Putkowski and Sykes, Shot at Dawn, pp. 126-127. 
by court martial, although only one was carried out.'17 Such incidents were an 
indication of how in extreme cases men were prepared to challenge military authority 
and acted as a constant reminder to the High Command that discipline needed to be 
handled with a degree of care. 
ii) Troop Morale and Mail Censorship 
The army's main source of information on morale later in the war was the regular 
' reports of the mail censors. Unfortunately, little of this has survived but what has a 
provides the historian with an invaluable insight into how troop morale was assessed. 
Much of this refers to the army in Italy and is the subject of detailed analysis in a later 
chapter, but we need to make some general observations about the army's assessment 
of morale here. The main source of this information comes from the reports based on 
mail censorship compiled.by Captain Hardie of Third Army. Other reports do exist 
but not in any great quantity. 
The reports based on mail censorship were an attempt to interpret morale in a 
0 subjective manner. This of course relied on the censor's own ability to read the men's 
mail and to communicate his interpretations to the High Command. There was also a 
quantitative evaluation of morale based on an examination of the green envelopes, 
which had not previously been subject to censorship. In September 1917 the Director 
of Intelligence Services reported that 4,552 letters in green envelopes from troops in 
France had been examined and was able to conclude that there was a negligible 
amount of war weariness in the BEF. 
Private John Braithwaite, an Australian serving with the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, was executed 117 
on 29 October 1916. PRO W0790/6. 
A report has now been received showing that of these 4552 letters only 28 or 
0.62% contained any expression of complaint or war-weariness. Since 7 of 
these 28 letters contained specific complaints that had no relation to war- 
weariness, the total number of letters showing weakening of morale is less 
than 21 or 0.5%.'18 
At roughly the same time Captain Hardie reported that morale in the Third Army, 
which was still in France, was beginning to be a cause of some concern: 
* 
In regard to morale it must be frankly admitted that the letters show an 
increasing amount of war-weariness. There is a large despondency that has 
never been apparent before, together with a large amount of unsettled feeling 
about the continuation and conclusion and after-effects of the war. The trouble 
is undoubtedly a mental one, which does not affect the discipline of the Army, 
but its presence must be noted.' l9 
What is most surprising about these two reports is that while morale in the BEF was 
thought to be good, despite the impact of the Third Battle of Ypres, in the Third 
Army, posted to a relatively quieter sector of the front, the assessment of morale was 
far less optimistic. 
' I s  Note on the Morale of British troops in France as disclosed by the censorship. PRO CAB24/26. 
' I 9  Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report on morale, dated 25 August 1917, p. 1 .  
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However, this should not be interpreted as evidence of morale crumbling when 
troops were not engaged in battle. Another examination of mail contained in green 
envelopes was carried out, this time involving some 17,000 letters. The report, 
completed in December 1917 after the full impact of the Passchendaele offensive had 
been felt, showed the effects of battle on troop morale. 
There is a very striking difference between the results of the examination of 
the Second Army, which at the time was bearing the brunt of the fighting, and 
that of the other Armies, and it must be admitted that in the former the 
favourable and unfavourable letters were almost evenly balanced: but taking 
into consideration the stress both mental and physical under which letters were 
written by men who were in the thick of the struggle, it would be an injustice 
to the men to suggest that no mental reaction will take place under less 
strenuous circumstances anymore than that the high morale of troops in the 
quieter sectors would die away when they are moved to more lively positions. 
In the other Armies the favourable extracts greatly exceeded the adverse.12' 
. 
Once again the report on troop- morale written by Captain Hardie, now posted to the 
Italian Front, appears to contradict this sentiment. There, morale was said to be much 
the same as in France despite the general feeling that the Italian Front was something 
of a 'picnic' in comparison."' 
Note on morale of the British Armies in France as gathered from censorship (18" December 1917). 
PRO CAB24/36. 




The relationship between the progress of the war and the state of morale was a 
complex one. At the end of the Battle of the Somme Captain Hardie was able to report 
that morale in the Third Army 'has never been higher than at the present moment'.'22 
Granted, the Third Army had seen relatively little action in the battle being positioned 
just north of the most serious fighting, but surely the reality of the situation could not 
have been hidden from troops in such close proximity. 
These contradictions, however, allowed the army to interpret morale in a positive 
manner under most conditions. On the one hand there was the well-established 
military concept that idleness was not good for morale and that troops needed to be 
kept occupied: by that was meant fighting. Duty was also the preferred treatment of 
regimental medical officers for, many a medical condition. Siegfried Sassoon, in his 
poem 'A Footnote on the War', referred to Captain J. C .  Dunn's 'medicine and duty' 
approach, especially to minor ailments.''3 One of the root causes of shellshock, many 
believed, was the inactivity of the men leading to excessive imagination. Generally, 
the reports of Captain Hardie fall into this category. For example, in his report for the 
period February to July 1918 he clearly states that the spirit of the men was enhanced 
by the Austrian attack, which, he said, gave them a sense of purpose.'24 Hardie had 
also gauged morale to be particularly high during the latter stages of the Somme 
offensive in November 1916 and again he noted that news of the German offensive 
during the Spring of 1918 'had a stiffening effect on men who were in comparative 
idleness'. 125 Hardie's subjective interpretation of morale, therefore, reflected 
* 
~~ 
Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report dated November 1916, p. 6. 
Siegfried Sassoon, The War Poems (Faber and Faber, London, 1983), p. 148. 
Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report for period February to July 1918, p. 1. 




traditional military values, which partly explains some of the contradictions contained 
in his reports. For example, in January 1917 he praised the stoicism of the British 
soldiers whom, he said, were 'prepared to 'carry on' without comment or 
discussion'.'26 Four months later in May 1917 he reported that morale remained good, 
but then added: 
The men are still 'fed-up'. 'I cordially detest military life and wish I might see 
the end of all this futile and reckless sacrifice of human lives' is not an 
uncommon sentiment.'*' 
It seems that Hardie didn't regard this as evidence of war-weariness for in August 
1917 he reported noticing 'a large despondency that has never been apparent % 
before'. 12' 
The statistical approach of the green envelope censorship might have resulted in a 
somewhat different analysis, but the censor was still at pains to present his findings in 
a positive light. No matter how the information was gathered, interpretation was still 
necessary. In the report of December 1917, for instance, the censor drew attention to 
evidence of war-weariness, but qualified it, saying that most mail examined 'were 
merely cheery ordinary letters which taken as a whole may be regarded as a 
favourable sign'. 
126 Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report dated January 1917, pp. 6-7. 
12' Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report dated May 1917, p. 1. 
Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report dated 25 August 1917, p. 1. 





It is impossible to say which method produced the most accurate report, but 
occasionally the contradictions are striking. The report of the British armies in France, 
dated December 1917, concluded: 
War-weariness there is, and an almost universal longing for peace but there is 
a strong current of feeling that only one kind of peace is possible and that the 
time is not yet come.13' 
In his final report from the Western Front, dated 25 August 1917, Hardie interpreted 
similar data rather differently, noting that 'furtive suggestions of a patched-up peace 
and vague mutterings of 'trouble' are beginning to make their appearance for the first 
tirne~.'~' 
Despite their rather differing interpretations, however, there can be no doubt that 
there was a significant amount of evidence of deteriorating morale in the British 
Army towards the end of 1917. Yet there is no corresponding rise in the number of 
death sentences meted out by courts-martial for offences such as mutiny, disobedience 
or insubordination during this period. There were only two condemnations for mutiny 
in 1917, fifteen for disobedience and five for insubordination, compared with eleven, 
thirty-five (not including the Non-Combatant Corps) and four respectively for 
1916.'32 If the army was at all concerned about the 'trouble' to which Hardie referred 
then the courts-martial certainly did not respond by ordering more executions. The 
I3O Note on morale of the British Armies in France as gathered from censorship (18 December 1917). 
PROCAB24/36. 
1 3 '  Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report dated 25 August 1917, p. 1. 
132 See Oram, Death Sentences. 
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truth was that, generally, there was no upsurge in military crime even though troop 
morale appeared shaky. As I have argued, disciplinary concerns had a small but 
significant influence on the final outcome of death sentences, but it appears from this 
evidence that the state of morale was far less influential. 
Morale in the British Army appears to have survived the ravages of the big 
offensives and rumours of food shortages at home alike. However, it suffered 
something of a collapse after the armistice and discipline crumbled along with it. 
Once victory had been achieved many troops withdrew their consent: they were 
unwilling to continue fighting when there was obviously no necessity. A similar trend 
has been detected in the German army in the autumn of 1918 when troops could no 
longer see the need to continue fighting in a war that was obviously lost and: 
desertions increased dramatically. 133 In the British army, mutiny, previously a rare 
charge, became quite common after November 1918. Most of the incidents were 
simply the result of frustration at the slow pace of demobilisation, but there is 
evidence of a growing resentment prior to the armistice. In 1917 Captain Hardie had 
commented: 
In reading the letters on this subject [peace] one cannot help feeling impressed 
by the fact that the British Army - a heterogeneous collection of men who 
before the war had the wide freedom of thought, speech and action that are 
their national birthright - should submit without a murmur to guidance and 
authority, and be prepared to simply ‘carry on’ without comment or discussion. 
Benjamin Ziemann, ‘Fahnenflucht im deutschen Heer 1914-1918’ in Militurgeschichtliche 133 
Mitteilungen 55 (1996), pp. 93-130. 
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In Germans one expects a subnlissiveness that has been bred in them and 
enforced by pains, penalties and fear through their whole national training 
before the war.'34 
Only eighteen months later in July 1918 Hardie's assessment had dramatically altered: 
Demobilisation and his [unfavourable] feelings towards the Italians practically 
monopolise the attention of the soldier on general subjects to the exclusion of 
political or other home affairs. . . . Considered as a whole, this branch of the 
correspondence indicates that many men take far too short-sighted a view of 
the question, and it is thought the imperfect comprehension of the aims, 
difficulties and machinery of the Scheme for Demobilisation and resettlement 
creates in the minds of many men, who would otherwise be much more 
patient, a feeling of personal victimisation, which, coupled with a sense of 
revolt against uncongenial surroundings, gives rise to a condition and 
increasing discontent and general weariness. 135 
This is further evidence that the British soldier's consent was becoming increasingly 
fragile towards the end of the war, even though victory was by no means guaranteed 
at this point. Following that victory much of it would be withdrawn. This coincided 
with increasing concern in the higher command following the Russian revolution, the 
British army's metamorphosis into a conscript army and the abandonment of 
134 Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report dated January 1917, pp. 6-7. 
Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report dated 20 July 1918. I35 
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undermining German morale as the keys me of military s *ategy. The introduction of 
citizenship classes and the reduction in the number of condemnations meted out by 
courts-martial were but two outcomes of these concerns. 
iii) Summation 
Ideas about morale were shaped from pre-war teachings, some of which, including 
Napoleon and the commanders of ancient Greece and Rome were very old. 
Clausewitz, though, remained the most important writer to British generals and 
interpretations of his work formed the.basis of military thought throughout the second 
half of the nineteenth century and in the years immediately prior to the First World 
War. These ideas focused on individual qualities of personal character - both of the 
generals and their men. A lingering faith in the character and superior 'moral qualities' 
of British troops fighting for King and Empire was further bolstered by a stubborn 
belief that the morale of the enemy could be broken and victory achieved. There was 
no one central body or even policy on troop morale and, accordingly, it was left to 
individual commanders to administer to the 'fighting spirit' of their men. Some 
adopted a progressive approach, encouraging initiatives from the ranks. The nature of 
entertainments and sports competitions often reflected this process. Others favoured 
the traditional method of tightening discipline to shore-up flagging morale. No doubt 
many of the executions were a direct result of this process. But most commanders 
followed a mixture of the two approaches, embracing new ideas whilst at the same 
time exacting harsh discipline if thev thought it was necessarv. 
Y Y 
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As the war drew on it became apparent that victory depended more on bringing 
sufficient mate'riel to bear on the enemy. This became most apparent after the failure 
of the 1917 offensive in Flanders when Robertson noted that too much emphasis had 
been placed on dubious assessments of crumbling German morale. This coincided 
with the transition of the British army from a volunteer to a conscript force and 
increasing evidence that the consent of British troops could not be taken for granted. 
There followed a significant shift in strategic thought, which had profound 
implications for army discipline and less use was made of the death penalty. The _ .  
emphasis was no longer on individual qualities such as 'moral superiority' and whilst 
troop morale remained important to the army, it was increasingly obvious that victory 
could not depend solely on breaking the enemy's morale. 
0 
Confusion about what constituted morale was reflected in the attempts at assessing 
it. Initially, the army was more concerned with the state of German morale than it.was 
with its own. However, a formalisation of the existing system of monitoring men's 
grouses, in 1916, indicated a realisation of the importance of maintaining the spirit of 
the troops. Whether this achieved anything beyond gauging the mood of the army is 
debatable, but its real significance is as evidence of the army modernising itself and 
learning to cope with its massive enlargement. 
0 
Certain issues dominated men's morale. Much has been written about the 
importance of good food, but it is my contention that not sufficient emphasis has been 
placed on the maintenance of links with the home front. This continued link was vital 
to troop morale. Leave - past, present and future - was the thread that linked home life 
to the trenches. Food parcels were tangible evidence of its perpetuation. Whilst 
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complaints about the weather, food and conditions tended to effect the men's mood, 
only concerns about the progress of the war itself could impact on their spirit in the 
way that worries about the home front could. A significant number of men who were 
executed for desertion committed their fatal act upon hearing bad news from home. 
Others cited concerns about their family and communities in defence of their actions. 
It is important also to note that the mail censor detected a downturn in morale 
. 
following news of food shortages at home. 
Few memoirs mention the impact of executions on the units concerned. It is clear, 
though, from those available that executions left behind a deep sense of shame. There 
is evidence to suggest that most men resented the army for acts they saw as vindictive. 
In an army where a belief in the justness of the cause was encouraged, such 
resentment was likely to undermine the morale of the men. Yet many commanders 
regarded executions as vital to inculcating fighting spirit as well as maintaining 
discipline. This was partly because discipline and morale were inexorably linked in 
the minds of many. Theorist such as Henderson had separated the two concepts, but 
this was not necessarily accepted by those commanding troops in the field. Baynes, 
Crozier and Moran, for instance, all considered morale only within the scope of wider 
issues of discipline. 
' 
The relationship between morale and discipline is a complex one and it was 
continually redefined during the war. The progress of the war itself was probably the 
most influential factor. The failures of the first three years prompted a new approach. 
So too did the altered state of the army. Discipline was gradually relaxed in 1918 as 
signs of war-weariness were detected, but the High Command, which remained 
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authoritarian in nature, never relinquished its control: the last two executions for 
desertion were carried out just four days before the armistice took effect. 
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Chapter 4 
Pour encourager les autres: 
Morale, Discipline and 
the Death Penalty on the Frontline 
Having examined how military law was structured and analysed attitudes towards 
morale and discipline we must now consider how British commanders used the death 
penalty, or at least the threat of it, during the war. Two broad questions will be 
explored. Firstly, what general trends can be discerned? To what extent do these 
a 
reflect pre-existing structures? And was any military formation more vulnerable to 
capital sentences than any other? Secondly, how were the sentences applied in 
individual>units? What variations from any detected general trends were there? 
Broadly this chapter will demonstrate that there were general trends. There were 
three 'types' of divisions in the British army during the war; the approach to discipline 
often reflected this and important individual differences occurred. The use of the 
death penalty as a means to enforce discipline was a contentious issue which was 
viewed differently by individual army commanders. Even some who expressed a faith 
in its deterrent value remained reluctant to employ it; but some were less reluctant 
than others. The number of death sentences passed by courts-martial largely reflected 
the divisional commanders' approach to discipline and the court was itself an 
extension of his authority rather than an instrument of general army policy. 
Executions were, however, largely out of the hands of the divisional commander. In 
a 
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theory this was the Commander-in-Chief s domain, but matters were often left to the 
Personal Services Branch. Divisional commanders' recommendations were no doubt 
valued, but the final decision to confirm a sentence, or otherwise, was taken elsewhere 
and it is at this stage of the proceedings where a general army-wide policy can be 
detected. 
The importance of the divisional commanders in the disciplinary process needs to 
be re-assessed. The popular public view of a callous Commander-in-Chief, epitomised 
by Haig's reputation as the 'butcher of the S o m e ' ,  has infiltrated what few writings 
there are on the subject. Whilst the Commander-in-Chief s ofice was responsible for 
confirming death sentences the evidence suggests that the nature of discipline in the 
field was largely the result of a number of other factors. Not least amongst these were 
the character, personality and attitude of the divisional commander. Battalion and 
brigade commanders also played a part in shaping disciplinary policy, but theirs was a 
lesser role in this regard. Furthermore, commanders at levels higher than division 
could exert a considerable influence on events although they relied heavily on the 
divisional commander to implement their decisions. Divisional commanders appear to 
have retained a surprisingly high degree of autonomy resulting in quite diverse 
disciplinary records in similar divisions. Consequently, in many cases the record of 
death sentences and executions in each division can be said to have reflected its 
commander's own approach rather than that of the High Command. 
When dealing with records concerning crime, whether military or criminal, it is 
important to keep in mind that we must qualify our conclusions with the proviso that 




convictions. Most courts-martial were assembled in the field, many of them hurriedly 
so, and the records are incomplete. For example, we have no records whatsoever of 
summary executions (and there is other evidence that many were carried out') and at 
least two capital courts-martial files are missing from records at the Public Record 
Office.* This, however, is not a problem for our purpose here which is to explore the 
manner in which the threat of execution was deployed as a disciplinary tool. 
Paradoxically, capital convictions and executions carried out by authority of courts- 
martial were of greater use to the army in this respect than summary executions since 
they were more widely promulgated spreading the fear factor far wider than localised ~ 
summary shootings. 
I 
It was also on the basis of statistical reports, including crime, that the state of 
morale and discipline in individual units was initially assessed, but. this method was 
hardly an accurate gauge of the level of offending in any unit. Such figures were 
merely a measure of the number of convictions for a given period. Criminologists are 
familiar with the problems associated with this type of data driven analysis. Rather 
than providing an accurate indicator of the level of crime in a particular army 
formation, these reports might be no more than a reflection of the willingness of the 
commanders to bring prosecutions. Again indicating that what these figures most 
accurately reflect is the divisional commander's approach to discipline and the death 
penalty . 
' For example, Brigadier-General F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land (Cedric Chivers, Bath, 
1930), p. 204, recalls ordering the machine-gunning of fleeing Portuguese troops during 1918. See also 
G .  Oram, Worthless Men: race, eugenics and the death penalty in the British army during the First 
World War (Francis Boutle, London, 1998), p. 33. 
for murder, but their names were not recorded in the courts-martial registers. 
On 15 February 1915 Private Morgan and Lance-Corporal Price, 2 Welsh Regiment, were executed 2 
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One further problem remains. The a m y  kept detailed records, but their accuracy 
can occasionally be called into question. The divisional reports on crime sent to the 
Commander-in-Chief are a case in point. Until 1917 these reports provided the basis 
for the army's assessment of morale in battle formations. However, with the benefit of 
a modern computer, serious omissions - or at least contradictions - become evident. 
Some reports showed that there were no convictions in divisions in which capital 
convictions (not to mention convictions for minor offences) can be traced in other 
registers. A minor headache for the researcher, this calls into question the whole 
manner by which the British army assessed the state of morale amongst its own 
troops. 
i) The Three Armies 
Gary Sheffield has shown that the anny's approach to discipline varied from one 
unit to another, and that the type of unit was ~ignificant.~ Sheffield argued that regular 
divisions maintained a traditional style of discipline which tended to be harsher, 
authoritarian, and reminiscent of the pre-war army. Territorial divisions also retained 
their pre-war style of discipline, but this was characterised by a more negotiated and, 
therefore, less severe regime by which, in some degree, the consent of the men was 
sought. This was itself a product of the nature of the pre-war Territorial Force where 
men were unlikely to remain if they regarded discipline as excessive, harsh or overly 
authoritarian. The territorials had also retained something of a community spirit and 
hierarchy in their ranks and men were likely to know their officers and NCOs in their 
G. Sheffield, 'Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army 1902-22', PhD 
thesis (King's College, London, 1994). 
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normal civilian lives. Despite the losses inflicted on the first formations sent overseas 
in 1915 and the topping up of units with volunteers or conscripts, the disparate 
approaches to discipline in the regular and territorial divisions proved to be 
remarkably resilient and to a large degree the ethos of each survived. 
Added to these formations were the New Armies largely associated with Lord 
Kitchener. Without the traditions of the Territorial Force, which proved so resilient, 
these formations were more prone to regular style discipline creeping in. Although 
discipline in the New Armies was rarely as harsh as that of the regular army, senior 
commanders' concerns about the reliability of these citizen-soldiers ensured that 
severe punishments were often meted out in an attempt to ensure obedience. Broadly, 
in terms of discipline the New Armies fitted somewhere between the regular and 
territorial divisions. 
, a 
This assertion can be tested and quantified by reference to the number of 
condemnations and executions in each formation. Whilst this might not be a perfect 
method of assessing the different approach to discipline in the 'three armies' it is, 
nevertheless, a convenient one and is in any case probably the best one available to 
the historian as being readily quantifiable. Furthermore, it is perfectly reasonable to 
assert that, if there was a marked difference in the manner of maintaining discipline in 
the various formations of the British army, then this would manifest itself in the most 
extreme from of authority available to divisional commanders, the death penalty. 
What then can we learn from a comparison of condemnations in the various 
formations of the British Army? 
0 
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ii) The Regular Divisions 
There were a total of twelve regular divisions in the army not including those 
British units serving with the Indian Army. There was a total of 908 condemnations in 
these units with 114 executions. On average then there were seventy-six 
condemnations and ten executions for every regular division. The rate of confirmation 
was, therefore, approximately thirteen percent. Needless to say there was a great 
variation within these units and to talk of typicality can be a little misleading. Some 
units saw much more action than others, but only two formations - the Guards and the 
27'h Divisions - experienced fewer than sixty condemnations within their ranks. The 
highest was the 3'd Division where 121 rnen were sentenced to death by court-martial 
and twenty-two were executed. Interestingly, this division had been singled out by 
General Douglas Maig in 1914 for its lack of military efficiency. In an implied 
criticism of Smith-Dorrien, who had ordered the stand at Le Cateau, Haig recorded in 
his diary for 7 November 1914: 
A very anxious day on account of the steady and determined advance of the 
Germans so close to our communications, and also because of the want of 
fighting spirit in the 3rd Division. This Division has never been in an efficient 
state since Le ~ a t e a u . ~  
Significantly, twenty-three death sentences were passed on men in this division during 
the following four months - a high proportion compared to other divisions at this time 
Robert Blake, The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1919 (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 
1952), p. 77. 
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- with three men being executed in February 1915. There had been only two 
condemnations in this division prior to Haig's remarks - one in September and another 
in October 1914. This is suggestive of a close relationship between beliefs about the 
military efficiency and the frequency of condemnations in army formations, with a 
corresponding increase in condemnations following poor assessments of either 
discipline or morale - the two main criteria of military efficiency. 
There were other reasons why the 3rd Division might have suffered poor morale. 
The original commander of the division, Major-General H. Hamilton, was killed in 
action on 14th October 1914. He was replaced by Major-General C .  J. Mackenzie 
whose command lasted a mere fourteen days, being himself invalided on 29 October 
1914, whereupon Major-General F. D. V. Wing assumed command. Without 
continuity of command it is no wonder that the 3'd Division's fighting spirit was 
suspect. Haig's comments on 7 November were swiftly followed by yet another 
change in divisional commander. On 2 1 November 19 14 Major-General Aylmer 
Haldane was appointed to the command of 3'd Division.' It was after this appointment 
that condemnations rapidly increased. It is unclear whether Haldane was appointed to 
this particular command because of his reputation as a strict disciplinarian or whether 
he was merely asserting his authority through the courts. The case of the 3'd Division 




In most regular divisions the number of condemnations was in the seventies or 
eighties. The average can, therefore, be safely regarded as a good reflection of a 
Major A. F. Becke, Order of Battle, Part I :  The Regular British Divisions (HMSO, London, 1945) 
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typical regular division. Most regular divisions - though not all - arrived on the 
Western Front in 1914 and were involved in the fiercest battles throughout the war. 
Most underwent at least one change at the top, but the rapid turnover of commanders 
of the 3d Division in 1914 was highly unusual. 








Figure 5 shows that the greatest number of condemnations in the 3rd Division 
occurred during the early part of 1915, the period of the battle of Neuve Chapelle, 0 
though the division had not been deployed in that particular action. Executions too 
were most frequent in 1915, this time in July. The later battles of the S o m e  in 1916 
and Ypres in 1917 are less obviously represented even though the division was 
deployed at both. This is surprising because it was during these latter battles that 
British courts-martial passed most death sentences and more executions were carried 
out! However, during these later battles, after the considerable enlargement of the 
6 See graph in Oram, Death Sentences. p. 14, or WortMessMen, p. 38. 
1% 
army in France with the arrival of New Army divisions, the regular divisions bore less 
of a burden. In 1915 the regular divisions performed the main offensive tasks of the 
British army. To a certain extent, then, the 3d Division’s record of condemnations and 
executions was a reflection of its own battle experience combined with the experience 
of the BEF as a whole and analyses of the division’s military efficiency. 
Similar observations can be made for the 6* Division, again represented in a graph: 
figure 6, below. 










Once again there was a hgh incidence of condemnations in early 1915. However, 
not all of the capital sentences in the 6th Division can be attributed to its experience in 
battle. There was a noticeable increase in the number of death sentences handed out 
by courts-martial in January 1916, after which the pattern settles down to fairly high 
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numbers of death sentences in the division, but only the occasional execution. This 
pattern was seemingly unaffected by the division's involvement in the Battle of the 
Somme. It was not until August 1917 when the number of capital sentences once 
again declines, and this reduction can be explained because the division was not 
deployed in the Third Battle of Ypres. 
The problem with the statistics for the 6'h Division is that the pattern of death 
sentences during 1916 does not obviously coincide with battle experience. There was 
a slight rise in the number of capital sentences during the battle of the Somme, but 
this was not particularly high in contrast with those in the preceding months. The first 
few months of 1916 are most intriguing for it was then that courts-martial passed the 
0 
highest number of capital sentences in the (jth Division for that year. The explanation 
is probably to be found in a change of commanders. On 14 November 1915 Major- 
General C .  Ross replaced Major-General Congreve as commander of the 6'h Division. 
Ross remained in command until 21 August 1917 when he was replaced by Major- 
General T. 0. Marden. It was during the period of Ross's command that high numbers 
of death sentences were most consistently passed by courts-martial. 
< 
0 
Death sentences were common in this division, as they were in other regular 
divisions, but the period of Ross's command is synonymous with a greater frequency 
of capital sentences. What is so remarkable about this period is how the numbers of 
condemnations was sustained over a number of months and not merely subject to 
sudden increases at times of battle. Does this suggest that Ross adopted a consistently 
harsher approach to discipline than other commanders of the division? It would 
appear logical to argue the case, particularly since the high numbers of capital 
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sentences passed in January and February 1916, all for desertion, came shortly after 
Ross had taken command; a time when he was seeking to assert his authority. There 
could be no clearer demonstration of authority than the use of capital punishment as a 
disciplinary weapon. 
iii) The Territorial Force 
In the fourteen divisions of the first-line Territorial Force there were just 283 
condemnations and thirty-one executions. Typically then the divisional average was 
1 twenty condemnations and two executions, little more than half the rate of the regular 
divisions. Again, however, there was a wide variation with some formations such as 
0 
' the 43'd and 44'h Divisions, which were posted to garrison duties in India, not 
experiencing any condemnations at all whilst at the other end of the scale there were 
thirty-nine condemnations and four executions in the Sth Di~is ion .~  Yet the overall 
average remains a good benchmark of death sentences in a 'typical' Territorial Force 
formation, with condemnations in most divisions somewhere in the twenties and 
thirties. This appears to confirm the existence of a less severe approach to discipline 
than that of the regular divisions. The confirmation rate in the territorial divisions was 
also less than that of the regulars. Only eleven percent of those 'territorials' 
condemned by courts-martial were executed. This is less than might have been 
expected, suggesting that the Territorial Force's reputed leniency extended somehow 
beyond courts-martial. 
e 
' If the 43rd and 44'h Divisions are removed from the calculation, the average number of condemnations 
in Territorial Force Divisions rises slightly to twenty-four; still significantly fewer than in regular units. 
.. . . .__I. . .. - . - _  .. - -  ...... 
. ,  . .  . 
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A second-line of territorial divisions was raised in August 1915; six of the fourteen 
divisions never left the United Kingdom and there were thirty-three condemnations 
and two executions in the others. As the period of service was relatively short and the 
numbers involved so small a statistical analysis here would be pointless. Nevertheless 
it should be noted that based on this evidence the death penalty does not appear to 
have featured highly in the disciplinary ethos of the second-line Territorial Force. 
Most references to divisions of the Territorial Force are, therefore, concerned with 
those first -line formations that went overseas from May 1915 onwards and were 
numbered in the order they were sent. The first such division to arrive in a foreign 
theatre was the 42nd Division, which was posted to Gallipoli, arriving there; via Egypt, 
0 
on 9 May 1915. It was immediately moved into the reserve positions and although it 
did not take part in any major offensive action until early June, two men, both serving 
with the Moth Manchester Regiment, were convicted of cowardice by a court-martial 
on 29 May. Both had their death sentences commuted to 5 years penal servitude. 
Intriguingly, there had been a problem landing two companies of the l/lOth 
Manchesters at Cape Helles at the same time as the rest of the division: the navy had 
inexplicably carried the two companies off, eventually landing them five days later. 
There is nothing other than speculation to connect the incident with the capital courts- 
martial, but clearly the division had seized on some incident early on and shown its 
determination to impose strict discipline. Its timing was significant: intense fighting 
had preceded 9 May, the day of the landing of most of the division, the reserves were 
used up and the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Ian Hamiliton - still unable to get his 
e 
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headquarters ashore -had been forced to cable Kitchener to plead for more divisions.8 
Indiscipline, it appears, could not be tolerated at such a moment. 
A further thirteen soldiers of the 42"d Division were sentenced to death before the 
peninsula was evacuated in January 1916, but none was executed. The division sailed 
to Egypt and eventually arrived on the Western Front in March 1917. Again it was not 
long after arriving at the front that a capital sentence was passed on one of the men in 
the division. Private Walton, a Lancashire Fusilier, had his capital sentence for 
quitting his post reduced to seven years penal servitude by Field Marshal Haig. 
However, a number of other men were sentenced to death in the final months of 1917, 
0 
during the Third Battle of Ypres, three of whom were executed. It appears that 
condemnations in this division followed a discernible pattern and were apparently 
used to tighten up discipline whenever deemed salutary - when first arriving at a battle 
zone, for example. The executions, all on the Western Front, also came at key 
moments in the division's active service. Three men were shot following offences I 
committed during the Ypres offensive in 1917 and a further two following the 
German offensive in the spring of 1918. 0 
This pattern - death sentences following specific battles - was typical of most 
Territorial Force divisions. Unlike the regular divisions, the death sentence does not 
appear to have formed a major part of discipline in Territorial formations in the 
periods of relative calm between engaging with the enemy. This is supported by a 
survey of death sentences in the fourteen first-line Territorial Force divisions, as 
shown in figure 7, below. 
~ ~~~~ 
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Figure 7: Condemnations in the First-he Territorial Force 
The big battles can be easily identified in figure 7: the Gallipoli landings (May 
1915, Loos (September 1915), Somme (July -November 1916), Messines Ridge 
(June 1917), Third Ypres (September - November 1917), German offensive 
(ApriVMay 1918), and the Allied advance (August 1918) are all denoted by an 
increase in the number of condemnations in the Territorial Force. Moreover, although 
the total numbers are fewer than in the regular divisions the differences between 
battles and times of relative inactivity are far more marked in the Territorial 
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formations. Indeed, figure 7 shows that death sentences were extremely rare in 
between these big battles. The death penalty might not have formed a fundamental 
role in the routine discipline of the Territorial Force, but its commanders were willing 
to resort to it in times of battle, albeit in a relatively muted form. 
iv) The New Army 
Thrty New Army divisions were raised and served in most theatres of the war.' 
1,049 death sentences were passed on men serving in these units and 135 executions 0 
carried out - a confirmation rate of thirteen percent, identical to that of the regular- 
divisions. With so many divisions is it no surprise that there should be a large 
variation in the number of condemnations in these units. In no New Army division 
were there no condemnations at all. The overall average per division i s  thirty-five 
condemnations and five executions. However, it is wholly erroneous to refer to a 
tpical New Army division, such a thing did not exist. Accordingly, it is difficult to 
sustain an argument that an average figure can be regarded as a true reflection of the 
New Army divisions' brush with the death penalty because of the broadly differing 
experiences of so many units. Three divisions (13'h,which was not deployed on the 
Western Front, 15fh and 17th) experienced more than sixty condemnations and six 
others (22"d, 26th, 38th, 39th, 40fh and Royal Naval Division) fewer than twenty. As the 
rest fit within that broad span between twenty and sixty condemnations the average of 
thirty-five per division is not a bad benchmark by which to measure the New Army, 
0 
For ease of reference and for the sake of completeness I have included the Royal Naval Division as a 9 
New Army formation. 
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but the word typical has to be avoided wherever possible when referring to the New 
Army divisions. 
Paradoxically, the absence of tradition in the New Army was at once liberating yet 
potentially enslaving for men of the 'service' battalions of the New Army. 
Commanders of these divisions were not snared by tradition: they had a blank canvas 
on which to paint. This partly explains why there is such diversity in the approach to 
the death penalty in New Army divisions when compared to other types of 
formations. More-so than in other units, the commanders of New Army divisions 
could impose their own character on their charges. We will deal with this in more . 
detail when we come to examine specific units and commanders, but some important 
observations need to be made at this point. 
Some commanders of New Army divisions clearly appreciated the enthusiasm and 
general quality of the volunteers in their charge. Maxse regarded the troops in his 1 Sth 
Division as potentially better than those of the regular army." However, not all 
commanding officers held the volunteers in the same high regard. Moreover, for those 
who doubted the abilities of the New Army it was their discipline that was of greatest 
concern, hence the surprise expressed by General Rawlinson at the achievements of 
his New Army divisions after the Battle of the Somme." Some commanders appear to 
have resented their commands - perhaps preferring command of a regular formation - 
and set about imposing an especially harsh form of discipline on their divisions, with 
the death penalty a vital component. Most vulnerable in this regard were the 
lo Maxse papers, IWM 1 1/1. 
1900-1918 (Routledge, London, 1990), p. 51. 
Quoted in T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British A m y  and the Emergence of Modem Warfare 11 
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unpopular commands such as the 35'h Division, a formation composed entirely of so- 
called 'bantam' units, battalions of men who did not reach the normal height 
requirement of the army, but who had volunteered to serve in specially constituted 
units. The men in the 35th Division had to endure a tirade of abuse from the press, 
from other soldiers and finally from their own commanders who imposed a 
particularly harsh disciplinary regime on their unwanted charges. Eventually, the 
division found itself a scapegoat following the S o m e  offensive and thirty-seven men 
were sentenced to death during the second half of 1916 alone, seven of whom were 
executed.12 In such cases the absence of tradition acted to enslave these units into a 
pre-war style of discipline based on fear and deterrence. Tradition served to protect 
Territorial Force divisions from such excesses, but there was no such check in the 
New Armies which were at the mercy of their commanders. 
0 
Most commanders of the New Armies appear to have taken a traditional view of 
discipline such as Brigadier-General F. P. Crozier, commander of a brigade in the 36'h 
(Ulster) Division. Crozier's belief in the deterrent value of the death penalty is best 
known from his own publication, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land. Indeed, Crozier 
appears to have been fond of his reputation as a hard disciplinarian; he had no qualms 
about ordering the summary shooting of fleeing Portuguese troops in 191813 and he 
certainly considered the discipline of the New Armies to be generally defi~ient. '~ It is 
impossible to say to what extent his views reflected those of the divisional 
commander or whether he was able to shape the approach to discipline in this 
0 
Curiously, the divisional history, Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Davson, History ofthe 3.5''' Division 
(Cassell, London, 1926) virtually ignores this unprecedented phenomenon. 
l 3  Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man's Land, p. 204. 
See remarks made in the case of Rifleman James Crozier, PRO W071/450, also discussed below. 14 
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division, but discipline in the 36'h Division had much in common with that of regular 
formations. The death penalty was used more frequently than in most New Army 
divisions, but not overly so: there were thirty-two condemnations and five 
 execution^.'^ However, they were not restricted to times when the division was 
engaged in battle and condemnations during the relatively quiet times were common. 
During the early months of 1916 a number of men were sentenced to death, mostly for 
desertion, and three were executed. There were fourteen condemnations in the 
division before the end of 1916, all but one was in Crozier's 107'h Brigade where the 
only three executions of this period also occurred. Six of the nine condemnations in 
the 36th Division during 1917 were also in Crozier's brigade, but the two executions 
carried out that year were against troops serving with other brigades. Condemnations 
in 107'h Brigade reduced following Crozier's departure in November 1916. 
Interestingly, discipline in 1 19'h Brigade, 40th Division - Crozier's new command - 
appears more reliant on the death penalty after that date: the five condemnations 
recorded in Crozier's new brigade amount to half the total for the entire division. 
0 
0 It appears, therefore, that reference to the frequency of death sentences provides a 
quantifiable means by which to measure discipline in various units. This is in keeping 
with Gary Sheffield's thesis. Discipline appears to have been imposed with the most 
severity in the regular divisions. The Territorial Force seems to have retained a less 
harsh form of discipline with fewer condemnations whilst the New Army divisions 
usually fit roughly halfway between the two. Condemnations were more common in 
the New Armies during times of relative inaction than in the Territorial Force. 
l 5  Crozier's unit, 9Ih Royal Irish Rifles had more than its share of condemnations - almost half the 
division's total until the end of 1916. 
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Accordingly, capital sentences in the New Armies were not so much a response to 
battle experience, but more an intrinsic part of the process adopted by some 
commanders for instilling discipline in these 'citizen-soldiers'. The death penalty 
formed a vital part of the disciplinary process during major battles, but its use in New 
Army divisions at other times should not be overlooked. In terms of the death penalty 
it is true to say that the New Army units were something of a hybrid between their 
two more established army ancestors, reflecting a limited form of both traditions, but 
they increasingly leant towards those of the regular army rather than the Territorial 
Force. 
Nowhere is the encroachment of regular style discipline into the New Army more 
apparent than in the number of condemnations. Discipline in the New Armies was 
also a major concern for the High Command.16 In spite of reports by some 
commanders such as Maxse, the view still persisted in the higher echelons of the 
British army that the volunteers could not be trusted and needed firm handling. This is 
reflected in the rate by which death sentences were confirmed. Indeed, the New Army 
experienced an identical rate of confirmations to that of the regular divisions. When it 
came to the death penalty the citizen-soldiers were not spared or given any special 
allowance by the Commander-in-Chief. 
The rate of confirmations in the Territorial Force was lower than in the Regular or 
New Armies. This is curious because the decision whether to confirm a death 
sentence or not was made by the Commander-in-Chief rather than a division's own 
commander. Pre-war traditions could have little impact on decisions taken at a level 
This is one of the themes of Travers, The Killing Ground. 16 
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of command higher than division, so how was it that this less severe form of 
discipline appears to have been carried over into the confirmation process? It is 
possible that more lenient recommendations by the unit, brigade and divisional 
commanders served to mitigate here. This seems to be the most likely explanation, but 
in the absence of each and every court-martial file it is impossible to be absolutely 
certain. In any case it should be noted that the variation is only slight. 
’ v) The Impact of the Big Offensives Q 
A number of factors could have played a significant part in determining how many 
condemnations courts-martial were likely to pass. First amongst these is the big 
offensive scenario. In the build up to a large-scale offensive such as the Somme in 
1916 or Ypres in 1917 tension increased. The intensification of the preliminary 
bombardment although directed at the enemy also played on the minds of those 
awaiting orders to advance. This might have resulted in an increase in desertion. 
Furthermore, charges of cowardice in the face of the enemy were most likely to be 
brought during battle itself rather than at times when most units were out of the line. 
The enormous number of casualties experienced in these battles might also have acted 
as the catalyst for more desertions. Add to this the increased determination of 
commanders, up to and including the Commander-in-Chief, to ensure tight discipline 
at such times and it appears perfectly reasonable to expect more death sentences to be 
passed during or as a result of the large offensives. This can be tested by comparing 
the number of condemnations in divisions deployed in these battles with those others 
on the Western Front which were not deployed and then with those in other theatres 
0 
b 
Divisions Deployed Other Divisions on 
in Somme Battle the W. Front 
45 ( 5 )  3 
49 (9) 4 
44 (8) 1 
59 (10) 2 
61 (13) 2 
60 (6) 0 
318 (51) 12 (0) 
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of the war. The total number of death sentences and executions for British divisions 
during the period July to December 1916 is shown in figure 8 below. The month of 
December has been included as part of the period covering the battle to account for 
cases arising from the action but dealt with later. 
1 Date 
I July 1916 
August 19 16 
September 19 16 
October 1916 
November 19 16 
December 1916 
Total a 
Figure 8: Condemnations and executions during the period of the Battle of the Somme 
(executions are shown in brackets) 
A striking feature of this comparison is that executions were only carried out in 
those divisions engaged in the battle. The fifty-one executions were a measure of the 
resolve of the Commander-in-Chief, Douglas Haig, to assert his authority during the 
offensive. This represented a far higher rate of confirmation than for the war as a 
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whole: sixteen as opposed to eleven percent. Significantly, no executions were carried 
out in other divisions on the Western-Front or elsewhere during the same period. 
The relatively low number of divisions in other theatres, and the still fewer 
divisions on the Western Front which were not deployed in the battle, render direct 
comparisons with those engaged in the Somme offensive difficult. However, what can 
be stated with confidence is that, in addition to there being no executions, even 
allowing for their smaller numbers, there were also far fewer condemnations in 
divisions away from the Somme offensive. For example, in the other theatres there 
a 
were two and a half condemnations for every division during this period. 'This is 
' comparable to the divisions on the Western Front not deployed in the Somme 
offensive for whom there were just under three condemnations for every division. 
However, there is a major difference in the divisions involved in the battle. Soldiers in 
these divisions were more than twice as likely to be condemned by a court-martial: 
there were more than seven death sentences for every division deployed in the battle. 
Of course, none of this is particularly surprising. The stakes were significantly 
raised in those divisions employed in the titanic struggle in Picardy and this has 
understandably affected the nature of discipline in those divisions as well, What 
though of the three types of division involved in the battle, how do they compare with 
the analysis (above) of condemnations during the war as a whole? 
Eighty-seven of the condemnations arising from the Battle of the Somme were 
passed on soldiers in regular divisions, roughly ten for every regular division. Eleven, 
or thirteen percent, of these were executed, a rate comparable to the regular divisions' 
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experience throughout the war. The same can be said of the New Army divisions 
where there were 191 condemnations arising from the battle and thirty-one 
executions, or approximately seven condemnations for every New Army division and 
a confirmation rate of sixteen percent. 
However, the territorial divisions' experience of discipline appears to have differed 
remarkably during the Battle of the Somme. The number of condemnations per 
division is lower than in the other types of division: there were forty death sentences, 
or five for every territorial division. This is consistent with the overall picture - more 
condemnations in the regular divisions, slightly less in those of the New Army and 
fewer still in the Territorial Force. Yet the nine executions represent a Substantial 
increase (from eleven to twenty-three per cent) in the likelihood of a condemnation in 
the Territorial Force being confirmed. 
0 
. 
This is suggestive of a harsher line being adopted with Territorial Force units 
during the Somme offensive. It is interesting that the Commander-in-Chief did not 
confirm death sentences in the regular divisions - where discipline was reputedly 
more severe - at an increased rate during the months of the Somme offensive, but 
slightly increased the number of confirmations in New Army units. The only major 
increase was in the Territorial Force, indicating a heightened concern about discipline 
in these units during a major battle. 
0 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of condemnations and 
executions for the period July to December 1917: the Third Battle of Ypres. During 
this period there were 3 1 1 condemnations in British divisions and forty-five 
executions. As we might expect most of these concerned divisions engaged in the 
21 1 
action at Ypres where the numbers were 264 and forty-three respectively, or 
approximately 6 condemnations per division with roughly sixteen per cent confirmed. 
This can be contrasted with the three condemnations per division both on the Western 
Front and in other theatres of the war during the same period. Again executions were 
virtually non-existent away from the major battle: just two executions were carried 
out in France in a division not deployed in the Flanders campaign. 
There were approximately six and a quarter condemnations per regular division, a 
figure remarkably similar to the six and a half per New Army division. However the 
number of condemnations per Territorial Force division was less than five.I7 Once . 
0 
again though the proportion of confirmations was much lower in the regular units (ten 
per cent) than in territorial (seventeen per cent) or New Army (eighteen per cent) 
divisions. That the rate of confirmations in regular divisions did not appreciably f 
increase during either the Somme or Passchendaele offensives yet rose substantially 
in the Territorial Force during these large-scale battles, and in the New Armies during . 
Third Ypres, suggests that concerns about the discipline of civilian-soldiers not only 
persisted, but might even have increased. 
2 
0 
There is other evidence that commanders were more concerned about the discipline 
of New Army and Territorial Force units than they were of that in the regular army. 
Lieutenant-Colonel F. P. Crozier's comments that 'the discipline of the 9th R.I. Rifles 
is good for a service [i.e. New Army] battalion','' implied that good discipline was the 
exception in the case of New Army battalions. This is supported by Travers, who has 
It is worth noting here that by the summer of 1917 2"d line Territorial Force units were posted to the 
Western Front to join the 1"line units, most of which had been there since 1915, and unlike the Somme 
offensive many 2"d line territorials were deployed at 3rd Ypres. 
l 8  Case of Rifleman James Crozier, PRO W071/450. See also Chapter 2 above. 
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observed that the state of discipline (and, therefore, the reliability) of their own troops, 
particularly those of the New Armies, preoccupied qfh Army commanders during their 
preparations for the Somme offensive in 1916. More attention was paid to discipline 
in the plans for the battle than was afforded the enemy about whom concerns were 
less obvio~s . '~  
Other commanders, however, saw different qualities in the men of the New Army. 
In his Notes on the New Armies by a DIVISIONAL Commander, dated November 
1914 and circulated to Lord Kitchener and Lieutenant-General Murray (Chief of Staff 
of the BEF), General Ivor Maxse said of the citizen-soldiers: 
a 
The distinguishing features of the infantry of the New Armies appear to be:- 
(I) The excellent physical and moral qualities of the Subaltern Officers. 
They have tackled the job of commanding war strength platoons with a 
zest and a fearlessness which augers well. . . . 
The quality of the men is undoubtedly of a higher standard than that of 
'the average men we usually recruited in the old Army. Every one I 
have spoken to holds the same opinion. Having discussed the matter 
with ex N.C. Officers who have re-enlisted, I find they hold the 
opinion that they never had better men in their old Regiments2' 
(II) 
0 
Maxse's opinion did not alter in the following few months and he restated it in a 
second report on the New Armies in February 1915. However, he did raise concerns 
Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 146. 19 
*' Maxse papers, IWM 69/53/11 (Box 1 Ul), 
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about the experience of the officers and he believed that a limited exchange of 
personnel between regular and New Army officers would be beneficial to all 
concerned.21 
If, however, the fault lay in the inexperience of the officers of the New Armies the 
solution to most disciplinary worries was held to be the occasional shooting of men in 
the ranks to set an example. Or to put it another way, perceived deficiencies in the 
management of the men was compensated for by the coercion of the rank and file 
through a regime of fear. Execution was widely held to be the only way to restore 
discipline where it was thought to be suspect. Furthermore, the use of the death 
penalty was frequently believed to be the most effective way of maintaining discipline 
and it might be recalled that General Horace Smith-Dorrien had considered that 'the 
only way to stop it [desertion] is to carry out some death penalties'.22 Smith-Dorrien 
also insisted on another execution later in 1915 because he did not want the resolve of 
the High Command to appear weak by reducing the fear of execution in the ranks: 
only yesterday a man in this very battalion [ lSt King's Own Royal Lancaster] 
was shot for a similar offence and it is not yet possible to see that an example 
is necessary - I think though it will have a bad effect if it is not carried out and 
therefore recommend it.23 
Maxse papers, IWM 69/53/11 (Box 1 l / l ) .  
22 Case of Private Scotton, PRO W071/396. 
23 Case of Private Kershaw, PRO W071/410. 
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In many other cases executions were carried out even though discipline in the unit 
was regarded as either very good or excellent. 
Similarly, recognition was given to those commanders whose disciplinary methods 
met with the approval of the High Command. In recommending the execution of a 
Scots Guardsman, Major-General Capper, commander of the 7th Division in 1915 
wrote: 
The battalion [2nd Scots Guards] has good discipline but it has been put into 
this state by a C.O. who has taken severe measures against those who have 
attempted to desert their comrades in action.24 
0 
The Major-General was not explicit about what these severe measures entailed. Not 
only was this the first case resulting in execution in the 2"d battalion Scots Guards, it 
was also the first condemnation. h the absence of any evidence to the contrary it can 
only be assumed that summary executions were not being practised in this unit and, 
therefore, the 'severe measures' must refer to field punishments. However, what is 
interesting is that the mere threat of an execution was not considered sufficient 
deterrent in itself, and this in a unit said to have good discipline. 
, 
This might indicate an over-reliance on the death penalty as a means to maintain 
discipline, which as such marks a degree of continuity with concerns raised by 
politicians of the Left during the pre-war debate about army  punishment^.^^ It might 
be recalled that during the debate about the abolition of flogging many senior 
24 Case of Private Reid, PRO W07 1/406. 
25 See Chapter 1. 
215 
commanders appeared unable to see an effective alternative. In the absence of 
corporal punishment many of those in senior posts of the British Army during the 
First World War fell back on the ultimate punishment rather than exploring other 
methods of managing discipline. This doctrine was applied every bit as much in units 
where even by their own standards no example was necessary, as it was in those 
where they perceived a problem. 
In his study of discipline and morale in the British Expeditionary Force, James 
Brent Wilson, argued that there was a relationship between experience in battle and 
the rate of crime.in any particular unit, contending that crime tended to rise most in 
units which experienced set-backs in action. This, according to Wilson, was the result 
of a collapse in 
reflection of increased coercion on the part of commanders. This assertion can also be 
tested by a more detailed analysis of divisions deployed in specific actions. The first 
day of the Somme offensive, perhaps the most controversial of all actions during 
World War One, is an ideal case in point. I have shown elsewhere how the number of 
condemnations increased roughly in line with the rate of casualties sustained - 
indicating that the threat of the death penalty was most often deployed at times of the 
greatest action on the battlefield.27 Was the experience of those units engaged on the 
first day of the Somme offensive consistent with this general trend? 
a 
To this we might add that it could just as easily be a 
e 
26 James Brent Wilson, ‘Morale and Discipline in the British Expeditionary Force 1914-1918’, MA 
thesis (University of New Brunswick, 1978). 
Oram, Death Sentences, p. 14 and Worthless Men, p. 38. 27 
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vi) The Battle of the Somme 
A total of thirteen divisions were deployed on the morning of 1 July 1916: four 
regular formations (4 , 7 , 8 , 2gth); seven new army divisions (18th, 21St, 30th, 31St, 
32"d, 34th, 36th); and two from the territorial force (46'h, %jfh). Close scrutiny of these 
divisions highlights the problem with relying exclusively on generalised conclusions. 
However helpful these general conclusions are there will always be exceptions which 
can only be revealed by close study of individual units at a given time. Viewed along 
with the general trends already identified these more individualised cases facilitate a 
more complete analysis of how the death penalty was operated at the time of a major 
battle. 
th th th 
a 
t 
The two territorial divisions had similar battle experiences. Involved in the same 
pincer movement, the 46th from the north and the 56th from the south, the two 
divisions suffered similar disappointments on 1 July. The 46th division had suffered 
from the start of their attack; many were lost in the smoke and the attack became 
bogged down in the mud. On reaching the uncut enemy wire some men made it as far 
as the German second line, but the division was repulsed with considerable casualties. 
Although initially enjoying more success, largely thanks to the enemy's wire being 
cut, the division was also repulsed after heavy fighting with a high number of 
casualties.** 
0 
There were also some similarities in the discipline approach in the divisions. In 
each division a mere five death sentences were passed throughout 1916, one prior to 
the attack on the Somme and four afterwards. However, the similarities end there. 
W09512683 & 2686. 
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Whilst there were three condemnations in the 46'h division in July there were none in 
the 56th. One of the condemnations in the 46fh division was carried out - the division's 
only execution throughout the war. The individual, Private Hawthorne, was convicted 
of an act of cowardice on the first morning of the battle.29 It appears, therefore, that 
although their experiences were similar the reaction in each division, at least in terms 
of the death penalty as a means of reinforcing discipline and maintaining fighting 
spirit, was quite different. 
Interestingly, the three condemnations in the 46th Division were evenly distributed 
across each of its three infantry brigades with the executed soldier belonging to 137th 
'brigade which had made the initial assault on the German lines. Condemnations in the 
46'h division were rare and three in one month was unprecedented. This, therefore, 
appears to be a case of pour encourager Zes autres. That the same did nut occur in the 
other territorial force division, which had endured a similar experience that morning, 
is further evidence that sentencing by court-martial more often than not was the , 
outcome of different approaches to the same problem by the respective divisional 
commanders. Throughout the whole war there were twenty-one and twenty-two 
condemnations in these two divisions - a relatively low number typical of territorial 
force formations - but on this occasion one commander had differed, perhaps under 





The crime statistics quoted by Wilson for these two divisions are incorrect. His 
table shows there to have been no convictions at court-martial for either division in 
29 wo71/490. 
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the month of October?' There were, however, two death sentences passed on men in 
the 56th division on 14 O~tober .~ '  The two men concerned, serving with 1/13 
(Kensington) London Regiment, were spared the firing squad by the Commander-in- 
Chief. This raises doubts about the accuracy of Wilson's figures and, therefore, those 
contained in the reports in the division's war diary - Wilson's source. If indeed there 
was a genuine rise in recorded convictions in the two territorial force divisions during 
August 1916 following their involvement in the first day of the Somme battle, as 
Wilson argues, it was certainly not matched by an increase in the number of recorded 
condemnations. This suggests that the nature of that crime was not thought to be a 
threat to discipline and only the commander of 46th division deemed it necessary to 
deploy the firing squad in an attempt to bolster discipline. 
0 
The number of condemnations and executions in the four regular divisions show 
some remarkable similarities. Each division experienced a slight rise in the number of 
capital sentences during the Somme battle - hardly surprising. Furthermore, the total 
number of condemnations in each division for the whole of 1916 varied little from the 
mean of ten. However, in the period prior to the start of the battle in July 
condemnations were far more common in these divisions than in the territorial 
formations. This was particularly so in the 4th and 7th rather than in the 8'h and 2gth, 
which differed slightly from the other regular divisions in that originally they had 
been assembled from various units serving across the Empire in 1914. Despite there 
being something of a rise in the number of soldiers in regular divisions condemned by 
courts-martial during the Battle of the Somme, this was far less than can be discerned 
0 
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in other types of divisions. In short the approach to capital punishment in these 
divisions varied surprisingly little over the twelve months despite the considerable 
impact of the Battle of the Somme. 
A number of executions were carried out in the 4'h and 7th divisions. Two men 
from the 4th Division were executed in August. The first, a soldier from the 
Hampshire Regiment, was shot for cowardice, then a few days later a highlander was 
executed for desertion. The men served in different brigades and their crimes were 
unrelated. Their treatment was entirely consistent with the division's record since 
arriving in France in 1914. Discipline in the 4'h Division had been strictly enforced 
since the beginning of the war. Condemnations were common and five executions had 
already been carried out before these two on the Somme. Nor were they the last to be 
shot, underlining the fact that .whilst recourse to the death penalty during the S o m e  
offensive might have marked a change of direction for territorial formations, for those 
in regular divisions it represented continuity. 
' 
Other regular divisions might not have been subject to quite such a harsh approach 
as the 4'h Division, but their experience remained different to that of the territorials. 
Condemnations were not as common in the 7th Division throughout 1916, but it was 
rare for a month to pass without at least one. Again this was consistent with the 
division's record; like the 4'h Division condemnations had been a feature of the 
division's disciplinary approach since 1914 and, also like the 4th Division, five men 
had already been executed. However, unlike in the 4'h Division no executions were 
thought to be necessary in the 7'h Division during the Battle of the S o m e .  There was 
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much commonality of experience of discipline within regular divisions, but subtle 
differences did indeed exist. 
Variations in the New Army divisions are even more marked. In some units such as 
the 30th Division there was a long history of condemnations. Throughout 1916 there 
were only three months when no soldiers in this division were sentenced to death by 
court-martial: April, December and, paradoxically, July. Nor was this merely a 
question of single condemnations. Again, surprisingly, the only month when there 
were fewer than two condemnations was August; there were four in February and 
nine in November. However, no sentence was carried out, until November when a 
total of three soldiers were executed. Was this a response to a particular incident or, 
given the frequency of condemnations in this division during 1916, did it signify an 
attempt to demonstrate a more general determination on the part of the commander to 
enforce discipline? 
' Interestingly, although arising from two separate incidents, all three executions 
were carried out against men serving with the same unit: 18th Manchester Regiment. 
Four of the five soldiers whose death sentences had been commuted to lesser 
punishments also belonged to a single unit - lgth Manchesters - whilst the one 
remaining, a Green Howard, was serving in the same brigade. The executions were 
carried out, it appears, at the insistence of the divisional commander, following set- 
backs in action, despite some opposition from his own junior commanders. 
0 
0 
On 1 July the 30th Division had achieved all its objectives, but successes in the 
following months eluded them. In mid-October the division had taken part in the 
Battle of the Transloy Ridges, but despite the use of tanks had been unable to hold 
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onto its gains. The attack by the 21St Brigade on 18 October had been chaotic. It was 
probably as a result of this that the four men of the lgth Manchesters had been 
condemned to death by court-martial on 13 November (the day that the Battle of the 
Ancre opened) for the offence of cowardice. All had their sentences commuted to 10 
years penal servitude. 
The three men whose sentences were carried out had been convicted of desertion. 
The first case was a direct result of the battle, the second - involving two men - was 
more an indirect consequence. Together these cases clearly demonstrate how battle 
could differently affect the men involved. The first case was that of Private William 
Hunt, who was tried for desertion during the battle of Flers on 12 October 1916. Hunt 
had absented himself during an attack on an enemy trench and made his way to a 
First Aid Post where he was seen by the battalion Medical Officer. The Medical 
Officer told the court: 
0 
I saw him standing outside the First Aid Post. I asked him what he was doing. 
He made no reply. I ordered him to return to his company. Shortly after I 
again saw him helping a man to the First Aid Post. He made no complaint 
about being ill or wounded. He had no rifle. I again ordered him to rejoin his 
company. 
However, Hunt only temporarily rejoined his unit and was, some two days later, 
discovered to have attached himself to another battalion, repairing trenches.32 
32 PRO W07 1 /5 16. 
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Hunt's defence was that he had lost control of his limbs and had made his way to 
the First Aid Post. After he was sent away by the Medical Officer he had assisted a 
wounded corporal to the same First Aid Post. Then, having become detached from his 
unit he had joined another. This was corroborated by two defence witnesses, but the 
court decided that Hunt had deliberately absented himself from his unit with the 
intention of avoiding duty in the frontline and found him guilty. His previous 
convictions for absence and disobedience, both in August 1916,33 might have been a 
factor in the decision to sentence Hunt &O death. But the decision to carry out the . 
sentence was probably more a question of timing: his was the nineteenth 
condemnation in the division during 1916 and at the height of a major battle it was 
likely that an example was deemed necessary. 
I 
Despite Hunt's claim that he had been unable to control his limbs, he was never 
medically examined. It seems likely that Hunt's nerve had cracked during the attack 
and his attempt to perform other duties Rad been to no avail. Nevertheless, he was not 
immediately singled out as an example to deter others. The brigade commander, 
Brigadier-General Lloyd, recommended that the sentence be commuted. Lloyd's 
comments are interesting: he clearly had little regard for Hunt's qualities, but appears 
to have been one of only a few generals to record their disapproval of the death 
penalty: 
33 PRO W071/516. 
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There is no circumstance which requires the extreme penalty to be inflicted 
[my italics]. The man is young, but his presence in the ranks of new 
reinforcements is not at all desirable.34 
Others were less inhibited. Lloyd was overruled by the divisional commander, Major- 
General J. S. M. Shea, who justified the execution on the grounds that 'the accused 
deliberately absented himself from the firing line'.35 
The unambiguous rejection of the death penalty as a means to enforce discipline by 0 
this brigade commander sheds some light on the commutation of so many 
condemnations in the 90th Brigade; Hunt's was the eighth condemnation in the 
brigade, but the first to be carried out. Interference in the independence of courts- 
martial, especially from divisional commanders was quite common, as we will see. 
The second case in the 30th Division involved two pre-war friends, Albert Ingham 
. and Alfred Longshaw, who had tried to flee the battlefront and return to England. I 
have briefly alluded to this case in an earlier chapter, but here we must consider the 
case in the context of the Battle of the S o m e ,  the nature of the offensive and the 
consequences of the huge loss of life. The co-defendants' testimonies are clear 
evidence of the effects a major action such as the Battle of the Somme could have on 
both unit and troop morale; in particular the impact of large numbers of casualties. 
Unlike the case of Private Hunt, who had seemingly cracked as consequence of a 
single action, Ingham and Longshaw's decisions to desert were the outcome of an 
accumulation of factors, not all of them related to events on the battlefield. 
0 
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Privates Albert Ingham and Alfred Longshaw were both employed as clerks at the 
Salford Goods Yard of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway before enlisting 
together at the outbreak of war.36 Although not deployed on the first day of the 
S o m e  offensive their unit had seen much action in the following weeks: the 
battalion war diary records how the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel W .A. 
Smith, was killed on 7 July. They had also been involved in the unsuccessful attack 
on Guillemont on 30 July.37 It was when the unit was returning to the frontline 
trenches on .5 October that Ingham and Longshaw absconded. They successfully 
negotiated their way to the coast where, dressed in civilian clothes, they boarded an 
England-bound ship at Dieppe. But there good fortune deserted them. Their attempts 
to pass as American tourists did not deceive the military police; both were 
apprehended and immediately admitted their crime. The prosecution case was not a 
difficult one - the facts of their capture alone were sufficient evidence to prove 
desertion. It must be acknowledged that this was aprirnefacie case which was likely 
to result in death sentences for both men regardless of unit history or commander's 
character. The evidence presented by the two defendants, recorded in the transcript of 
the trial, indicates that the soldiers were aware of the implications of their actions and 
that they were on trial for their lives. 
e 
a 
A clerk recorded Longshaw's statement in which he told the court that he had 
absented himself from his unit, adding: 
36 Putkowski and Sykes, Shot at Dawn, p. 138. 
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I was prompted to act thus by the state of mind caused by the wish to visit my 
people at home, about whom I was greatly worried; also my service at the 
Somme front had reacted on my state of mind, which had become morbid and 
irrational, also the fact that practically all my comrades were gone induced me 
further to this act. Also all immediate prospect of leave was denied.38 
Longshaw's account raises a number of important considerations. Firstly, it is clear . 
that concerns for his 'people at home' were paramount and it is significant that he put 
this first. This suggests that the link between home and battle fronts was an important 
one. When the link came under threat, as appears to be the case here, it could induce 
men to react without regard for the consequences of their actions. The link with home 
was crucial to the morale of the troops and should not be underestimated. That so 
much mail, parcels and the like were received by men at the front even at times of 
0 
fierce engagements with the enemy suggests that the importance of this was not lost 
on the army at the time. 
0 Another important feature of army discipline and morale was the so-called esprit de 
corps, which was so enthusiastically encouraged by commanders. The impact then to 
troop morale of huge losses within tightly knit units could be devastating. Perhaps it 
was this effect that Wilson has noticed with the increased incidence of crime after 
units had seen action. Longshaw's concern about the loss of so many of his comrades 
should be viewed within the context of the inculcation of esprit de corps. Thought to 
38 PRO W07 1 /525. 
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be a valuable adjunct to fighting spirit, esprit de corps was a remarkably fragile 
concept on the modem battlefield, especially in a 'Pals' unit such as this. 
Longshaw's complaint regarding leave might seem a minor one under the 
circumstances. However, this issue had also concerned the mail censor, Captain 
Hardie, who had identified leave as the single greatest complaint affecting the morale 
of the troops in Third Army around the same time.39 Indeed, leave appears to have 
been a universal concern amongst troops at the front: Petain had to make significant 
t concessions to French troops following the mutinies of 1917. Although the prospect 
of no leave was in itself unlikely to have induced Longshaw and others like him to 
desert, it had an enormous compounding effect on other concerns in soldiers' minds. 
Most notable amongst these was worry about family and friends at home. For a 
soldier many miles away from his family the solution to such concerns would in all 
likelihood appear to be leave. Its denial, or the prospect of its denial, was probably 
powerful enough to make some act irrationally. 
0 
For good measure Longshaw also appealed to the better nature of the court in 
e which he unwittingly re-stated this desire for familial contact: 
My motive wasfirst to visit home and then to join in the same unit of the 
Naval Forces as my brother [my italics]. I regret this act. I have served with 
my battn in France for twelve months and hope that this service and my 
character will aid in my plea for a chance to make full reparation in service to 
condone my offence.40 
39 Hardie papers. Report re troop morale for November 1916, p. 4. 
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Not surprisingly Private Ingham, the co-defendant, made a similar plea: 
I was worrying at the time through the loss of my chums. Also about my 
mother at home, being upset, through hearing bad news of two of my 
comrades. I plead for leniency on account of my previous good conduct. I beg 
for a chance to make atonement. I left with my chum firstly to see those at 
home and then to try to get into the Navy along with his [Longshaw's] other 
brother, who is serving there.41 
0 
Concerns like these, most particularly the longing for home, became most 
heightened during battle. This is hardly surprising. Battle would have made soldiers 
most aware of their own mortality and thoughts about home took on a morbid tone 
with some wondering whether they would ever see home or family again. Then there 
was the lingering concern about how one's family would cope financially should the 
worst happen. It seems likely that these two defendants had discussed their respective 
defences and the similarities probably owe something to this. However, the mail 
censor for Third Army had noted identical concerns about home amongst troops in his 
formation. The clamour for parcels and the like from home, he stated, had been duly 
met4*, which suggests that the desire for continued link between home and war fronts 
was a mutual one. In assessing the state of morale of men, especially, those involved 
0 
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in a battle as fierce as the Somme, we should not overlook the importance of the 
home-front. 
Paradoxically, there appears to have been no disciplinary necessity to carry out the 
executions of Longshaw and Ingham. The brigade commander, Brigadier-General 
Lloyd, accepted that a well thought out plan to desert such as theirs was likely to 
attract the extreme penalty, but added 'There is however no other reason either for the 
sake of discipline or example in the units concerned that it should be carried 
The circumstances of their desertion, however, were such that again Lloyd's opinion 
@ 
' was discarded by Major-General Shea, the divisional commander, whose view that 
'this is a clear case of desertion' met with the agreement of corps and army 
 commander^.^^ The near success of their desertion was probably the undoing of 
Lonshaw and Ingham. Theirs was the kind of desertion for which the Army Act had 
been designed to punish in the most extreme manner. Clearly the divisional 
commander was not prepared to allow the culprits to escape with their lives despite 
the protestations of the brigade Commander. To have done otherwise would probably 
have met with disapproval from the High Command, but there is nothing in the e 
division's record to suggest an alternative outcome. 
Other divisions' experience differed. In the 18th Division, a New Army formation 
commanded by Major-General Sir Ivor Maxse, condemnations were rare and 
executions rarer still. Throughout 1916 there were only five condemnations in the 18th 
Division and no executions; of the New Army divisions only the 34'h Division had 
fewer condemnations during 1916. This contrasts with most other divisions where 
43 PRO W0711525. 
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condemnations were far more common and highlights the problems associated with 
general conclusions, especially those concerning the New Armies. Maxse had stated 
how he decided to use the trial of two soldiers of the Northamptonshire Regiment in 
January 1916 'to illustrate to all battalions the necessity of never surrendering without 
a fight'.45 However, he did not specifically call for the death penalty and the one death 
sentence passed in that case was later commuted. Unfortunately, Maxse's 
recommendations have not survived, nor is anything known of his attitude towards 
capital punishment, but the rarity of condemnations in the 18'h Division suggests that 
he might not have been a supporter of the death penalty as a means to enforce 
0 
discipline. 
Significantly, it was during the first two months of the S o m e  offensive that four 
of the five condemnations in the 18'h Division were passed. On 1sJuly the division had 
achieved its first and second objectives despite encountering some stiff opposition and 
being held up at significant points. Enemy counter attacks were beaten off and further 
progress made the following morning. They were also involved in the dawn attack on 
14 July, capturing TrBnes Wood. Casualties had been high, yet it was in the battalion 0 
held back in reserve on 1 July, the 12fh Middlesex, that two condemnations followed 
rather than in those deployed in the battle. This must cast some doubt on Wilson's 
argument that increased levels of crime cannot be separated from reverses in battle. 
The circumstances of the offences are unknown, but it appears likely that the two 
Maxse papers, file 14/1. 45 
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men, convicted of desertion on 12 July, had absconded whilst the battalion was being 
moved forward to captured enemy 
The key issue here is whether the comparatively low number of condemnations in 
the 18th Division were attributable to its relative success in battle or whether it should 
be viewed in the context of Maxse's more progressive approach to discipline. 
Certainly, the five condemnations during 1916 were the only ones in the lgth Division 
during the entire period of Maxse's command and there were no executions. 
Furthermore, the division's record was markedly different under another commander. 
Aftet Maxse's promotion to GOC XVIII Corps in 1917 the number of condemnations 
in the division increased massively: there were eighteen condemnations in 1917 and a 
further five in 1918 with a total of four executions carried out. In this case at least it 
appears that the character of its commander had a profound affect on the division's 
0 
approach to the death penalty. 
Maxse's views of discipline in his troops was closer to the concept of 'intelligent 
bayonets' more usually associated with the French army than with the British. It is 
also worth, at this point, reconsidering another case - from 1917 - related by the . 
Courts-Martial-Officer, Gerald Hurst. Two soldiers had been acquitted of the offence 
of plundering by a Field-General-Court-Martial. The president of the court was, 
according to Hurst, an experienced barrister. However, as Hurst stated: 'The 42"d 
Divisional Staff required the President to furnish forthwith in writing a full 
explanation of his conduct in allowing the acquittals to take place [my  italic^]'.^' 
0 
The war diary shows that the battalion was being moved steadily forward from 1 until 13 July in 
readiness for the assault on TrBnes Wood on 14 July. 
47 Hurst, 'The Administration of Military Law' in Contemporary Review, Vol. CXV (1919), p. 325. 
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The important point here is that it was the divisional commander who sought to 
extend his authority in an attempt to influence the findings of the court and not some 
higher office such as the Commander-in-Chief, as is far too often assumed by 
historians and public alike. Hurst, who was supportive of the courts-martial system as 
the most efficient and fair means to administer military law, gave details of other 
incidents of interference with judicial process. Invariably, it was divisional 
commanders who were guilty of these 'gross tamperings with the course of justice'.48 
Of course divisional commanders could be cajoled or bullied into following certain 
courses of action. Some were simply afraid of being branded poor disciplinarians. An 
obvious case concerned the 35'h Division, already discussed, above. The twenty-nine 
death sentences passed on men in this 'bantam' division followed prejudicial remarks 
made at an inspection by the corps commander, General Aylmer Haldane. This 
prompted a purging of so-called 'degenerates' from the division and four executions 
were carried out. However, these 'worthless men' had endured a torrid time long 
before Haldane's inspection; more prosecutions were brought against men in this 
division than in any other in the ~ 0 r p . s . ~ ~  The divisional commander, Major-General 
Landon, had blamed the poor quality of the troops for this and justified a number of 
executions on the grounds of the 'mental and physical degeneracy' of his men.50 
An analysis of the 35'h Division demonstrates how the British army assessed 
discipline and how it sought to address concerns. On 26 November 1916 Corps 
Headquarters took a close interest in the 35th Division, focusing on their high crime 
0 
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rate - as represented by the number of prosecutions. This according to the corps 
commander was a sign that discipline was 'not what it should be'.51 However, the 
timing is interesting - one week after the end of the offensive. The bantams, it was 
said, had 'not done well in the fighting line',52 but in reality they had achieved as much 
as many other units: they repelled three enemy attacks on 18 July and captured a 
section of enemy trench two days later despite heavy losses.53 Discipline was believed 
to be suspect, but the only means of assessment appears to be the crime rate recorded 
in the division and it was this that corps focused on. The divisional commander, 
Major-General Landon, had every reason to fear for his own professional reputation. 
In 1914 Landon had been the commander of the 1"Brigade at the First Battle of 
0 
Ypres when, owing to an injury .to General Lomax, he became de facto commander of 
the lst Division. Despite the division capturing the village of Gheluvelt, General Haig 
was not overly impressed with Landon, who was then returned to England to assume 
his unwanted command of the 35'h Division. Haig recorded in his diary for 17 
November 1914: 
I saw General Landon today. Although he has done well as a Brigade 
Commander [sic], and had my confidence as such, I have not felt the same 
feeling in his judgement since he took over the lSt Division after Lomax was 
wounded. I have therefore recommended him to be transferred to England to 
help to train the new Army for which he is well qualified and because the 
5' PRO W095/2468. 
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strain and hard work has begun to tell on him. He quite agreed when I told him 
of my decision and said he did not feel the same. He has certainly had a very 
hard time, nerve-racking to a degree, being for many weeks constantly under 
shell-fire [sic].54 
This was clearly a retrograde step for Landon, but there was yet another reason why 
Landon might have resented his appointment to the 35'h Division. Landon had been in 
charge of physical training in India before the war, so his command of a division of 
'bantams' must have come as something of a culture shock to him. Naturally, 
therefore, when criticism of his command was implied he focused on the physique of 
his men, seeing in their supposed degeneracy an explanation of the high crime in the 
division. This explanation by Landon prompted the inspection by Haldane and the 
subsequent dismissal as 'unfit for infantry duty' of 2,784 men.55 
0 
a 
Such liberal use of the death penalty in conjunction with the medical discharges , 
suggests that Landon was eager to dispel any lingering concerns about his approach to 
discipline. Examples were hardly necessary in a division that had virtually been 
broken up. Degeneracy and the poor quality of recruits was little more than a 
convenient excuse for Landon. But in this he was supported by other commanders in 
the division including the divisional historian who, some years after the war, wrote: 
0 
the men who were sent to take their [casualties] places were, in most cases, not 
'Bantams' at all, as the term was originally understood, but undeveloped men, 
54 Blake, The Private Papers ofDouglas Haig, p. 77. 
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who had been previously rejected by the commanders and who were unfitted, 
both morally and physically, to take their places in the fighting ranks of the 
British Army.56 
This merely justified the expulsion of unfit men and does not explain the necessity of 
carrying out executions. Surprisingly, Wilson, in his thesis, also blames the 
breakdown in discipline on 'lower quality troops'.57 However, neither Davson nor 
Wilson appear to realise that the executed men had originally been sent overseas with 
the division in February 1916 and were not part of a later top-up. 
e 
The death penalty had been used in the division before the Somme battle: there had 
been three condemnations and one execution in May and June 1916. But 
. condemnations and executions on the scale that followed the Battle of the Somme 
amounted to an overt demonstration of military authority. The timing was important 
coming as it did at the end of the battle. This appears to have been common in other 
divisions where more death sentences were passed as commanders' attention shifted 
from fighting to discipline. The measures taken clearly became more extreme in the 
last months of 1916. In taking stock of the battle divisional commanders and the High 




It was during November that the greatest number of condemnations and executions 
occurred amongst those divisions involved in the first day of the Somme offensive. 
There were twenty-seven condemnations during November in the thirteen divisions 
56 Davson, The History of the 35*h Division, p. 48. 
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compared with only fourteen in July itself, eighteen in August, eight in September and 
six each in October and December. In short it was as the battle was coming to a halt 
rather than at its height that discipline appears to have been most ruthlessly enforced. 
The evidence of Ingham and Longshaw suggests that, towards the latter part of 1916, 
troop morale was suffering the effects of the offensive. This was especially the case in 
units where casualties had been heaviest - a phenomenon less obvious in divisions not 
so heavily engaged in the fighting on the Somme. For example, Captain Hardie was 
able to report in November that, in Third Army at least, 'the spirit of the men, their 
conception of duty, their Moral [sic], has never been higher than at the present 
moment'.58 The reaction in those divisions suffering a crisis of morale was to pass 
more death sentences as a demonstration of the command's resolve to enforce 
discipline. It was only in the Territorial divisions and in Maxse's 1 sth Division that . 
there were no condemnations in November. There were condemnations in all the 
other divisions engaged on 1 July, with the greatest numbers occurring in the very 
divisions which had previously been most liberal with capital sentences - the 30th and 
36'h. These were the divisions whose commanders were less willing to explore 
alternatives to the deterrent approach to discipline. However, in what appears to be 
acts of desperation most other commanders did likewise. 
a 
0 
Assessments of discipline based on achievements in battle were as unsatisfactory as 
those based on crime rates. A division's success in any given engagement depended 
not only on its own abilities, but also on those of other units. Most important was the 
artillery bombardment. Invariably wherever the wire was uncut the attack became 
'* Hardie papers. Report re troop morale for November 1916, p. 6. 
bogged down as the forward units struggled to overcome the first line of defence. 
Once objectives had been gained they could only be held with the arrival of reserves. 
Each division also relied on those divisions on either side making similar progress to 
avoid becoming isolated or exposing its flank to the enemy. In the post-mortem that 
followed the Battle of the S o m e ,  however, commanders appear to have taken little 
account of factors outside the ranks of their own divisions. 
The effects of battle on morale and discipline were even more numerous and 
complex. It appears, however, that the modern battlefield had a tendency to erode the 
very foundations on which good morale and discipline was based, at least in the 
British army. The local identity, so keenly fostered in the county regiments, was 
something of a double-edged sword. Esprit de corps might have been easier to 
engender in a locally recruited unit but the price was a high one and was cruelly 
exposed by the Battle of the S o m e .  The huge casualties, concentrated in the first . 
units to be sent into action, had the dual effect of destroying the fighting potential of 
certain battalions whilst at the same time focusing the concerns of the survivors on 
how the news would be received at home. This, fused with the despair felt at the loss 
of comrades, was a powerful cocktail which destroyed the ability of men such as 
Longshaw and Ingham to endure any more. 
Concerns about leave, or the lack of it, were paramount in men’s minds. This was a 
key issue in men’s mail and frequently emerged in defences at courts-martial. In The 
Pity of War, Niall Ferguson cites leave as one of the seven ‘carrots’ that, according to 
him, kept men in the fighting line?’ Surprisingly he places it last in his list, arguing 
59 Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (Allen Lane, London, 1998), pp. 350-357. 
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that the 'sense of alienation' was resented by those fortunate enough to be granted 
leave. The problem for Ferguson, like Fussell before him, is that he placed too great 
an emphasis on accounts by officers such as Robert Graves and Siegfried Sassoon.60 
As the evidence contained in the mail censor's reports and the testimonies of Ingham, 
Lonshaw and a host of others who stood on trial for their lives shows, the men saw 
things rather differently. Concerns about rations and other creature comforts, placed 
higher in Ferguson's list of 'carrots', were of less importance when it came to men's 
motives to desert, but they were nevertheless important underlying issues. The army 
did much to counter these: the reports of Captain Hardie show that the army was 
0 
aware of the problems and constantly monitored them. Yet so long as it maintained an 
offensive policy on the battlefront the a m y  was powerless to prevent the sudden 
erosion of troop morale. Instead it sought to deter with overt threats of certain death 
inflicted by one's own comrades for those who would not face possible death inflicted 
by the enemy. Not all divisional commanders pursued this policy with alacrity. They, 
though, were the exceptionsrather than the rule. But did executions deter others as 
was no doubt intended? 
An execution in a division was often followed by a period during which further 
condemnations were rare. For example in the 31" Division three men were executed 
from a total of five condemnations during August 1916. There then followed a period 
of three months before another was condemned. In the 4'h Division two executions 
were also carried out in August. Again it was three months until another 
condemnation. A similar period without condemnations followed the execution of a 
Ferguson, The Pity of War. Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modem Memory (Oxford University 60 
Press, Oxford, 1975). 
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soldier in the 2 lSt Division and there were also significant pauses following 
executions in the 2gfh and 46th Divisions. There are a number of possible explanations 
for this. Firstly, it is possible that the executions did indeed have a deterrent effect on 
the troops. On the other hand it could be the case that commanders felt they had 
demonstrated their resolve sufficiently and that further condemnations were not 
necessary. The answer remains elusive. However, increased unwillingness on the part 
of courts-martial to pass further death sentences cannot be discounted. Courts-martial 
duty was unpopular at the best of times and most courts appear to have had no great 
desire to have their condemnations carried out - in most cases the court, in passing a 
sentence of death, made a recommendation to mercy. 
The effectiveness of the death penalty as an instrument of discipline is difficult to 
measure. We have discussed the deterrent effect on the individual in an earlier 
chapter, but we must also consider it in the wider context of its effect on divisions. 
The executed individuals were in most cases unfortunate men who simply could go on 
no longer, which meant that their usefulness to the army was over. As such they were 
the ideal candidates for examples to others. But how far this policy succeeded remains 
open to debate and the relationship between military effectiveness and the death 
penalty - essentially an extension of Wilson's thesis - is a dubious one. Failure in 
battle often led to an increase in condemnations, but this was most marked in those 
divisions where the death penalty was already a common feature of discipline - the 
30fh Division for example. Furthermore, condemnations tended to remain a constant 
feature of discipline, save the usual one or two month pause following an execution. 
There is no evidence to suggest a greater military effectiveness in any divisions 
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during these periods. However much commanders justified the death penalty pour 
encourager les autres the truth was that in most cases it was no more than a signal to 
those senior in rank as much as those below that the divisional commander was a 
tough disciplinarian. 
vii) Summation 
The manner in which the death sentence was applied clearly varied from one 
division to another and a number of factors were influential in this. Firstly, the type of 
division appears to have made a considerable difference. Even allowing for the 
different lengths of time spent on the Western Front, soldiers in regular formations 
were more vulnerable than were those in territorial units. Divisional commanders, it 
appears, followed long established traditions of discipline whereby territorials were 
not treated in as harsh a manner as their regular counterparts. This was reflected in the 
relatively low number of condemnations in the territorial divisions. These traditions 
proved to be fairly resilient to change and were only slightly diluted by the topping up 
process that invariably followed the huge losses inflicted in battle. 
Men serving with New Army formations were subject to something of a hybrid 
version of these two approaches. As Gary Sheffield has shown, without the long- 
standing traditions of the territorial force the New Army divisions were more 
vulnerable to a 'regular' style of discipline creeping in.61 This trend can certainly be 
detected in the approach to capital punishments. Maxse's lgth Division is a good case 
in point: capital punishments were unheard of in the early years, but after Maxse's 
61 Sheffield, 'Officer-Man Relations', 62. 
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departure in 1917 the threat of the firing squad became commonplace. Although it 
should be noted that this reflected an army-wide development whereby the frequency 
of condemnation and executions peak in the autumn of 1917 before decreasing once 
again in 1918, the period of Maxse's command of the lgth Division is synonymous 
with an extremely low incidence of capital sentences. Such variation, however, was 
mostly restricted to the New Armies and is less obvious amongst the other types of 
divisions, which appear to have followed their established traditions in this regard. 
Unit traditions and even structures for that matter exerted a heavy influence on 
divisional commanders. Few were able, like Maxse, to act with apparent total 
autonomy when it came to the use of capital punishment in their formations, but most 
nevertheless stamped their own identity on their divisions. Accordingly, 
condemnations usually follow a pattern that can be regarded as an outcome of unit 
tradition coupled with the commanders' own approach. Yet both these factors were 
very much in the shadow of the pre-war structures, in particular the very nature of 
military law. Few commanders were able to pursue a disciplinary policy that 
compromised the principles of the 188 1 Army Act. Accordingly, most fell back on the 
regular style discipline - even the Territorial Force frequently resorted to the death 
penalty when discipline was at its most vulnerable during the big battles. The 
discernible difference between the three types of division was a reflection of their 
respective traditions - or in the case of the New Army divisions the absence of 
tradition - but these were compromised by the expectations of a High Command that 
required the compliance of the divisional commander. In most cases his compliance 
was forthcoming. This was certainly the case in the 35'h Division where the 
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commander responded directly to criticism from ,,is supeilxs, resulting in the bcath 
by firing squad of three of the troops under his command on a single day. When it 
came to generals' reputations the lives of the men were extremely cheap and most 
divisional commanders could be easily bullied by those at corps, army or higher level. 
Disciplinary policy within each division was formulated by its commanding officer, 
but this could only be achieved within the confines of the structures of command and 
military law. The law placed a responsibility on all commanders to put discipline 
ahead of concerns for justice and the High Command expected divisional 
commanders to comply. Tradition it seems could only mitigate the effects of battle on 
disciplinary policy within divisions. 
The involvement of commanders below divisional level was apparently restricted to . 
implementing decisions made elsewhere. Battalion commanders frequently! 
recommended commutation of death sentences only to be over-ruled. Indeed, it was 
rare for a battalion commander to sanction an execution and some gave evidence to 
the courts-martial in defence of their troops. Of course this could have been motivated 
by a desire to avoid criticism of poor discipline in their unit, but if so it was a risky 
policy to pursue. Undoubtedly, general discipline was diluted as it descended the 
chain of command until it reached company commanders, but rarely did this impact 
on capital punishments. It is unlikely that commanders below the level of division 
were able to influence official discipline policy in the most severe cases. Even a 
brigade commander who opposed capital punishment could be over-ruled by his 
immediate superior. 
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The role of the officers commanding divisions was, therefore, most crucial. 
Nowhere does this become more apparent than when we analyse the differences 
between individual formations. The number of condemnations and executions in 
many divisions was often a reflection of the personality of its commanding officer. 
The cases of Generals Maxse, Landon, and Shea have been discussed at length, but 
the same was equally true of many other formations. Most conformed to a style of 
discipline based on fear and deterrent, but exceptions such as Maxse are evident albeit 
rare. 
: The evidence suggests that we should dispense with the notion that capital 
0 
punishments were carried out merely at some implicit insistence of Douglas Haig. 
The reality was far more complex than that. Tradition played a significant role. So too 
did the personalities of many commanders junior to Haig. The divisional commanders 
had a large professional stake in the discipline of their formations and sought to 
impose their will utilising the methods they were most comfortable with. In most 
cases this entailed maintaining a tight grip on courts-martial and ensuring not only the 
desired verdict but sentence too. In this they were well served by military law, which 
ensured that their power to control army discipline was not compromised by civil 
servants, appeals or an over-riding concern for justice. The law had also preserved the 
role of the Commander-in-Chief, again preserving it from outside interference. 
Confirmation of sentences was a matter for the Commander-in-Chief, but divisional 
commanders' recommendations carried great weight in the process. As we have 
already seen, Haig's office carried out the task with surprising leniency given the 
circumstances and beliefs prevalent in the army at the time. Clearly the execution of 
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one in ten was regarded as a 'safe' level politically speakmg, satisfying both military 
and judicial considerations. 
Commanders-in-Chief were granted wide powers by Parliament. In most cases this 
was interpreted as a confirmation of pre-war style military discipline of which the 
death penalty was considered a vital component. 
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Chapter 5 
Discipline and Morale in the Three Armies’: 
case studies of three British infantry divisions 
The British Expeditionary Force that landed in France in August 1914 was a very 
different organisation to that which fought the later phases of the war. Over the course 
of four years the changing nature of modem battle led to the composition and 
organisation of infantry divisions being gradually altered. The number of horses 
declined from 5,594 in 1914 to 3,838 in 1918; the number of machine guns increased 
from 24 in 1914 to 400 in 1918. The allocation of artillery pieces to infantry divisions 
also decreased from 76 to 48, but trench mortars were added in 1916. The personnel 
of divisions also fluctuated between 1914 and 1917: there was a total of 18,179 all 
ranks in 1914; 18,122 in 1915; 19,372 in 1916; and 18,825 in 1917. But the most 
a 
significant change in manpower came in 1918 when the strength of an infantry 
division was reduced to 16,035 all ranks.* 
Hidden behind these figures were the most important changes of all: the 
enlargement of the regular army by deploying the Territorial Force overseas followed 
by the addition of the New Armies and finally the introduction of conscription. As we 
have already discussed, the three armies - regular, territorial and new army formations 
Peter Simkins, ‘The Four Armies’ in Chandler, D. (ed.), The Oxford History of the British A m y  
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), pp. 235-255, identifies four armies: the regular army; the 
territorial force; the ‘Kitchener’ volunteers and the conscript army. To this we might add the Dominion 
and Colonial forces. For our purposes, however, there were three armies - regular, territorial and new 
army - each characterised by different approaches to discipline. 
Divisions, Part I - The Regular British Divisions (HMSO, London, 1935), Appendix 1, pp. 126-127. 
I 
Major A. F. Becke, History of the Great War based on Ofjcicial Documents: Order of Battle of 
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- retained differing approaches to discipline, which were reflected in the numbers of 
condemnations and executions in the divisions. In this chapter we will analyse three 
infantry divisions, one from each type of formation, and assess the experiences of 
each over the course of the entire war. Although it is impossible to disentangle 
conscripted men from volunteers, we will also consider the impact of conscription on 
the morale and discipline of the divisions selected. What changes can be detected in 
disciplinary practises and how are these affected by the type of formation, by 
assessments of morale, the theatre in which the divisions were deployed and the 
progress of the war? 
e 
The three divisions selected - the 7'h Division, a regular formation; the 48'h (South 
Midland) Division from the Territorial Force; and the 23Cd Division of the New Army 
- represent an ideal cross-section of the British army in the war. There are a number of 
advantages in analysing these particular divisions. Each served on the Western Front, 
being deployed in the major battles. There were condemnations and executions in 
each division, which broadly conform to what we have already identified as typical 
for the type of formation. Finally, in November 1918 all three divisions were posted 
to the Italian Front. Although little use was made of the death penalty in Italy, this 
remains a major advantage because it allows us to compare the divisions' experience 
in two different theatres of the war and also enables us to make ample use of the 
assessments of troop morale by Captain Hardie, the mail censor. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first deals with the three divisions in 
general terms and examines how they fit within the broader model for the British 
army, discussed earlier. In the second section a detailed analysis is made of each 
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division on the Western Front. Finally, the experiences of the Italian front are 
considered in detail with particular reference to Captain Hardie's reports on morale 
and the impact of the influenza epidemic. It is also possible - because of the fewer 
numbers involved - to consider convictions for other, non-capital, offences on the 
Italian Front. 
i) The 7th, 23'd and 4Sfh Divisions in France and Italy: An Overview 
Despite their differing origins, the three divisions shared similarities in battle a 
experience that went beyond merely forming the backbone of the Italian 
Expeditionary Force.'During their respective times on the Western Front the divisions 
were deployed in the large offensives of 1916 and 1917, often fighting in the! same 
battles (both the S o m e  and Third Ypres campaigns can be divided into a series of . 
separate battles). Furthermore, the divisions often shared the same front. Accordingly 
many place names crop up in the history of each division: names such as High Wood, 
Bazentin-le-Petit, Langemarck and Poelcapelle appear frequently. It would be wrong 
to assert that the divisions had identical experiences of battle. Variations in terrain, the a 
manner of defence and innumerable other factors affected the deployment of these 
divisions and, equally important, their fortunes. Similarities, though, there were and 
the comparisons are revealing. 
There were 101 death sentences passed in these three divisions on the Western 
Front. Fifteen condemnations resulted in execution and included the case of Second- 
Lieutenant Eric Poole, who, as noted earlier, was the first officer to be executed. This 
rate of fifteen per cent of death sentences confirmed does not exactly match the eleven 
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per cent for the British Army as a whole, but is consistent with practice on the 
Western Front where 307 out of 2,247 condemnations resulted in execution, a rate of 
approximately fourteen per cent. 
A further ten condemnations can be detected in the divisions in Italy - all but one 
for the offence of desertion. Although less use was made of the death penalty in the 
British army as a whole during 1918, this is nevertheless considerably fewer than the 
number of condemnations experienced by most divisions on the Western Front at this 
time. No soldiers from the British Isles were executed in Italy which, together with 
the significant fall in the number of condemnations in each of the divisions following 
their arrival in Italy, is suggestive of a different approach to the death penalty. This 
might reflect the differing battle experiences - in particular the changing fortune of the 
British army in 1918 - but, as we will discuss later, there is evidence that by being 
posted to Italy the three divisions enjoyed a far more relaxed disciplinary regime. 
These divisions are also representative of the British Army for a number of other 
reasons. In common with the rest of the army, desertion was the most prevalent 
capital conviction: there were eighty-six death sentences for desertion, nine for 
cowardice, seven for sleeping on post and four for quitting post. Although one might 
expect the number of condemnations for sleeping on post to be higher if this was a 
true reflection of the rest of the army, the essential features are nevertheless in place.3 
See the comparative tables in G .  Oram, Death Sentences passed by military courts of the British army 
1914-1924 (Francis Boutle, London, 1998), p. 15, and Worthless Men: race, eugenics and the death 
penalty in the British army during the First World War (Francis Boutle, London, 1998), p. 120, a 
synopsis of which is as follows: 
Condemnations for desertion: 2,004 (272 executions) 
cowardice: 213 (14 executions) 
sleeping on post: 449 (2 executions) 
quitting post: 82 (6 executions) 
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Desertion and cowardice were the most important military offences and in spite of the 
huge number of condemnations for sleeping on post it was not an offence that the 
army took particularly ~eriously.~ Fourteen executions in the three divisions were 
carried out for desertion, the other for cowardice. Again, this is an accurate reflection 
of the general trend in the army as a whole. In short, for our purposes this small 
selection from just three divisions, when considered together, represents a reasonably 
precise microcosm of condemnations in the British army.5 Each type of unit is 
represented; there is a typical spread of death sentences, a confirmation rate consistent 
with the rest of the BEF, and the execution of one single officer and fourteen other 
ranks. 
Broadly speaking, there is much here to support the view that the approach to . 
capital punishment conformed to more general disciplinary trends identified in 
Sheffield’s thesis.6 It appears that a harsher form of discipline - characterised by. more 
,frequent use of the death penalty - was practised in the regular 7th Division than in the 
48th (Territorial Force) Division. Furthermore, the different approaches to discipline 
proved to be remarkably resilient suggesting that the character of the officer-men 
relationship and the nature of discipline outlasted the original members of the unit. In 
terms of discipline, subsequent drafts appear to have experienced something akin to 
those whom they replaced. The 23rd Division, in common with most other service 
Although there were 449 condemnations for sleeping on post only 2 were carried out. I have argued 
elsewhere that courts-martial did not expect the Commander-in-Chief to confirm these sentences and so 
passed them all too frequently in order to enforce their authority on the ranks. However, after the 
execution of two men in Mesopotamia for this particular offence, courts-martial could not afford to 
regard a condemnation with such impunity. Consequently the number of condemnations for sleeping 
on post fell dramatically. 
later. 
thesis, King’s College, London (1994). 
Some trends in the 231d Division that are not typical of other New Army formations will be discussed 
Gary Sheffeld, ‘Officer-Man Relations: Morale and Discipline in the British Army 1902-22’, PhD 
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units, fitted somewhere between the two being heavily influenced by practices in the 
territorial force, but with regular style discipline increasingly creeping in. 
The 7th Division was formed from four regular battalions in Britain and eight from 
overseas in September 1914 and transfemed to the Western Front soon afterwards. 
During the period spent in France there were a total of fifty-seven death sentences 
passed on men in the division, eight of which were carried out. The 4gth Division, a 
South Midland Territorial Division which existed at the outbreak of war, was 
transferred to the Western Front some months later, landing at Le Havre on 13 May 
1915. In stark contrast to the 7'h Division only twelve men serving with the 4Sth in 
France were sentenced to death with three executions being carried out. Even 
allowing for the different amount of time spent in the war zone (which was, in any 
case, negligible given the duration of the war) the variation is quite staggering. 
On the face of it, then, the numbers of death sentences appear to reflect the 
a 
differing attitudes to discipline adopted in the regular and territorial divisions. There 
is further evidence to support Sheffield's argument if we examine the death sentences 
passed in the 23rd (Service) Division, a New Army formation created during the rush 
to the colours in August 1914, which landed at Le Havre in August 1915. Thirty-two 
death sentences were passed on men in the 23rd Division with six executions being 
carried out. On the basis of death sentences, then, this particular service division does 
indeed fit somewhere between the regular 7th Division and the territorial 4Sth 
Division. 
0 
In general terms, therefore, it can be stated with confidence that our three divisions 
outwardly displayed the sort of approach to discipline one might expect given the type 
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of divisions concerned. If discipline was applied on an ascending scale of severity in 
'Territorial', 'Service' and 'Regular' divisjons it is likely that this would be reflected in 
the approach taken towards capital punishment with less tolerance to crime exhibited 
in the regular formations. This, however, pre-supposes that each division had a 
comparable experience of the battlefield. If, for example, the 7fh Division saw more 
action, suffered greater casualties and, therefore, experienced a greater turnover of 
personnel than the other two divisions then it might raise questions about its esprit de 
corps and morale. Furthermore, to be consistent with Sheffield's thesis, the vital 
officer-men relationship might have been adversely affected if there was a high 
wastage amongst officers of the division. We must, therefore, examine in some detail 
the war experience of each division and, at the'same time, contextualize each 
condemnation. 
* 
ii) The Divisions 
ii. 1) The 7fh Division 
In common with most regular formations, the 7'h Division was thrown into the 
action shortly after its arrival on the Western Front. Its first engagement came at 
Antwerp on 9/10 October 1914, only three days after landing at Zeebrugge. This was 
followed by the First Battle of Ypres between 19 October and 5 November 1914, 
where the division experienced heavy fighting during the battles of Langemarck (21- 
24 October) and Gheluvelt (29-3 1 October). Some units in the division appear to have 
suffered heavily in these early exchanges: the war diary for the 2"d Royal 
Warwickshire Regiment records heavy casualties suffered during the battalion's first 
. 
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experience of heavy artillery fire from the Germans on 24 October, many officers 
being amongst the dead. By the end of the month things were desperate in the division 
and cooks and officers' servants were put into the firing line. A large contingent of the 
2"d Royal Warwickshires were cut off by the enemy on 3 1 October resulting in the 
effective strength of the battalion being temporarily reduced to little more than 100 all 
ranks7 
The first death sentences passed in the division, not surprisingly, occurred in the 2"d 
Royal Warwickshires. The circumstances of these condemnations,remain unclear. 
However, what can be ascertained is that on 8 December 1914 the battalion was 
moved back into the frontline in readiness for an attack on the enemy lines near Bas 
Maisnil. On 14 December three men from the 2"d Royal Warwickshires were tried for 
desertion and sentenced by the court to be executed. The sentences were commuted to 
two years hard labour. The following day two men of the Bedfordshire Regiment, also 
in the 7'h Division, were condemned for quitting their posts. They too had.their 
sentences reduced to two years hard labour.8 The subsequent attack on 18 December 
was a disaster with 363 casualties in the ranks of the 2"d Royal Warwickshires and 
several officers, including the battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Brewis, 




The most likely explanation behind these condemnations is that the commander of 
the division was eager to firm up discipline in the formation following its 
PRO W095/ 1664 - battalion war diary, 2"d R. Warwickshire Regiment. 




uncomfortable early experiences on the Western Front. The divisional commander, 
Major-General T. Capper, had also toured his units in an attempt to improve morale. 
On 4 December he had inspected the 2nd Bedfordshires, telling them that they had 
endured a 'severe test' in the opening months of the war." In this their experience was 
similar to the other divisions of the BEF in 1914. 
The first execution in 7'h Division came in February 1915. Private A. Pitts, 2"d 
Royal Warwickshire Regiment, had been found guilty of desertion and sentenced to 
death by a court-martial on 30 January 1915. Pitts had actually absconded on 24 
October 1914 during the fighting around Ypres - the day the battalion suffered heavy 
casualties from artillery fire. The unit had also made an attack to recapture lost 
trenches near Zonnebeke that day. Pitts had successfully negotiated his way to the 
coast and was captured by the military police at Boulogne on 12 January whereupon 
he had compounded his crime by giving false particulars." Given the circumstances it 





a Interestingly, Pitts's was the twentieth death sentence to be passed in the division 
and the twelfth in the 2nd Royal Warwickshires. It was likely, therefore, that it would 
have been carried out regardless of the extreme nature of the case, which probably 
only made the court's task far simpler. There was clearly a perceived discipline 
problem in this unit during the end of 1914, which continued into early 1915 - another 
four men of the 2"d Royal Warwickshires were condemned in February'* - and if its 
PRO WO951 1658 - war diary, 2"d Bedfordshire Regiment. 
PRO 21313. 
I O  
" PRO W071/398. 
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commanders desired to rectify it by setting an example, Pitts was an obvious choice. 
However, it seems likely that the battalion did not recover from the high number of 
casualties suffered in the early engagements with the enemy and in particular the loss 
of its commanding officer. 
The second execution followed approximately one month later. The case contains 
evidence that makes explicit the true purpose of the imposition of the death penalty. 
Private James Briggs of the 2"d battalion Border Regiment had also managed to 
escape from the battle zone - this time whilst his unit was resting on 20 January 1915. 
He too had made it as far as the coast and was actually stowed away aboard an 
England-bound ship at Le Havre when he was a~prehended.'~ Briggs was only the 
second man from his battalion to be condemned by court-martial, but owing to the 
circumstances of his offence he was an ideal candidate pour encourager les autres 
and many of his comrades were forced to witness his execution on 6 March 1915. A 
graphic account of the execution can be found in the diary of an unknown British 
s01dier.I~ 
0 
The 2"d Border regiment had also endured a torrid time during the early exchanges 
and had fought with conspicuous bravery during November 1914 when it had been 
surrounded by the enemy at Veldhoek but, despite heavy losses, had held its line. This 
action had brought commendation from Major-General Capper, the divisional 
commander, who informed Corps headquarters: 
l 3  PRO W0711404. 
Hulloch by Captain N. J. Sievers on 17 November 1915 - quoted in full in Chapter 3. 
IWM - Misc. 550. Diary of unknown British soldier discovered in a captured German trench at 14 
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The devoted and firm conduct of this Battalion repeatedly called forth the 
admiration of the Brigadier and of other officers in other battalions in the same 
brigade; and I, myself, can testify to its fortitude and determination to maintain its 
position at all costs; a spirit which saved a difficult and critical situation. It is 
impossible to praise this Battalion too highly for its firmness and battle 
discipline. l 5  
r By the middle of November 1914 the 2"d Border Regiment had suffered enormous 
casualties: 9 officers and 79 other ranks killed; 6 officers and 259 other ranks 
wounded and 5 officers and 253 other ranks missing.16 The battalion, however, 
remained an effective fighting .unit and was again involved in fierce fighting, this time 
at Rouge Bancs during December 1914 where two of the battalion's other ranks won 
Victoria crosses .I7 
e 
. 
It is unclear whether it was the 2"d battalion Border Regiment that was forced to 
witness the execution of Briggs, but it seems likely; the battalion was in the area 
where the execution took place and the firing squad was obviously made up from his 
unit. In the light of the commendation of the commander of the division and the 
decorations won by this battalion there cannot possibly have been a question mark 
over the discipline and fighting abilities of the battalion. Yet it appears that it was still 
felt necessary to parade the entire unit in the early hours to witness Briggs' execution. 
It is highly improbable that unit discipline could have deteriorated in the two months 
0 
l 5  PRO 9511655 - battalion war diary, 2"d Border Regiment. 
l 6  PRO 9511655 - battalion war diary, 2"d Border Regiment. 
wounded comrades under heavy fire from the enemy. 
Privates Abraham Acton and James Smith were each awarded the Victoria Cross for rescuing 
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intervening. This graphically demonstrates the army's unquestioning commitment to 
the principle of deterrence. 
Four days after Briggs's execution the division was deployed at the battle of Neuve 
Chapelle, but the deterrent value of the public execution remains suspect. Private 
Isaac Reid of 2"d Scots Guards, a unit attached to the same brigade (20th) as Briggs' 
battalion, deserted during an attack on 11 March 1915. Reid was later tried and then 
executed on 9 April 1915.'' There is nothing to suggest why two executions were 
deemed necessary in such a short space of time in the 20th Brigade and Reid's crime 
does not appear to have been particularly unusual: there were literally thousands of 
.similar desertions during battle. Morale in the formation appeared to be good even 
though the brigade had undergone a number of changes in leadership. The original 
commander, Brigadier-General Ruggles-Brise, had been wounded in the particularly 
fierce fighting during the previous November. He was temporarily replaced by Major 
Cator who himself was replaced by Brigadier-General F. J. Heyworth on 14 I 
November 1914.'' Reid's commanding officer and his brigade commander both 
recommended commutation of the sentence. Reid's character was regarded as 'very 
good' and it was generally acknowledged that 'The battalion is in an excellent state of 
discipline'. The divisional commander, Major-General Capper, agreed but indicated 
a 
0 
that he was not prepared to tolerate desertion from the battlefield itself and 
recommended the death sentence be carried out.20 It seems likely that Capper 
PRO W07 1/406. 
Becke, Order of Battle, Part I, p. 82. 
*' PRO W07 1/406. 
19 
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regarded this case as an opportunity to demonstrate that the high standards of 
discipline already achieved would be maintained, by extreme measures if necessary. 
Major-General Capper was himself wounded on 1 April 1915 and Brigadier- 
General Lawford, previously commander of 22"d Brigade, assumed command of the 
division. One day after the start of Lawford's command two men of lSf battalion Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers were condemned by court-martial for desertion. Both men had been 
absent from their unit for some months and it was generally accepted to be a serious 
1 case. Given the standards already set in the division, it seems likely that the sentences 
would have been carried out in any case. However, both men had originally been 
serving with Lawford's brigade and he was familiar with the state of discipline in the 
formation. Lawford recommended that even though it was a serious case the 
sentences should be commuted because 'there has already been one example in the 
brigade since which there has been no case of desertion'. Both the corps commander, 
Lieutenant-General Rawlinson, and the army commander, General Haig, disagreed 
and Privates Penn and Troughton were executed on 22 April 1915.*l 
' 0  
0 The original divisional commander, Capper, returned to his command on 19 July 
1915, but was mortally wounded little more than two months later whereupon the 
commander of 21" Brigade, Brigadier-General H. E. Watts, was promoted and 
assumed command. It is unclear whether Lawford's recommendations to mercy in the 
case of the two Welsh Fusiliers had been a factor in his being overlooked for the 
command vacated by the death of Capper. In September 1915 Lawford took 
command of 41" Division. The twenty-two condemnations in the 41" Division is 
2' PRO W071/413 & 414. 
257 
relatively low for a New Army formation, but the four executions carried out - all for 
desertion - is higher than most. The divisional commander could exercise 
considerable control over condemnations, but could only hope to influence the final 
decision. 
The new commander of 7fh Division - Watts was promoted to Major-General on 27 
September 1915 - appears to have adopted a relatively lenient line with the division 
during the entire period of his command, which lasted until January 1917. The 
division consistently saw action in all the major battles over this period yet few I 
condemnations occurred and no executions were carried out.22 The division was I 
deployed at the battle of Loos in the autumn of 1915 but it is the battle of the S o m e , .  
where the division was involved in some of the most intense fighting, that is of 
particular interest. 
The 7'h Division's experience in the battle of the Somme was a mixture of successes 
and failures. Overall, the division appears to have demonstrated a level of efficiency 
akin to that shown during 1914. On. 1 July the 22"d Brigade had been involved in the 
attack on Fricourt under heavy machine-gun fire. They were able to hold on to their 
gains and consolidate them during the night. Four days later the same brigade 
mounted further attacks in the Mametz Wood area, but they were driven back by 
German counter-attacks. The brigade obviously maintained its fighting spirit because 
it was able to mount two more attempts to regain the lost ground before being forced 
to abandon the attack, again due to heavy machine-gun fire. The only death sentence 
to originate from this period was passed on a man serving with a brigade not directly 
22 Only nine death sentences were passed between Watts' appointment in charge of 71h Division on 26 
Sept. 1915 and 7 Jan. 1917, the date his successor took over. 
258 
involved in the attack. Private Albert Holloway of the 2"d battalion Royal West Surrey 
Regiment (91st Brigade) was charged with cowardice in the face of the enemy, 
indicating that his offence had been committed on the field of battle.23 His sentence 
was not confirmed, which unfortunately means that it is not possible to obtain further 
details of the case. 
The whole division was involved in the highly successful night-time attack of 14 
July 1916. The German first and second lines were captured with comparative ease 
and the division pushed on to Bazentin-le-Petit, which it captured and then held 
against persistent counter attacks by the enemy. Attempts to capture High Wood the 
following day met with less success and after sustaining heavy casualties from enemy 
machine-gun fire the attack was called off. A German counter-attack forced a 
retirement, but again the division's discipline remained good and the lost ground was 
recaptured. Douglas Haig recognised the ferocity of the fighting in his despatch: '[the 
7'h Division] entered High Wood at about 8.0 p.m., and, after some hand-to-hand 
fighting, cleared the whole of the wood with the exception of the northern apex'.24 
Further attempts by the division to capture High Wood - presumably the northern 
apex - were repulsed by the Germans on 20 July. Private William Carden's unit, 22nd 
battalion Manchester Regiment (91" Brigade), had been involved in this phase of the 
fighting and had sustained heavy casualties, especially in the attempts to clear High 
Wood. Carden was convicted of desertion and sentenced to death on 3 August. His 
sentence was commuted to three years penal servitude.25 Again, there are no other 
. 
23 PRO W0213/10. 
*' PRO W0213/11. J. H. Boraston (ed.), Sir Douglas HaigS Despatches (J. M .  Dent & Sons, London, 1919), p. 30. 
24 
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details available, but the timing of the trial suggests that Carden had deserted during 
the fighting at High Wood; the new divisional commander appears to have been more 
tolerant of such an offence than his predecessor. 
The division saw less action during August, but was deployed once more on 1 
September when its attack on Delville Wood was repulsed, again by machine-gun 
fire. The attack was renewed some four days later, again it was unsuccessful, but a 
further attack on 5 September resulted in some limited gains. Attempts to improve on 
those gains during the following afternoon failed. The division remained in the 
Somme area for some months, but saw relatively little action. It was during this period 
of comparative inactivity that two more death sentences were passed on men in the 
division, one for desertion the other for sleeping on post26 - perhaps a symptom of the 
tedium of the less active phases of trench warfare. 
0 
The 7th Division, then, had been involved in some of the best known battles of the 
Somme offensive yet, unlike most other divisions, it had not seen any executions and 
little in the way of the threat of the firing-squad. The division had maintained an 
aggressive role during the offensive despite heavy casualties. It seems that its morale 
remained high and the division's proven military efficiency rendered the threat of the 
death penalty unnecessary. It also appears that Major-General Watts relied less on the 
death penalty to maintain discipline than had Capper before him - and less so than 
most other British commanders for that matter. 
0 
26 Private J. Coley, lSt South Staffords, was condemned for desertion on 1 Nov. 1916 and Private T. 
Roberts, lst Royal Welsh Fus, was condemned for sleeping on post on 6 Nov. 1916. Both PRO 
W02 13/12. 
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Watts was replaced as commander of the division by Major-General G. de S. 
Barrow on 7 January 1917.27 This was followed by an increase in the number of 
condemnations: four in March alone, when the division was deployed in operations in 
the Ancre area. There were, however, no executions during this period. Barrow was 
replaced by Major-General Shoubridge on 1 April 1917, who remained in command 
of the division until the end of the war except for a brief period in February 1918 
when he was sick.28 This final command was punctuated by a number of executions. 
The first execution involved a soldier who had first arrived in France with the 
division in 1914. Private Samuel Cunnington was a member of 2"d Royal 
Wanvickshires, the unit that had endured a spate of condemnations in 1914. 
Cunnington had deserted during the fighting on the Somme the previous year and had 
remained free, largely because of assistance from a French couple, until his capture in 
' December 1916. To compound matters Cunnington also had previous convictions for 
de~ertion.~' Given the circumstances, his execution, in May 1917, was hardly unusual, 
but the timing is interesting coming as it did the day after the division was relieved in 
the battle of Bullecourt. It seems likely that the command used this relatively serious 
case to reinforce discipline in the division. 
0 
Operations early in 1917 had won the praise of the Commander-in-Chief and the 
division was mentioned in his despatches for its action during the German retreat to 
the Hindenburg Line on 2 April and again during the battle of Arras on 7 May 1917.30 
But whilst the Battle of the Somme had been a relatively successful campaign for the 
Becke, Order of Battle, Part I, p .  82. 
2g Becke, Order of Battle, Part I, p. 82. 
29 PRO W071/558. 
30 Sir Douglas HaigS Despatches, p. 75 and p. 102. 
27 
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division, the Third Battle of Ypres was not. The 7'h Division was deployed in Flanders 
throughout most of October 1917 and after some involvement in the battle for 
Polygon Wood the division moved on to Broodseinde where, on 4 October, all three 
brigades were involved in a successful attack. Objectives were swiftly taken and 
casualties were light. On 9 October the 22nd Brigade attacked again as part of the 
offensive on the village of Poelcapelle. After some preliminary difficulties the brigade 
was able to take and consolidate its objective - to 'straighten' the British line in the 
area known as Judge Copse. Not all had gone according to plan though and a few 
days later three men were condemned by courts-martial for deserting the battle. Two 
of the men came from the 2nd battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment - the unit 
which had experienced most difficulties during the attack. The other came from the 
21" battalion Manchester Regiment. All three sentences were commuted to ten years 
penal ~ervitude.~' 
0 
The division was relieved on 21 October, but five days later went into action once 
again, this time in the battle for Passchendaele. Units from all three brigades took part 
in some of the fiercest fighting of the offensive. Some objectives were taken, but most 
were lost to German counter-attacks. The 2nd battalion Queen's (Royal West Surrey) 
Regiment and the 21" Manchesters (both 91St Brigade) were pinned down by 
machine-gun fire and were unable to make any headway. The 2"d battalion Border 
Regiment (20th Brigade) saw some initial success but became literally bogged down 
in marshes around Krommebeck where most became casualties to sweeping machine- 
gun fire. The survivors unsuccessfully attacked the pill-boxes around Gheluvelt. The 
0 
3 '  Privates James & Wooding, 2 R. Warwicks and Private Kinsey, 21 Manchesters. PRO W0213/18. 
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attack was continued by the gth and gth battalions Devon Regiment which seized a 
defensive position in a railway cutting north of the village, but they were driven back 
by German counter-attacks. By midday the 7th Division had been convincingly 
repulsed, losing all the ground it had taken during the morning. 
Two men who deserted the fighting were tried in the days following the battle. 
Significantly, both came from units that had suffered badly in the attack at Gheluvelt. 
A man from the gth battalion Devon regiment was condemned for desertion, but had 
his sentence commuted to five years penal servitude32 - a remarkably light sentence 
by the standards applied by the Commander-in-Chief during the battle for 
Passchendale. The other, a private from the 2"d Queen's Regiment, was executed for 
his offence.33 It is unclear why these two cases received such radically different 
treatment from the High Command. Putkowski and Sykes suggest that Private 
Thomas Hawkins - who was executed - was a persistent offender with an earlier 
suspended death sentence to his name.34 A search of the courts-martial register reveals 
that a Private T. Hawkins of the 7'h Queen's Regiment had been sentenced to death by 
courts-martial on no fewer than two previous occasions - on 3 January 1917 and 12 
June 1917 - but had escaped with 10 years penal servitude (suspended) each time.35 
Although not an uncommon name it seems likely that this was the same person - 
transfers to other battalions were not unusual - which explains the final decision to 




32 Private Goff. PRO W0213/19. 
33 Private T. Hawkins. PRO W07 1/622. 
35 PRO W0213!13 & 15. 
Putkowski & Sykes, Shot at Dawn, pp. 218-219. 34 
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Flanders offensive, therefore, was not a reflection of the division's performance in 
battle and had more to do with the soldier's own disciplinary record. 
Two other men who deserted during the disastrous attack at Gheluvelt were able to 
escape the military authorities for some months. In fact the division had been posted 
to Italy (from 17 November 1917) by the time Privates Johnson and McClair, both of 
the 2"d battalion Border Regiment, were tried. On 8 July 1918 a court-martial 
convened on the Western Front sentenced the two soldiers to death for desertion. The 
decision to execute them was based on the seriousness of their crime rather than any 
disciplinary shortcomings in their unit.36 Men who had been absent for eight months 
were unlikely to receive mercy regardless of the type of unit they be€onged to or how 
it had performed in battle. 
,. 
I 
The relationship between battle experience and the death penalty in a division such i 
as the 7'h is a tenuous one and not at all obvious. In fact the 7'h Division experienced 
fewer death sentences in its ranks during the third battle of Ypres than it had during 
the Somme offensive. This was despite there being more condemnations in the British 
army as a whole during the Flanders campaign than at any other point in the war. The 
acts of desertion that resulted in death sentences during these large battles had their 
origins in the experience of battle, occurring most often in the units worst affected by 
the fighting. Yet the decision to carry out an execution was invariably based on the 
seriousness of the individual crimes: long periods of absence being the most normal 
reason given. 
0 
Was this also the experience of the Territorial Force? 
36 PRO W0711657. 
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ii. 2) The 4Sth (South Midland Territorial Force) Division 
The 4ffh (South Midland) Division was a pre-war Territorial Force formation. A 
change in commander in late July 1914 was swiftly followed by another the day after 
war was declared. The original composition of the infantry remained unchanged for 
the duration of the war, but in common with other divisions of all types, trench mortar 
batteries were added and modest alterations were made to the artillery. The original 
three infantry brigades, the Warwickshire, the Gloucester and Worcester, and the 
South Midland brigades, eventually became known as the 143fd; 144'h and 145'h 
brigades respectively. The division arrived on the Western Front on 1 April 1915 
where it remained until moving to the Italian front in November 1917. The 
commander, Major-General Heath, retired sick little more than a month after its 
arrival in France. A temporary commander was immediately installed, but was soon 
succeeded by Major-General R. Fanshawe who took command of the division on 3 1 
May 1915 and remained in charge until the middle of 1918.37 Despite the rapid 
turnover in command at the beginning of its war the division enjoyed continuity of 
command at the times when it mattered most. This might explain why the approach to 
the death penalty in the division throughout its time on the Western Front is 
characterised by consistency. 
\a 
0 
In keeping with its Territorial Force traditions few men serving with the 48th 
Division were condemned by courts-martial. However, a high proportion of those 
who were condemned had their sentences carried out: three executions were carried 
'' Major A. F. Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions, Part 2A - The Territorial Force Mounted Divisions 
and The 1st- Line territorial Force Divisions (42-56) (HMSO, London, 1936), p. 77. 
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out from a total of just nine condemnations. This is consistent with trends already 
identified in the Territorial Force and discussed in the previous chapter. Although 
there were condemnations in all three brigades, the distribution was not even: there 
were four condemnations and two executions in the 143'd (Warwickshire) Brigade; 
three condemnations and one execution in the 145'h (South Midland) Brigade; and 
two condemnation with no executions in the 144'h (Gloucester and Worcester) 
Brigade. This might suggest that discipline was more problematic in the 143'd Brigade 
than in the 145th and more so still than in the 144th. 
. 
0 
Concerns about the physique of troops in the division had been raised as early as 
December 19 15. The Director-General Medical Services (DGMS) for Third Army 
noted that a sanitary report had singled out the 48fh Division, which was said to be in 
poor physique with 'signs of overstrain among the older and younger men'. The 
DGMX recommended maximum rest and observed that one possible cause was the 
overcrowding of the billets. The 48th Division was compared unfavourably with all 
other divisions, especially the 18'h (commanded by Max~e) .~ '  Despite this the 
commander did not seek to bolster discipline through liberal use of the death penalty, 
although this appraisal of the division might cast some light on the high ratio of 
condemnations confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief. 
a 
The division's first experience of battle came during the S o m e  offensive in 1916. 
Initial experiences of the battle were confined to acting as comparatively small units 
in support of other divisions. One battalion, the 1/6 Royal Warwickshires, was 
deployed on 1 July in the fighting around the village of Serre, sustaining casualties 
38 War Diary - DGMS - 3rd Army. PRO W095/381. 
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from machine-gun fire and enemy bombing attacks. On 14 July another unit, the 1/7 
Royal Warwickshires, took part in the daytime attack on the Bazentin Ridge with little 
success. The involvement of larger forces from the 4gth Division began on 16 July 
with a successful attack on Ovillers village by 144th Brigade with one battalion from 
143'd Brigade and, a little later that day, the rest of the division. This action attracted 
the attention of the Commander-in-Chief who wrote of the division in his despatches: 
On the 16fh.July a large body of the garrison of Ovillers surrendered, and that 
night and during the following day, by a direct advance from the west across 
No Man's Land, our troops (48th Division, Major-General R, Fanshawe) 
carried the remainder of the village and pushed out along the spur to the north 
and eastwards towards P o z i k r e ~ . ~ ~  
a 
. 
The first execution in the division was a result of this opening phase of the S o m e  I 
offensive. Private A. Earp, 1/5 Royal Warwickshire Regiment, actually committed his 
offence prior to the start of the battle. His unit was holding the line near Htbuterne 
during the preliminary bombardment, but had been unnerved by the enemy's counter- 
barrage. He was found guilty of desertion by a court-martial convened on 10 July and 
sentenced to death. The court recommended mercy and Earp's commanders agreed 
that the sentence should be ~ommuted.~' This suggests that the divisional commander 
believed that the mere knowledge amongst the men in the division of a death sentence 
on one of their own was a sufficient deterrent to maintain discipline. However, 
a 
39 Sir Douglas Haigs Despatches, p. 30. 
40 PRO W071/485. 
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General Hubert Gough, the army commander, viewed matters in broader terms and 
recommended confirmation of the sentence. Douglas Haig concurred and Earp was 
executed on 22 July 1916. 
The timing of this execution is crucial to understanding its true purpose. It came 
immediately after the division's first experience of battle. Although there was no 
suggestion of poor discipline or morale in the division, the execution was no doubt 
designed to reinforce the army's determination to impose its authority. Furthermore, 
the execution was carried out on the eve of the division's next deployment - the battle 
of Pozikres. 
e 
The battle of Pozikres can be divided into two phases. The 4gth Division was 
deployed in both. The first phase started with an unsuccessful attack on 23 July. 
Another attack in the Mash Valley area resulted in sections of enemy trenches being 
captured and a counter-attack beaten off, but some units, particularly 
(144th Brigade) suffered severe casualties. Attempts to advance further the following 
day were unsuccessful. During the following few days, 143rd Brigade in particular 
were involved in further attacks in the same area, often in conjunction with Australian 
units, with some limited successes. 
Gloucesters 
a 
The division returned to the attack on 14 August and continued fighting for the 
following few days. All three brigades were involved in action around the so-called 
Liepzig Salient, although fortunes were mixed: the 143'd and 144fh Brigades suffered 
heavy casualties during the first day and were forced to give up most of their gains, 
but four days later the division made good progress despite determined resistance 
from the enemy. In the following week the division repulsed a number of German 
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counter-attacks. Attempts to make further gains between 23 and 27 August resulted in 
heavy casualties. 
Two capital trials resulted from the battle of Pozikres, both held on 2 September 
when the division was resting. The first, a man serving with the l/lSt Oxford and 
Bucks Light Infantry, was condemned by court-martial for cowardice. Fortunately for 
the individual concerned, Private B. Schulman, the sentence was not ~onfirmed.~' A 
soldier who deserted on 14 August, the finst day of the battle, was less fortunate. On 
' 13 September 1916, Private Charles Depper, 1/4'h Royal Berkshire Regiment, was 
executed for desertion.42 The battalion war diary recorded that 'the execution was 
witnessed by 40 men of the battalion under the command of Lieutenant Hamp~hire ' .~~  
This was a sufficient number of men to ensure that the deterrent effect was achieved 
in the unit. 
0 
The battle of the Somme had been a hard introduction to the war for the 4Sth 
Division. They had suffered considerable casualties and two men had paid the capital 
penalty for moments of temporary indiscipline. A number of other death sentences 
had not been confirmed but, interestingly, all can be directly attributed to specific 
incidents in battle. 
0 
In 1917 the 4Sth Division, in common with other divisions on the Western Front, 
enjoyed an early advance as the Germans retreated to the Hindenburg Line. On 17 
March the division occupied P h o n e  and then took up positions at Mont St. 
Quentin.44 The next major deployment for the division was during the Flanders 
4'  PRO W0213/11. 
42 PRO W071/501. 
43 War diary - 1/4'h battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment. PRO W095/2762. 
Sir Douglas Haig's Dspatches, p. 72. 44 
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offensive in the following Autumn, and in particular the battle of Langemarck from 
16 to 18 August 1917. 
The fighting during this part of the offensive was particularly difficult for the 
advancing British divisions as they confronted a chain of concrete bunkers and pill- 
boxes. According to Haig's despatches: 
These field forts, distributed in depth all along the front of our advance, offered a 
serious obstacle to progress. They were heavily armed with machine guns and 
manned by men determined to hold on at all costs. Many were reduced as our 
troops advanced, but others held out throughout the day, and delayed the arrival of 
our supports. In addition, weather conditions made aeroplane observation 
practically impossible, with the result that no warning was received of the enemy's 
counter-attacks and our infantry obtained little artillery help against them. When, 
therefore, later in the morning [of 16 August] a heavy counter-attack developed in 
the neighbourhood of the Wieltje-Passchendaele Road, our troops, who had 
reached their final objectives at many points in this area also, were gradually 
compelled to fall back.45 
0 
a 
Elements of the 48'h Division had reached its objective on 16 August, but had not 
been able to hold onto it. The attack had started at 4-45 a.m., spearheaded by 145'h 
Brigade ( Mth Gloucesters, l/lst & 1/4'h Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, with 1/4'h 
Royal Berkshire in reserve) which captured the village of St. Julien. The attack then 
45 Sir Douglas Haig's Dspatches, pp. 118-1 19. 
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pressed on towards the objective, Springfield Farm, which men from the Oxford and 
Bucks Light Infantry were seen to reach. The rest of the brigade was unable to join 
them and the objective was lost, together with the men who had made it that far. By 
mid-morning a new line was established approximately halfway between the starting 
point and the objective, and in the evening a number of determined German counter- 
attacks were repulsed. The importance of holding this line was recognised by Haig 
who commented '[the 48th Division] established themselves on a line running north 
from St. Julien to the old German third line due east of Langemarck. This line they 
maintained against the enemy's attacks, and thereby secured the flank of our gains 
further north'.46 Losses, however, had been substantial and a further attempt to 
advance the following day failed. 
0 
Greater success followed for the division on 19 August when, supported by a 
number of tanks, the line was advanced closer still to the original objective, the 
divisional diarist recording a number of strong points overrun and many enemy 
defenders killed.47 The division extended its gains on 22 August with 1/5fh Royal 
Warwickshire Regiment capturing strong points along the line of the original 
objective. The gains were lost to a German counter-attack, but recaptured later. Other 
units of the Gloucestershire Regiment encountered a similar ferocious defence, 
gaining, and then losing to enemy counter-attacks, a number of pill-boxes. Further 
gains were made on 25 August, but the division still had not reached its original 
objective for the opening day of the offensive, such was the ferocity of the fighting 
around Langemarck. 
a 
46 Sir Douglas Haigs Despatches, p. 119. 
47 PRO WO9512746 - War diary, 48Ih Division. 
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Following this intense fighting, the division was able to pause for a while and a 
number of capital trials were convened. On 3 1 August Private Charles Britton, 
Royal Warwickshire Regiment, was found guilty of desertion and sentenced to death. 
He had absented himself from the original attack on 16 August. His offence was not 
especially unusual or serious, but Britton was executed on 12 September 1917.48 
There can be little doubt that the execution was designed to bolster discipline for the 
remainder of the offensive: General Hubert Gough, the Army commander, ordered 
' that details should be read out on parade immediately after the exe~ution.~' 
As usual timing was the crucial factor. Britton's was the first condemnation in the 
division during the Flanders campaign, therefore giving the commanders an early 
opportunity to demonstrate their resolve. Subsequent condemnations were treated less 
harshly. On 3 September Private Bullas, 1/7'h Worcestershire Regiment, was 
convicted of cowardice - arguably a more serious offence than desertion - and Private 
Collins, 1/4th Gloucestershire Regiment, of desertion. Neither sentence was carried 
out." Both offences probably originated from the attack on 22 August when the men's 
respective units were most heavily affected by the action. 
There were no further capital trials in the 48th Division during the remainder of its 
time on the Western Front. The division continued to be involved in the Flanders 
campaign, taking part in the battles of Polygon Wood, Broodseinde and Poelcapelle 
between 28 September and 9 October 1917. It even suffered the potentially morale 
sapping experience of being shelled by British guns during an attack at Poelcapelle on 
48 PRO W07 1/586. 
49 PRO W095/954, War diary of A. G. ,  XVIII Corps. 
50 PRO W0213/17. 
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9 October, which was otherwise marked by some success. Unit discipline had never 
been called into question, with the Commander-in-Chief commenting favourably 
about the division in his despatches. Casualties, like those of other British divisions at 
Third Ypres, were heavy, but the division had maintained its offensive spirit, 
displaying the tenacity that characterised the British offensive during the autumn of 
1917. The division left for Italy on 21 November.'l 
Condemnations in the 48'h Division during its time on the Western Front, although 
few in number, can be directly attributed to specific battles. Executions were often the '0 
outcome of disciplinary considerations, although not necessarily because of a lack of 
fighting spirit or unit discipline. Moreover, executions were seen as a method of 
reminding the men that indiscipline would not be tolerated. In this, timing was often 
the most important factor with men being executed at moments when commanders 
deemed it appropriate rather than on the basis of the gravity of their crimes. This trend 
was a consistent feature of discipline in the 48fh Division and can be detected during 
. the formation's involvement in both the Somme and Flanders offensives. 
ii. 3) The 23'd (New Army) Division 
Unusually, the 23'd Division enjoyed continuity of command for almost the entire 
war. Major-General J. M. Babington commanded the division from the date of its 
formation on 18 September 1914 until 15 October 1918 - less than one month from 
the end of the war. That aside, there was little else to distinguish the division from 
others of the New Army. The usual problems of New Army divisions - lack of 
5 1  Becke, Order of Battle - Part 2A, p. 83. 
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officers, uniforms and equipment - were eventually overcome and the formation 
arrived on the Western Front on 29 August 1915 where it remained until its transfer to 
the Italian Front in November 1917.52 
The death penalty was relatively common in this division. A total of forty death 
sentences were passed by courts-martial whilst the division was on the Western Front. 
Six executions were carried out in this period - a high proportion. Amongst those 
executed was Second-Lieutenant Eric Skeffington Poole. In terms of the death 
sentence, therefore, the 23rd Division could be considered atypical. The formation 
+ appears to have maintained a good fighting spirit in both the battles of the S o m e  and 
Third Ypres, but the death penalty was frequently applied. This might suggest that the 
commander adopted a style of discipline that resembled a regular formation rather . 
than a Territorial one. Indeed, little more than a month after arriving on the Western 
Front, two men of the Division were condemned by court-martial for sleeping at their 
posts.'? Although neither sentence was carried out it was nevertheless an indication of 
the nature of discipline to come. 
. 
. I 
- 0  
I 
0 The 23rd Division was heavily involved in the battle of the Somme, its first 
deployment in action. Initially, the division was used to support attacks by other 
formations, but major deployments soon followed. On 5 July 1916 the Division made 
an attack on German strongholds just south-east of La Boiselle. Early gains were 
gradually lost to enemy counter-attacks, which continued most of the day, before the 
52 Major A. F. Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions, Part 3A - New Army Divisions (9-26) (HMSO, 
London, 1938), pp. 119-125. 
53 According to Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions, Part 3A, p. 124, concentration of the Division 
around Tilques in France was completed on 29 August 1915. Private J. Bird, 11 Sherwood Forresters, 
and Private T. Roach, 11 West Yorks, were sentenced to death on 1 and 16 October respectively. PRO 
W0213/6. 
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Division rallied, made further gains and consolidated its position in the region of 
Contalmaison - an action that earned the Division and its commander, Major-General 
Babington, a mention in d e s p a t c h e ~ . ~ ~  The Division attacked enemy positions in the 
village of Contalmaison three days later, but was beaten off by intense machine-gun 
fire, although some ground was taken unopposed the following day. Amongst the 
many casualties from the early encounters was Second-Lieutenant Eric Skeffington 
Poole, serving with the 1 lth battalion West Yorkshire Regiment. Knocked out by a 
shell explosion and evacuated to hospital via a Field Ambulance on 7 July suffering . 
from shellshock, Poole was prematurely returned to his unit only to desert at a later 
date. This act of desertion was the incident which resulted in his execution.55 
0 
Meanwhile, the Division spent the next few days trying to improve the newly 
gained position by mounting bombing raids and generally harassing the Germans 
opposite them. Unfortunately, one such raiding party was shelled by British artillery 
on 9 July forcing the,party to abandon its position, in the so-called Bailiff Wood 
(south of Contalmaison), which the Division recaptured later that day. The new 
position in Bailiff Wood provided the platform for a highly successful, if costly, 
attack on 10 July. A frontal attack by 69fh Brigade resulted in the capture of 
Contalmaison and retreating enemy troops were cut-off by units attacking their flank 
from Bailiff Wood. Determined enemy counter-attacks were beaten off in the 
evening. However, casualties were extremely high and the battalion war diary records 
0 
54 Sir Douglas Haigs Despatches, p. 27. 
55 PRO W071/1027. 
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that the strength of 8th battalion Yorkshire Regiment (69th Brigade) was reduced to 
five officers and 150 men by the end of the fighting.56 
On 17 July the Division went into action once again. This time the 68'h Brigade 
spearheaded an attack near Pozikres, which was stopped by German machine-gunners. 
The Division then spent a period of relative inactivity during which time the first 
capital trial occurred. Private Robinson, 12th battalion Durham Light Infantry, was 
found guilty of desertion by court-martial on 24 July 1916 and sentenced to death.57 
Robinson's unit was one of those involved in the attack of 17 July and it seems likely 
that his offence was committed that day. Fortunately for him the sentence was not 
carried out. Once again, however, the timing was significant and the 23'd Division 
went back into action just two days later - long enough for word of the condemnation 
to have circulated. The attack by the Division, on 26 July, was again spearheaded by 
the 68fh Brigade (including the 12th Durhams), but failed. 
There then followed a period of consolidation. Again bombing parties raided the 
German trenches, but the Division did not undertake any major frontal assault for a 
number of weeks. Relatively small sections of trench were captured from the enemy 
by these operations, often at night. On 28 August a court-martial passed another 
capital sentence for desertion. The sentence on Private Clee, a soldier serving with the 
Pioneer battalion, was commuted to ten years penal servitude and suspended.58 
Around the same time (16 August) Private James Grampton, gfh York and Lancaster 
Regiment, had been detailed to carry out pioneer work, this time assisting the Royal 
0 
56 PRO W095/2184 - War Diary, 8Ih Battalion, Yorkshire Regiment. 
57 PRO W02 13/11. 
58 Private R. Clee, 9 Bn South Staffordshire Regiment. PRO W0213/11. 
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Engineers. Grampton deserted and managed to stay free until long after the battle of 
the Somme was over. He was tried in January 1917 and shot on 4 February - the 
length of his absence sufficient justification for his commanding officers.59 These two 
cases highlight the nature of the work being undertaken by the Pioneers, which 
became increasingly hazardous during h is  period of consolidation - digging trenches I 
and carrying out repairs, often under enemy fire. 
The Division was again deployed as the battle entered another phase in mid- 
September. On 15 September units of the 70th Brigade acted in support of the 15'h 
Division in the attack on the village of Martinpuich near Thiepval, but by the evening 
the Brigade held the fonvard-most position, just west of the village. A few days later 
0 -  
s *  
the whole division was deployed on newly captured ground to the north and east of a 
the village, which had fallen to the British advance. The Division gradually extended 
the line during the following days. An attack by 70th Brigade on the morning of 29 
September succeeded in seizing German strong-points at Destremont Farm and 
further gains were made by the Brigade in the region of Le Sars during the following 
days. A more ambitious attack by the whole division on 1 October was unsuccessful. a 
Curiously, a court-martial was convened that same day. On trial was another Pioneer - 
Private Botfield. The case originated from an incident during the night of 21 
September when Botfield, with others from the Pioneer battalion, were sent out to dig 
new trenches in open ground. The working party had come under enemy fire and 
Botfield had fled when a German shell exploded nearby. Botfield was condemned for 
cowardice and shot a little more than two weeks later!' Again the timing of the trial 
59 PRO W071/543. 
6o PRO W071/508. 
I .  
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was important; coming on the day of a failed attack by the Division and just before 
another attack was to go ahead. The village of Le Sars eventually fell to the Division 
after a determined and steady attack on 7 October. The position was improved further 
by another attack the next day. 
The last major operation by the 23rd Division in the battle of the Somme was highly 
successful. However, away from the battlefield the Division's reputation was under 
threat. Ironically, Second-Lieutenant Poole, who had deserted the fighting two days 
earlier, was arrested on the day of the Division's most significant achievement. After 
his initial treatment for shellshock arising from the fighting around Contalmaison in 
early July, Poole was taken to a convalescent home where he was examined by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Foster, of the Royal Army Medical Corps. Foster recorded: 
e 
' 
[Poole's].Condition improved in C. C. Home but [he] did not look well and some 
objective nervous symptoms [were] complained of. I brought him up to Sir James 
Fowler (Medical Consultant) on 19/8/16 who found some degree of irregular 
action of heart and tachycardia, but no signs of any lesion either cardiac or 
nervous. He [Fowler] agreed with me he [Poole] was at present still unfit for duty 
at the front and considered he should be sent to Temporary Base Duty for a time. 
[Poole was] Discharged on 22.8.16.6l 
Poole was indeed sent to an Infantry Base Depot on 23 August 1916. A few days later 
he was again examined, this time at Etagles where Lieutenant-Colonel Martin 
6' PRO W071/1027. 
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(RAMC), certified that Poole was classified as 'A', or 'fit for Poole was 
returned to his unit just as it was going back into action. 
The Division was positioned in the frontline trenches on 5 October in readiness for 
its attack on Le Sars. The company commander, Captain Armstrong, inspected the 
troops at midnight on 5 October and discovered that Poole had absconded from the 
trenches leaving behind the troops in his charge. Poole managed to avoid capture until 
after the attack, whereupon he wascharged with desertion. His claim that he had left 
to seek treatment for rheumatism was rejected by the court, which sat on 24 , 
November 19 16. Poole, who was described by his battalion cowander,  Lieutenant- 
0 
Colonel Barker, as 'rather stupid' - a view supported by other witnesses, including 
those for the defence - was executed on 10 December 1916.63 
There was a steady flow of condemnations in the spring and summer of 1917. A 
total of thirteen between February and July, involving men from each brigade, but 
none was carried out. Most had probably resulted from the division's deployment in 
the Battle of Messines in mid-June; there were five condemnations in June and 
another four in July. The next execution was carried out on the eve of another attack 
by the division, once again indicating that the death penalty was often employed as a 
e 
deliberate means of stiffening unit discipline at specific moments. 
Again, the unfortunate man, a private in the sth battalion, York and Lancaster 
Regiment (70th Brigade), was an ideal candidate: the Commander-in-Chief had 
suspended a previous sentence of death against him. Deployment to the Ypres area 
and the opening of the offensive at the end of July had proved too much and he had 
62 PRO W071/1027. 
h3 PRO W071/1027. 
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deserted only to be recaptured and tried on 5 September. This time the sentence of 
death was confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief and the execution went ahead on 19 
September.64 The following morning the Division went into action in what became 
known as the Battle of Menin Road Ridge. 
The Division's attack that morning appears to have been a great success. All the 
objectives were taken despite stiff resistance from German machine gunners in 
concrete bunkers around Veldhoek. These were captured and a number of counter- 
attacks repulsed in the afternoon. The division was relieved from the frontline on 25 
September, but a few days later it was deployed once more. On 30 September a 
determined attack by Germans armed with flame-throwers was beaten off.65 Another 
German attack on the line held by the 23'd Division, this time supported by aircraft, 
resulted in some ground being lost on 1 October. The Division was again relieved on 
9 October and a few days later handed over its section of the line in readiness for the 
transfer to the Italian Front, which began on 3 1 October. 
I 
It appears that the division utilised the time out of the line to resolve any 
outstanding disciplinary matters and the courts-martial were busy during this period 
of relative peace. A number of condemnations followed and although in the absence 
of the case papers it cannot be ascertained whether they were connected, five involved 
men of the 70th Brigade, the formation involved in repelling the flame-thrower attack. 
Another two men in the 70th Brigade who had both deserted in separate incidents near 
the end of August were executed in November. One, Private Charles Nicholson, 8'h 
battalion, York and Lancaster Regiment, had deserted his unit for the second time. He 
64 Private Leonard Mitchell. PRO W071/590. 
65 PRO W095/ 2170 - War diary, 23rd Division. 
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appeared before a court-martial on 8 October and was sentenced to death.66 Two 
others who had appeared alongside him had their sentences commuted to periods of 
penal servitude, but Nicholson's record, which included a conviction for absence, 
singled him out. The other, Private Davis of the 1 lth battalion, Sherwood Forresters, 
again a persistent offender with a previous death sentence to his name, was 
condemned near the end of October. 67 
Both men had remained behind on the Western Front whilst the Division moved 
elsewhere. Davis was executed at Wizernes near St. Omer on 15 November and 
Nicholson was shot two days later. The rest of the Division had left for Italy on 6 
November.68 It is unlikely that these executions were intended to address any 
particular disciplinary concerns in the brigade because with the division being absent 
the deterrent effect must have been minimal. Accordingly, we should view these two 
executions as the removal of undesirable soldiers rather than as examples to their 
comrades. As with all capital cases the m y  ensured wide dissemination of their fate 
- intended as a more general deterrent. 
. 
iii) The Italian Expeditionary Force 
Due to the collapse of the Italian army in the face of the Austro-German offensive 
during October 1917, a joint Franco-British force was hastily despatched to Italy as 
reinforcements. The force initially comprised five divisions (23rd, 4lSt, 7'h, 48th and 5th 
in order of arrival) under the command of General Sir H. C .  0. Plumer, except for a 
66 PRO W071/619. 
" PRO W071/617. 
Italv on 6 November. arriving near Mantua on 16Ih. 
According to Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions, Part 3A, p. 125, the 231d Division entrained for 
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brief period shortly after its arrival in Italy when Lieutenant-General the Earl of 
Cavan was appointed temporary commander. By the time it was involved in action 
during the following summer the force was reduced to three divisions (23rd, 7th and 
48th) and was again under the command of the Earl of Cavan, who was promoted to 
General in June 1918. This arrangement did not change for the remainder of the war. 
The command structure of the force was further complicated when it was temporarily 
placed directly under the Italian commander at the end of 1917. However, the 
-essential features are that by the spring of 1918 the British force in Italy, constituting 
the 23'd; 7'h and 48th Divisions under the command of the Earl of Cavan, was 
deployed in the mountainous Asiago sector of the Piave front, The stark differences 
between their new surroundings and those they had left behind on the Western Front 
were obvious. The magazine of the 1/5'h Gloucestershire Regiment (48'h Division) 
featured a cartoon depicting a *fully-laden British soldier climbing a sheer rock-face in 
its July 1918 edition.69 Towards the end of 1918 the 7th and 23rd Divisions were 
transferred to another sector, still under the command of Lord Cavan, leaving the 48'h 
Division behind under the Italian XI1 Corps. For the majority of their time in Italy, 
therefore, the divisions' experiences were broadly similar. 
. e 
0 
The idea of transferring British troops from the Western Front to Italy was not 
supported by a High Command that continued to be irritated by the retention of 
valuable troops in Salonika. The subject had been raised by the French Minister of 
War, Paul Painlevi, as early as April 1917 - at the time that British troops launched 
their successful offensive at Arras in support of Nivelle's offensive on the Chemin des 
The Fifth Glo'ster Gazette 1915-1919: A Trench Magazine of the First World War (Sutton, Stroud, 69 
1993), p. 257. 
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Dames. General Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, reassured 
Haig in a message sent on 10 April 1917: 'You may depend on me doing the right 
thing so far as it is in my power to do it with respect to the despatch of troops to Italy', 
adding that 'It would be folly to send them'.70 To a large extent the Italian force was a 
political gesture rather than a military necessity aimed at maintaining the alliance. 
Significantly, the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, appears to have been more 
enthusiastic for it than his military commanders. Lloyd George's promise of 
delivering a 'big-blow' in Italy, in July 1917 on the eve3of the Passchendaele 
offensive, was described by Robertson as 'damned madne~s'.~' Although, following 
0 '  
, 
the Italian collapse in October, even Robertson conceded that 'We must not get rattled 
over this business [the rout of the Italian army], but of course we must stop the rot if 
we As described above, the divisions despatched were in no way second-rate: 
they had all shown good fighting spirit in the recent Flanders operation. 
Of the first months in Italy Captain Mardie, the mail-censor, reported 'there is 
widespread indication of good Morale in the Italian Expeditionary Force'.73 It appears 
that most troops were glad to get away from the slaughter of the Western Front. 
According to Hardie, 'most men look on the Italian campaign as a "picnic" compared 
with that in Belgium and France'.74 This was despite earlier fears to the contrary: on 
27 October 1917 Robertson had remarked 'it is really very hard on our men after what 
70 David R. Woodward (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 
Chief of the Imperial General Stag December 1915-February 1918 (Army Records Society, London, 
1989), p. 168. 
7' The Military Correspondence of William Robertson, p. 235. 
72 The Military Correspondence of William Robertson, p. 240. 
73 Papers of Captain Hardie, IWh4 84/64/ 1. Report for period December 191 7-February 19 18. 
" Papers of Captain Hardie, IWh4 84/64/1. Report for period December 1917-February 1918. 
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they have recently gone through [Passchendaele!] to send them to Italy'.75 The men, it 
seems, preferred to take their chances in the unknown Italian theatre than to continue 
the war in Flanders. In short, their morale was influenced as much by notions of 
safety as by any other factors. Statistics produced by the War Office after the war 
suggest that the men were right: there were 653 total casualties (from all causes, 
including sickness) per 1000 troops in Italy compared with 1,139 on the Western 
Front. Furthermore, in Italy the figure for casualties resulting from battle only was far 
lower still: sixty-four (2.13% of whom were killed) per 1000 troops as opposed to 493 
(6.13% killed) on the Western Front?6 Italy was a safer posting and the men knew it 
better than the Chief of the Imperial General Staff did. 
The first British court-martial in Italy took place before the arrival of the main 
force. A member of the Royal Engineers - presumably sent ahead to prepare for the 
arrival of the British force - was convicted on 25 October 1917 (the day after the 
opening of the main Austro-German offensive) of absence and sentenced to six 
months hard labour.77 In the early days of November eleven other courts-martial 
heard cases ranging from drunkenness to rnansla~ghter.~~ This was still prior to the 
arrival of the first infantry division (23rd> which did not reach Italy until 16 
November.79 As the British force steadily grew so too did the number of courts- 
martial. These were mostly for minor offences such as drunkenness, but also included 
trials for various capital offences: within two weeks of arrival one man had been 
75 The Military Correspondence of William Robertson, p. 240. 
7b Major T. J. Mitchell and Miss G .  M. Smith, History of the Great War, based on ofJicial documents - 
Medical Services: Casualties and Medical Statistics of the Great War (HMSO, London, 193 1), pp. 107 
& 177. 
77 Private A. Greene, 23 Middlesex Regiment (attached to Royal Engineers). PRO W0213/19. 
78 PRO W0213/19. 
79 Becke, Order of Battle - Part 4, p. 66. 
convicted of desertion, one of sleeping at his post, four for striking a senior officer 
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and several for insubordination and disobedience. The usual sentence for these 
offences during this early period was between two to three months' field punishment 
and none was sentenced to death.80 
The first death sentence was passed by a court-martial on 8 December 1917. Private 
W. Simpson, serving with the gth battalion, Yorkshire Regiment, escaped execution 
when the Commander-in-Chief commuted his sentence for desertion to ten years 
penal servitude. This case.was swiftly-followed by a similar one on 12 December. 
Private P. Montgomery, loth battalion, West Riding Regiment, was also condemned 
for desertion. His sentence was commuted to fifteen years penal servitude.*' There 
were two factors surrounding both cases that are especially significant. Firstly, these a 
were just the second and third convictions for desertion in Italy. The seemingly harsh 
response should be viewed as a deliberate demonstration of authority designed to 
reinforce discipline at an early stage. Secondly, both men's units were in Babington's 
23'd Division where, as we have already discussed, discipline frequently involved the 
death penalty. Consequently, this case was merely a continuation of a disciplinary 




Other Western Front practices were also retained in Italy. Desertion had been taken 
particularly seriously by courts-martial in France and Flanders and these early cases 
are suggestive of an identical approach in Italy. The next case to be heard (18 
December) involving a charge of desertion (it is not necessary to refer to convictions 
because acquittals were extremely rare in the ranks) resulted in two years hard labour 
PRO W0213/19. 
*' PRO W 0 2  13/19. 
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for a soldier serving in 22nd Manchesters (7'h 
another soldier serving with the loth West Riding, again 23rd Division, was sentenced 
to death for desertion.83 Although his sentence was commuted to five years penal 
servitude it was once more an indication of the seriousness that was attached to 
desertion at such an early point of the Italian campaign: three out of five convicted 
deserters had been sentenced to death - all were in the 23rd Division. Death sentences 
in Italy became less frequent after this initial demonstration of authority, but desertion 
remained the offence most likely to attract the ultimate response from the courts - all 
but five of the fifteen capital condemnations in Italy were for offences of desertion. 
Then on 20 December 
Desertion attracted a relatively consistent response from the courts, which usually 
passed sentences clearly aimed at deterring potential offenders. During the period 
November 1917 to-March 1918 there were fifty-five trials involving cases of alleged 
desertion.84 This period is.particularly important from a comparative point of view 
because the 5'h Division left Italy on 1 March 1918 and was followed one month later 
by the 41" Division.85 It is only during this period that all five British divisions were 
in Italy and, therefore, can be regarded as distinct from the period following 1 April 
1918 when the British contingent was reduced to three divisions - which we will deal 
with later. There were six death sentences passed on deserters during this initial phase 
of the Italian campaign - two on men in the 7th Division, but all the others on men 
serving with the 23'd Division. Does this suggest that desertion was a greater problem 
* 
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'* Private A. Craven. PRO W0213/19. 
83 Private E. Rickett. PRO W0213/19. 
84 Figures collated from courts-martial registers - PRO W0213/19 & 20. 
85 Becke, Order of Battle - Part IV, p. 66. 
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in the latter division, or can this be attributed to differences in the approach adopted 
by the respective commanders of the five divisions as I have previously argued? 
Conditions in Italy were by no means easy for the British troops. Poor 
communications in the Piave River region - where all the British divisions were 
initially posted - made transportation and supply difficult. Captain Hardie identified 
the effect this had on troop morale in his report of February 1918; a 'downturn' in 
morale was, according to Hardie, the result of food shortages.86 Equally difficult was 
the evacuation of the wounded and sick. These problems increased when the British 
took over the mountainous Asiago region, but this was not until 29 March - the latter 
phase - and we need not be concerned with this at this stage. The British divisions 
e 
%' 
shared the same front and conditions for most of the Italian campaign. There was little 
serious fighting until June 1918 and the courts-martial were concerned with general 
disciplinary issues during the first winter in Italy. 
There appear to have been great variations between discipline in the five divisions. 
Almost half the trials for alleged desertion involved men serving with the 23'd 
Division. There were twenty such trials in the 23'd Division, eight in the 41St, seven in 
the 7'h and none in either the 5th or the 48th. Perhaps it is no surprise that there were no 
trials brought in the Territorial Force formation (48'h), but that the two New Army 
divisions (23'd and 41St) tried so many more than their Regular counterparts (5'h and 
7th) requires an explanation. 
a 
Overall this appears to have been little more than a continuation of practices 
already established on the Western Front. In the two regular divisions there were 
86 Hardie Papers, Report on Troop Morale based on Mail Censorship for period December 1918 - 
February 1918, p. 3. 
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eighty-one and sixty condemnations respectively with eight and nine executions on 
the Western Front before their removal to Italy. This compares with forty 
condemnations and six executions in the 23rd Division and another fourteen 
condemnations with three executions in the 41St. At first glance this might appear to 
suggest a more rigid and harsher discipline in the regular divisions than in these 
particular New Army formations. But this is misleading and takes no account of the 
actual time each division was posted to the front. The regular divisions had been at the 
front for over a year by the time, the 23rd Division arrived in France and it was a 
further nine months before the 41" Division joined them (May 1916). The consequent 
direct comparison suggests that the death penalty was at least as frequent in the 23rd 
Division in particular. There is also a noticeable trend towards less frequent recourse 
to the threat of execution in the regular divisions whilst in the New Army divisions 
the reverse is true.87 This is probably a reflection of the shifting burden of the . 
fighting, which after the end of 1915 was less reliant on the regular formations. 
Furthermore, the ratio of executions to condemnations is far higher in the New Army 
divisions. All this suggests that discipline was becoming harsher in these two 
particular New Army formations - a trend that appears to have continued after their 
transfer to the Italian Front. 
Illness and disease were a particular problem in Italy, but there is no reason to 
suppose that this affected one division any more than others, at least during the initial 
phase of the campaign. The situation was monitored by the Director of Medical 
Services (DMS) who, on 14 January 1918, noted a 'slow but steady increase of 
Compiled from courts-martial registers PRO W02 13/1-34 inclusive. Also published in G .  Oram, 87 
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Enteric and Para-typhoid' fever amongst the troops.*8 By 31 January, though, the 
situation appeared to be improving: 
The health of the troops during the month has been very good, an 
improvement on the previous month as witnessed by the Admissions to 
Casualty Clearing Stations from Field Ambulances. The number of infectious 
cases reported during the latter part of the month was less than in the earlier 
part. The number of Enteric Fever reported has considerably.decreased. I ,  
I. 
Evacuated to Base: Officers 28, Other Ranks 393.89 
This is~especially interesting because courts-martial appear to have been particularly 
busy during the month of January. In fact there were 310 trials during January - the 
highest of the winter period. This was approximately half as many again as during 
December 1917 with a noticeable downturn in February and March 1918. The 
overwhelming majority of these trials were for minor infractions of discipline such as 
drunkenness. It seems, therefore, that courts-martial were busiest at times when the 
men were subjected to the greatest discomfort: food shortages and illness. Courts- 
martial statistics, as far as can be ascertained, for this period are: 
~ 
0 
88 War Diary - DMS (Italy), PRO WO95/4198. 
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Month 






















January 1918 h 
November 1918 
March 1918 1 268 
149 
April 1918 I 236 
December 1918 184 
A further twenty-three trials convened during this period involved officers; the 
overwhelming majority of which (seventeen) were for drunkenne~s.’~ Of the 
remaining six, two were for absence and three officers were accused of conduct 
90 Figures compiled from courts-martial registers. PRO W02 13/19-27. 
9’ Compiled from register of General-Courts-Martial - PRO W090/8. 
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prejudicial to military discipline - the precise circumstances of which is unknown and 
could involve almost anything. Interestingly, the two officers accused of absence - 
arguably the most serious of these particular offences - were acquitted by the 
respective courts.92 But the apparently high level of drunkenness amongst officers and 
men was probably little more than a symptom of the miserable conditions in Italy. 
Similar patterns can be detected in courts-martial of officers and men alike. The 
highest number of officers court-martialled occurred in January 1918 (eight cases 
including one of absence). The next highest was in February (six cases) and thereafter 
the number of officers being tried gradually declined. It was rare for more than one or 
* 
two officers to be tried in any one month, although the figure did rise to eight once 
% more in July 1918 following the Austrian offensive.93 Most trials were for 
drunkenness or an unspecified act prejudicial to military discipline.(Section 40, Army 
Act), but in April 1918 Lieutenant W. H. Aitken, Royal Engineers, was convicted of 
inflicting a wound on himself and re~r imanded.~~ This particular offence was 
indicative of low morale, but it is impossible to identify this officer with any division. 
Of those officers whose units can be identified with specific divisions six were 
serving with the 48'h, five with the 23'd, and one with the 7'h Division. These cases 
also appear to be concentrated in certain brigades: four in the 6Sth Brigade (23rd 
Division) and three in the 143rd Brigade (48'h Division). It might, therefore, be 
e 
significant that the Deputy-Director-Medical-Services (DDMS) noted in May 19 18 
92 2Lt  G. Brown of 14 London Regiment was cleared of absence on 22 January 1918 by a court- 
martial sitting at Taranto, and 2Lt  A. Harmer of 13 Durham Light Infantry was cleared of the same 
offence by a court convened in the field on 25 February 1918. PRO WO90/8/16. 
93 Figures compiled from Register of General-Courts-Martial, PRO W090/8. 
94 PRO W090/8/2 1. 
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that the fever was proving to be difficult to eradicate in certain units of the 70th 
Brigade?5 
There is further evidence to suggest a relationship between illness and minor 
indiscipline. By mid-February the Director-Medical-Services reported that sick 
wastage 'is the lowest since the arrival of the force in Italy' although there was little 
change in the numbers evacuated to Base: 23 officers and 439 Other Ranks.96 If the 
corner had indeed been turned then the effects of the epidemic on army discipline was 
still felt - hence the number of courts-martial for February, whilst declining, remained 
relatively high. The gradual reduction in cases brought to trial after. March should be 
viewed in the context of the improving health of the troops throughout February. 
x 
2 .  
' 
Indeed, on the last day of February the Director-Medical-Services was able to report 
that the 'health of the troops during the month has been very good, no epidemic 
disease', Furthermore, he recorded in his diary that no evacuations to Base had been 
carried out during the final week of February.97 The reduction in the number of 
courts-martial continued with the exception of June and July. This was probably the 
result of the Austrian offensive during June, but even this did not result in as many 
cases being tried as the months of February and March. 
The Austrian offensive during June had an impact on the nature of courts-martial. 
Exposure to battle resulted in four trials for cowardice: there was only one other triaI 
for cowardice during the entire Italian campaign.98 Two men of the Royal 
95 War Diary - DDMS (Italy), PRO W09514198. 
96 War Diary - DMS (Italy), PRO W095/4198. 
"War Diary - DMS (Italy), PRO W095/4198. 
desertion in January 1918, but had been found guilty only of absence. PRO W0213/19, p. 82. 
Private J. Welsby, 2 King's Own Scottish Borderers (5'h Division) had been tried for cowardice and 98 
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Warwickshire Regiment (48'h Division) were sentenced to fifteen years penal 
servitude by a court on 7 June 1918. Another man, serving with the York and 
Lancaster Regiment (23'd Division), and another with the Pay Corps (HQ) received 
lesser sentences for the same offence on 27 June and 1 July re~pectively.~~ The 
inclusion of a man in the Pay Corps might be suggestive of a manpower problem in 
the frontline during the offensive. 
Surprisingly, the number of trials for desertion following the June offensive did not 
increase markedly from the preceding months - as shown in the table below: 0 
99 PRO W0213/23, pp. 168, 182 & 183. See also appendix. 
i . . .  .- . .  
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Figure 10: Number of trials for desertion in IUalian Expeditionary Force'oo 
~~~~ 
No. in 7fh Div. 
~~~~ 
No. in 23'* Div. 
~ ~~ 
No. in 4Sth Div. Month Total 
Nov. 1917 1 




15 1 8 
12 3 3 
5 2 
Apr. 1918 8 3 1 
May 1918 5 1 1 2 
Jun. 1918 3 1 2 
~~~ 
Jul. 1918 6 2 1 
Aug. 1918 5 2 1 
Sep. 1918 7 2 2 2 







91 18 44 6 
Figure 10 clearly shows that trials for desertion were highest during the period 
December 1917 to February 1918 when the influenza epidemic was at its worst. The 
Austrian offensive during June, which resulted in an increase in cases of cowardice, 
loo Compiled from courts-martial registers. PRO WO 2 13/19-27. 
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did not lead to an increase in desertion. The cases of desertion during November 
1918, all in the 23rd Division, all occurred after the armistice (see appendix) and were 
probably part of a more general act of indiscipline as consent was withdrawn in all 
theatres.'" Few cases were brought in the 48'h (Territorial Force) Division, but the 
number of trials in the 23'd (New Army) Division was greater than in the 7'h (Regular) 
Division, all of which conforms to the patterns we have already identified. Discipline, 
it appears , was being more rigidly enforced in the 23'd Division. 
Despite the constant tightening-up of discipline in the 23'd Division the general 0 
approach to discipline in Italy was probably more lenient than in other theatres. The 
acquittal rate for trials in Italy was roughly ten percent - compaiable to the overall 
average of 10.1 percent for trials overseas during the war.'02 Other features point to a 
disciplinary code less rigidly enforced in Italy. Firstly, no British or Dominion troops 
were executed. One black soldier of the British West Indies Regiment was shot for 
mutiny just after the armistice. This merely reflected more general trends in the 
British army, which tended to treat black troops more har~h1y.l'~ Cases of desertion 
were often downgraded to absence. As desertion was the most important capital 
offence, this is an important distinction because it effectively turned the crime into a 
non-capital one. Of the ninety-one cases involving men charged with desertion during 
the Italian campaign, sixty-one (more than two-thirds) were found guilty of absence 
only (see appendix). It is unclear from the records if this was the actual finding of the 
court or whether the Commander-in-Chief had adjusted the conviction upon review. It 
0 
See Chapter 3.  
Statistics of the Military Esfort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914-1920 (HMSO, 
Oram, Worthless Men, pp 102- 1 19. 
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1922), pp. 644-645. 
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is likely that it was a mixture of both. Whilst this did occur in all theatres, the ratio for 
these cases in Italy seems to be remarkably high. This was a well-established practice 
in criminal law. As we discussed earlier, juries in French criminal courts often found 
'extenuating circumstances' in murder cases to avoid a death sentence.Io4 Similar 
traditions had existed in the application of English criminal law since the eighteenth 
century. Juries then, often with the connivance of the judges, would convict for theft 
of a quantity of 'metal' (coins) or 'paper' (bills of exchange) rather than theft of a 
specific sum in excess of ten pounds, which, was the sum necessary to make an 
offence capital. Judge Blackstone referred to this practice as 'pious-perjury'. lo5 The 
military precedents are unclear, but it is likely that courts-martial also practised a form 
of 'pious-perjury', especially, it seems, in Italy. 
e 
By the Spring of 1918 a distinctly separate phase of the Italian campaign can be 
discerned. The 5'h and 41" Divisions had returned to France, where the BEF was 
fighting for its very existence.. In Italy the remaining British divisions had survived 
the winter and the Earl of Cavan took over command of the force on 10 March 1918. 
On 29 March the British force was moved to the mountainous Asiago sector and a 
new GHQ was established in mid-April.106 With the arrival of Spring came also 
preparations for action against the enemy. All these factors effected the morale and 
discipline of the troops; they could also have an adverse effect on the morale of 
officers. Only three days after a court-martial had reprimanded Lieutenant W. H. 
0 
IO4 See Chapter 1. See also G. Oram, "The administration of discipline by the English is very rigid': 
British Military Law and the Death Penalty 1868-1918: in Crime, histoire et sociktWCrime, History 
and Societies, (forthcoming), 
IO5 J. M. Beattie, Crime and Courts in England, 1660-1800 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), pp 424- 
430. Clive Emsley, Crime and Society in England 1750-1900, 2"d edition (Longman, London, 1996), 
pp. 185 & 197. 
IO6 Becke, Order of Battle - Part IV, p. 66. 
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Aitken for inflicting a wound on himself a further two Royal Engineer officers were 
convicted of minor acts of indiscipline. '07 
The threat of disease remained a constant concern for the army in Italy. The 7fh 
Division appears to have had a particularly difficult time during the spring months. In 
April two men of the division were convicted of desertion and sentenced to death."* 
Both sentences were commuted and although the circumstances of their crimes 
remain obscure there is evidence that the division was not in a healthy state. An 
inspection on 13 May 19 18 by the 7fh Division's commander, Major-General 
Shoubridge, resulted in a complaint being lodged with the Deputy-Director-Medical- 
Services that the men were in a 'dirty and shabby' condition. The following day staff 
0 
from the medical services discovered an army bakery at Novoledo to be in an 
unsatisfactory state; no protection against flies or mosquitoes had been introduced as 
had apparently been ordered following a previous in~pection.''~ 
The miserable conditions caused discontent to spread throughout the three divisions 
and HQ troops. A medical officer in the 23rd Division reported many of his men 
affected by headaches and dizziness. Arm outbreak of pyrexia in the 4Sth Division was 
noted on 17 May and similar illnesses occurred in the French division based in the 
same area. By 20 May the medical services had reached the conclusion that the illness 
was 'an infectious condition with a short incubation period' and arranged for the billets 
of the men to be vacated and disinfected.' lo The Director of Medical Services had 
PRO W090/8/21 
Private H. Horton, condemned on 14 April 1918, and Private A Maunders, condemned on 20 April I08 
1918. Both were serving with the 1" Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment. PRO W0213/21. 
IO9 War Diary - DDMS - Italy. PRO WO95/4198. 
' lo  War Diary - DDMS - Italy. PRO W095/4198. 
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reported on 17 May that 'the onset symptoms etc. appear to point to the cases being 
phlebotomus fever, which is prevalent in the North of Italy in the Spring'. He further 
noted that the worst affected units were those resting in the area of the Piave plain 
rather than in the mountains.''' On 21 May the consulting physician, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Gates, arranged for a search for sand-fly, and stated that he 'is rather of the 
opinion that it is an influenza1 condition'.'I2 Despite a report, dated 23 May, that the 
number of cases was diminishing, the situation continued to worsen and by 10 June 
the DDMS recorded in his war.diary that there were more than 2,000 cases in two . 
casualty clearing stations alone. The worst affected unit was undoubtedly the gth 
Battalion, York and Lancaster Regiment (23rd Division), which alone had suffered 
1 e 
- 
114 cases by 21 May.'I3 During this period two men were sentenced to death for 
mutiny. It is unclear whether the miserable conditions were a cause, but the timing is 
significant. Pioneer Jelly of the Royal Engineers was condemned on 27 April and 
Gunner Edwards of the Royal Field Artillery on 30 May 1918.'14 The circumstances 
of the offences, which are unknown, were probably not serious because'the sentences 
were commuted to five and three years' penal servitude respectively: an extremely 0 
lenient response even by standards in Italy. This suggests that the Commander-in- 
Chief had taken into consideration extenuating circumstances such as the unbearable 
conditions and illness. 
The other main factor effecting morale during this period was concern for the plight 
of the BEF on the Western Front, causing Captain Hardie to remark that 'the shadow 
~~ 
I"  War Diary - DMS - Italy. PRO W09514198. 
War Diary - DMS - Italy. PRO W09514198. 
' I 3  War Diary - DDMS - Italy. PRO W095/4198. 
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of events in France has lain dark across the Italian Expeditionary Force'.' l5 This 
remark probably reflected the frustration of both officers and men alike. Inactive 
troops were of great concern to their commanders at the best of times, but when 
events in France had taken an apparent tarn for the worse these concerns were 
heightened. However, their relative inactivity did not last long and the war in Italy 
entered a new phase with the opening of an offensive by the Austrian army on 15 June 
1918. Fifty-one Austrian divisions attacked the Piave sector of the front whilst a 
further fifty-five launched an assault across the Asiago plateau. This part of the sector 
was held by the Italian Sixth Army, which included the British 23rd and 4Sth Divisions 
with the 7fh in reserve. The preliminary bombardment started at midnight and by 3 am 
it was reported to be particularly intense. At 8 am the attack proper began and the 7'h 
Division - the reserve - were put on two hours notice to move to positions as required. 
The 23rd Division, holding the right hand side of the British lines, was driven back off . 
the ridge, but the ground was swiftly retaken by a counter-attack. On the left the 4Sth 
Division was forced to give up roughly 2,500 metres of its line to a depth of 1,000 
metres. This caused some reorganisation of the British medical services and those 
suffering from influenza were evacuated to Base to free-up room for the wounded in 
the field ambulances and hospitals. By 6 p.m. 575 wounded had passed through the 
dressing stations. The following day the line was restored and the Austrian first line 
trenches were captured. But British casualties had been considerable: 23'd Division 
had lost 35 1 all ranks, 48'h Division suffered 420 casualties of all ranks whilst the 
'15 Hardie Papers - Report on Troop-Morale based on Mail Censorship for period February-July 1918, 




reserve (7'h Division) had lost 34 men and GHQ a further 50.' l6 Amongst the dead 
was Captain Edward Brittain MC, brother of Vera. By 18 June casualty figures had 
increased: more than 1,100 British casualties were reported, worst affected was the 
4flth Division which lost 33 officers and 537 other ranks, followed by the 23'd Division 
with 19 and 417 re~pectively."~ 
Immediately after the worst of the fighting was over a soldier of 23'd Division was 
tried for desertion. The circumstances of Private Jackson's case are unknown, but the 
timing of his trial was probably influential and the court sentenced him to death.' '* 
Jackson's sentence was commuted, but his was the only capital sentence during the 
period of the Austrian offensive. Significantly, the soldier concerned was serving with 
the 23'd Division, with its apparent tradition of a harsher disciplinary code than the 
other divisions in Italy, and not in the 48'h Division, which suffered most casualties 
during the Austrian offensive. Perhaps equally important was the fact that Jackson 
was serving with the 8'h Battalion York and kancaster Regiment - the unit most 
affected by the influenza outbreak. Morale in this unit was probably lower than in 
others because of the effects of illness and its role in countering the enemy offensive. 
However, Captain Hardie did not identify this as a concern in his report. Instead 
Hardie's evaluation reflected more general concerns of commanders worried about the 
effects of inactivity on the morale and discipline of their men, noting that a renewed 
'sense of purpose following the Austrian attack has been good for the men'.11g 
, .  . . , . .  . . 
. .  ' 1  , .. . I .  
I .  . .. 
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Although each British division took part in a number of operations, most especially 
during the autumn of 1918, Jackson's was the last death sentence to be passed on a 
British soldier in Italy.'2o On 28 June the DMS reported that 'the epidemic of fever 
has now practically ceased' and turned his attention to other matters. Concerns about 
venereal disease had resulted in the cancellation of soldiers' leave (but not that of 
officers). A number of brothels and the town of Vicenza were placed out-of-bounds. 
Furthermore, the men were warned that courts-martial would take a serious view of 
cases of concealment of venereal disease.I2' 
. The apparent abandonment of the death penalty for desertion in Italy during the 
second.ha1f of 1918 reflected the general trend throughout the British army. On the 
Western Front the transformation from a volunteer to a conscript army was one of the 
main causes of this shift in disciplinary practice,'22 but it is unlikely that this was as 
irnportant a factor in Italy. Death sentences had been rare in the Italian Expeditionary 
Force and none were carried out for purely military offences. Cases of alleged 
desertion had usually been downgraded to the non-capital offence-of absence. Of the 
fifteen condemnations throughout the Italian campaign, eleven had been passed 
during the first five months - a time when the command was establishing its authority. 
Paradoxically, there were fewer condemnations during the period of the main fighting 
in Italy. The outbreak of influenza towards the end of 1918, which effected the Italian 
and French armies more than the British force, remained a significant preoccupation 
of the British command, Illness rather than desertion was regarded as the greatest 
0 
Two men of the British West Indies Regiment were condemned after the war: one for murder and 
another for mutiny - the former was carried out. 
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threat to military efficiency. Accordingly, the outbreak was monitored closely. 
Dysentery and diarrhoea were major headaches for the medical services: 255 cases of 
dysentery and 498 of diarrhoea were recorded in August 1918.'23 Influenza - the 
greatest concern - caused 3,375 admissions to hospital and 142 deaths in October 
a10ne.l~~ Given the pervasive attitude of the commanders in Italy towards the death 
penalty coupled with the effects of the outbreak of influenza it is no surprise that the 
death penalty ceased to be employed as a disciplinary instrument during the last 
j months of the campaign. 
All three divisions had comparable war experience. Each had taken part in the 
major battles of 1916 and 1917 before being transferred to Italy. Yet the approach to 
0 
discipline in each division appears to have varied considerably. This depended on a 
number of factors. Firstly, the type of formation undoubtedly did much to shape the 
nature of discipline. Initially, discipline in the regular 7th Division was more harshly 
enforced than in the other two. Yet, in common with many other New Army 
formations, the 23'd Division was undergoing something of a change in its approach. 
Gradually the 23'd Division abandoned its Territorial Force style discipline and 
increasingly adopted regular division practices. As Gary Sheffield has shown, there 
was a tendency for this to occur in the New Armies, which 'lacked a longstanding 
tradition of informal discipline, and were perhaps more vulnerable to Regular 
discipline creeping in'.'*' By the time the divisions reached Italy the 23'd had become 
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of the process of the commander asserting his control over the division. Certainly 
discipline in the 23rd Division appears to have leant towards the harsher of the New 
Army formations. By contrast, the 7'h Division, which in common with other regular 
divisions had maintained a harsh approach to discipline from the earliest clashes with 
the enemy, appears to have adopted a more lenient approach as the war progressed. 
Many of the decisions in capital cases in the 7'h Division were based on individual 
rather than unit considerations. This was especially so during the battles of the 
Somme and Third Ypres. In keeping with Territorial Force traditions, the death 
penalty had never been a significant feature of discipline in the 48th Division, but 
appears to have been deliberately applied at significant moments such as at the 
beginning of battles. In terms of the death penalty men serving with the 48'h Division 
on the Western Front appear to have been at greatest risk when the division was 
entering or leaving the line. In Italy the threat of the death penalty was non-existent in 
the 48'h Division. The timing of trials was often an important factor in every division. 
Moreover, the differing approaches to capital punishment was little affected by the 
apparent state of troop morale in each division, or even by its experience in battle. 
The 48'h had been singled out for the poor condition of its troops, yet maintained its 
fighting efficiency without recourse to capital punishment in any great numbers. 
There is no evidence to suggest that death sentences were more likely after reversals 
in action. In fact during the Austrian assault and the subsequent counter attacks by 
British forces in June 1918, the 7'h Division, which had suffered most casualties, did 
not find a need to condemn any of its men, unlike the 23'd Division. 
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Factors other than purely military and tactical considerations were of equal 
importance to troop morale. First amongst these was undoubtedly concern for family 
at home, as we have discussed in the previous chapter. But next probably came the 
conditions under which the men were living: their billets, food and so on. These 
factors were consistent regardless of the location. In Italy conditions were miserable 
and compounded by the spread of illness amongst the troops. Evidence suggests that 
there was a close relationship between these conditions and military crime, with men 
in units worst effected being most likely to desert. The death penalty, as a disciplinary 
weapon, was variously applied according not only to tradition, but also depending on 
the Commander-in-Chief s assessment of conditions at the time. In ,Italy at least this 
assessment appears to have reached beyond the purely military. 
3 .  0 
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Conclusion 
What kept men in the line - why did most of them 'stick-it' through to the end? It 
seems unlikely that the threat of the death penalty was by itself sufficient to ensure 
obedience. Yet it undoubtedly formed a vital part of pre-1914 thought, much of which 
survived to the end of the war. These ideas, though, were continually revised as the 
army learned to cope with the pressures and changes that modern warfare forced on it. 
The army never abandoned its faithin deterrence and continued to execute men until 
the final days of the war, but by 1918 use of the death sentence, and of execution . 
itself, was in decline. The relationship between commanders and their men had been 
redefined. The balance had shifted. 
Despite changes in the army's approach to discipline it remains an inescapable fact 
that the British army executed far more of its own troops than the other major armies 
engaged on the Western Front. In 1918 alone - when the death penalty was most 
sparingly used by the British - the number of men executed still exceeded that of the 
German army for the whole war. If we are fully to comprehend the reasons for this we 
must look beyond the war and beyond the military. The pre-existing legal, social and 
cultural structures combined to create the circumstances necessary - the pre- 
conditions - that made possible this disparity. 
British Military law was constructed in a manner that encouraged harsh discipline: 
the principle of deterrence dominated ideas about control of the army. This was partly 
the result of lingering notions of British troops as ignorant and immoral recruited 
from the lowest strata of society, but also owed much to more general ideas about 
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deviance, crime and the nature of punishments. The criminal code was also dominated 
by ideas of deterrence, especially when it came to serious crime. Speaking of the 
criminal code between the wars, Professor Victor Bailey suggests that 'the 'classical' 
jurisprudential axioms of personal responsibility, deterrence, and a due proportion 
between crime and punishment retained much of their authority'.' Of all the western 
countries, Britain clung most steadfastly to corporal and capital punishments 
reflecting the importance attached to deterrence, which remained an essential element 
of penal policy throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This reliance 
on deterrence was particularly evident in the military code. But unlike the criminal 
e 
I code, which had to wait until 1965 for the abolition of capital punishment for murder: 
there was sufficient concern at the standards.applied by courts-martial to ensure that 
the death penalty was effectively abolished for military crimes by 1930.3 The events 
of the First World .War, and in particular the execution of so many British soldiers, 
were crucial in focusing those.concerns and mobilising the political opinion that 
eventually led to abolition. 
0 In common with the criminal law, the military code was reformed during the mid- 
to-late-nineteenth century: first public whippings for criminals and then branding and 
flogging of soldiers were abolished. Concerns about the impact of public brutality on 
society provided the impetus for the former, but the death of Private Slim in 1867 
Victor Bailey, 'The Shadow of the Gallows: The Death Penalty and the British Labour Government, 
Capital punishment for murder was suspended for five years in 1965. It's eventual abolition came at 
The capital offences of Treason and Mutiny remained. The death sentence for these, together with the 
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1945-51' in Law and History Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 349. 
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last few remaining capital offences in the criminal code, has recently been abolished. See John 
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focused attention on the nature of military punishments. Branding was abolished in 
1871 despite the resistance of some military commanders and an increased use of 
flogging in the 1870s ensured that it too was abolished in 1881. However, this does 
not mean that the army had been brought under the control of parliament. Moves to 
wrest authority away from the Commander-in-Chief were fiercely resisted. Nowhere 
more so than in matters of discipline. In the decades before the First World War the 
army resisted challenges to its autonomy from the Judge-Advocate-General and from 
politicians - the Kinlock affair for instance. Invariably, defenders of the status quo 
cited the army's political independence as sacrosanct and any attempt to alter this 
potent status was doomed to failure. With flogging no longer available to them, some 
British commanders increasingly looked towards capital punishment as the only 
effective deterrent to desertion during the war. Unlike other armies the British did not 
have penal battalions and the options available to commanders were severely limited. 
Field Punishments were frequent, but unpopular. Certainly no soft option, Field 
Punishments were most often inflicted for minor offences such as drunkenness and 
this suggests that they were not generally believed to be an effective deterrent for a 
determined deserter. The failure of the British legislators and military alike to 
envisage alternative punishments before the war or to develop other strategies to 
manage indiscipline during it merely heightened the problem. 
In many ways military traditions had triumphed over the modernising reforms. The 
Commander-in-Chief retained his absolute power in matters of military discipline and 
the Judge-Advocate -General remained on the margins of the disciplinary process. 
Furthermore, there were few safeguards in place to prevent any abuse of authority and 
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no structure to allow for any direct political involvement. In this respect Britain was 
- '  0 
a 
alone amongst the major Western democracies - the codes of both France and the 
United States allowed for some form of political restraint of military authority - and 
had more in common with the old empires of Eastern Europe. During wartime the 
power of the Commander-in-Chief was consolidated rather than limited and many 
forms of military-style discipline even crept into civilian life. Nevertheless, there was 
sustained criticism of the use of the death penalty in spite of the restrictions of 
censorship, and the criticism commonly highlighted the unfettered nature of military 
authority. Later, this became a potent element in the movement to abolish the death 
penalty for military offences after the war. Despite the apparent restraint of Haig and 
the others, the untrammelled authority of the Commander-in-Chief eventually proved 
to be the Achilles Heel of traditional forms of military discipline. 
r Comparisons with the French and American codes reveal deficiencies in the 
construction of British military law. Most marked of all, though, were the differences 
between the British and German codes. The fierce Prussian-code was abandoned 
shortly after the unification of Germany. The new code of 1872 was arguably the 
most liberal of all the belligerents of the First World War. Without doubt the 
construction of the state governed by law, or Rechsstaat, played a large part in this. 
The law was more tightly constructed than the British code. Desertion, for example, 
was not as loosely defined as it was in the British code. Sentencing and the rights of 
soldiers were also written into the law rather than being left to the whim of the 
Commander-in-Chief. This caused some consternation to Ludendorff and his staff, 
who clearly felt constrained by the nature of German military law, but the significance 
* 
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of the differences between the two codes cannot be overstated. It appears likely, from 
what he had to say after the war, that Ludendorff would have preferred to preside over 
a disciplinary code every bit as harsh as did Haig. That he did not suggests that 
popular notions of pre-war Germany being dominated by a severe Prussian militarism 
do not apply, or at least need qualification even with regard to discipline in the army. 
The further liberalisation of the military code suggests that even during the war 
politicians were able to impose their will on the military. The same cannot be said of 
0 Britain. 
Unlike their French and German equivalents, British soldiers were regarded as 
subjects rather than citizens at least in the early years of the war. This was largely 
because of contrasting traditional forms of recruitment. The British army was 
intolerant of desertion by its volunteer soldiers, which contrasts with the French and 
German armies where certain types of desertion by those the state compelled to serve 
were excused. Only during the final year of the war did the British army change its 
harsh approach to discipline. During this period, when conscripted soldiers formed the 
bulk of the army, the number of death sentences meted out by courts-martial fell 
dramatically. There had been no liberalisation of the British military code as there had 
been in Germany. Nor had there been any direct political intervention such as the 
French army had experienced. Instead changes occurred within the army itself. 
e 
At the end of 1917 the British army, mindful of the situation in Russia, increasingly 
concerned about the quality of its own troops and aware of deteriorating morale 
following the failure of the Flanders campaign, implemented subtle changes, which 
would have dramatic implications for discipline. First, the strategic emphasis shifted 
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from moral to mate'riel superiority; no longer was it believed to be sufficient to 
undermine the morale of the enemy. This represented an abandonment of much pre- 
war military thought, but also placed less emphasis on the individual character of 
British troops. Secondly, a programme of citizenship education was introduced, which 
indicates a tacit acceptance of consent as the basis for future discipline rather than 
mere coercion. 
These changes had been forced on the army by a number of developments - social, 
I political and military. Undoubtedly, the altered recruitment of the army had placed 
enormous strain on the existing structures including disciplinary ones. Men who had 
volunteered under Kitchenefs scheme resented old-army forms of discipline based on 
deterrence. Later,vthe army was seemingly uncomfortable with the thought of 
shooting men who had been compelled to serve. Such an act would no doubt have 
brought down on the army some form of direct political control - a situation the 
Commander-in-Chief could not tolerate. Failure on the battlefield had forced the army 
to question its own practices by the end of 1917. Practices rooted in old-fashioned 
ideas about individual character - this time of the enemy - were found to be wanting. 
Wholesale changes in personnel followed. Less obvious were the changes in attitude. 
Lessons learned from the collapse of the Tsarist armies accelerated the need for 
change. General Maxse urged commanders to place greater trust in their men in an 
effort to retain their consent and thereby avoid 'what has happened in Russia through 
indi~cipline'.~ 
General Sir Ivor Maxse, Notes and Hints on Training (February 1918). Maxse Papers, IWM, 6915311- 4 
18. 
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It is incorrect, however, to view military discipline as conforming to two phases: 
coercion prior to 1918 and consent thereafter. The need for the consent of the troops 
was recognised long before 1918 - it was the emphasis that shifted. Even in the 
preceding three years the death sentence had only been carried out in approximately 
one tenth of the cases referred to the Commander-in-Chief. Given the importance 
attached to the principle of deterrence, one in ten is a surprisingly low proportion and 
without the checks and tolerance enshrined in other codes it is no small wonder that 
there was not a greater abuse of authority. But one in ten was probably thought to be 
sufficient to deter potential offenders whilst keeping politicians at bay and 
maintaining the consent of the troops. It also conformed to a long-established military 
precedent, itself no doubt rooted in the desire to balance authority and consent. There 
is evidence that commanders were mindful of this need from the first moments of the 
war even when inflicting punishments designed to deter such as Field Punishments. 
The exigencies of the war presented a challenge to conventional military thought on 
matters of discipline and morale. This was partly because of the sheer scale of the war 
and of the armies deployed, but also because so much pre-war thought had its roots in 
much older models that placed the emphasis on individual qualities. Like so many 
other features of total war, both discipline and morale defied attempts to comprehend 
them in individualist terms. Military punishments, constructed around the concept of 
individual deterrent, were found to be ineffective; desertion rates increased and the 
number of condemnations rose each year until 1918. The importance attached to 
individual character gradually diminished also until 1918 when it too was effectively 
abandoned. In their place emerged a programme of collective education. The 
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relationship between coercion and consent had varied with the emphasis shifting 
decidedly in favour of the latter by 19 18. 
The decision whether to execute or not was undoubtedly an administrative one, 
probably taken by the Director of Personal Services rather than by the Commander-in- 
Chief himself. The criteria applied are not always obvious. Unit discipline and 
individual character were of undoubted importance here, but so too was timing. Most 
executions were carried out at critical moments of the war. Often, an ideal candidate 
would present himself to the confirming authority, but not always, and those cases 
which seem to defy rationale should be viewed in this context. The most obvious 
examples are the twa officers, Dyett and Poole, who were executed at the very 
moment that there was increasing disquiet at the inequality of punishment between 
officers and men. The army had its examples, but it restricted itself to an acceptable 
number by a confirmation process that amounted to 'bureaucratic decimation'. 
Discipline was the central tenet of military efficiency in pre-war British military 
thinking. The pervasive belief was that victory would be achieved by the most 
disciplined army; a view that also prevailed after the war. Indeed, the length of the 
war was often understood in the context of a struggle between two highly disciplined 
armies - Britain and Germany - and military collapses were placed in the context of 
poor discipline, in society as well as in the army. This was believed to be the reason 
for the mutinies and collapse in Russia, Italy and even France. Military law was 
constructed to ensure that the authority of the Commander-in-Chief was upheld. It is a 
mistake to regard the military code as a legal framework designed to ensure that 
justice was dispensed. The unique judicial role granted to the British Commander-in- 
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Chief was an essential element in this. The apparent contradiction of the dual 
responsibilities of his office - the maintenance of discipline and final arbiter in capital 
cases - was no mistake. The stated intention of military law was 'to maintain 
dis~ipline'.~ The legal process provided not only a framework for the authority of the 
Commander-in-Chief, but legitimised its implementation. 
Pre-war thought placed the emphasis on good leadership. However, during the war 
disciplinary problems were often blamed on the troops, utilising explanations centring 
on degeneracymor poor moral fibre. Commanders were concerned about the enormous 
expansion of the army, and as the army was enlarged to encompass most elements of 
society, so the fear of military crime rose. The enlistment of so many men from urban 
centres caused great concern, but not nearly as much as the arrival at the front of 
xolonial troops and native labourers - 'racially inferior' men. The approach to 
discipline and punishments often reflected these anxieties with black and oriental 
troops and labourers having to endure severe restrictions on their movements and 
harsh punishments for those who deviated. 
. 0 
0 Shellshock was often regarded as a disciplinary issue rather than a medical 
problem. Although the army did respond to the psychological issues in a muted form, 
it still sought a disciplinary solution. Even those concerned with the (medical) 
treatment of shellshock, such as Charles Myers, saw a connection between the 
condition and discipline. The frequency of shellshock cases was regarded as an 
indicator of the state of discipline in a particular unit - a view which persisted after the 
war. Some of those executed were undoubtedly suffering from the condition, but we 
MunuaE of Military Law, 1914 edition (HMSO, London, 1914), p. 6. 5 
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should view these cases in the context of contemporary concerns about discipline and 
degeneracy. 
Morale posed several problems for the army. Firstly, no single definition existed. 
This was at once problematic in addressing concerns, yet helpful to those who wished 
to interpret assessments of morale in a positive light. The ambiguity of the term 
enabled the British mail censor to write positively of morale even at times of profound 
war-weariness in the British army. Secondly, assessing troop morale proved to be 
beyond quantitative methods, forcing the army to adopt qualitative means, as the . 
French had before them. However, these were subject to such dubious interpretation 
that we must question the extent to which the High Command and, therefore, the 
Government, had any notion of the state of troop morale in the British army. Although 
there is no evidence to suggest that the army deliberately misled the Government, it 
was nevertheless in the army's interests to present an optimistic evaluation to the 
Cabinet if it was to avoid direct political interference in military matters. Lastly, the 
relationship between morale and discipline remained an ambiguous one. Most 
commanders believed that the two were linked and that good morale was the outcome 
of strong (though not necessarily harsh) discipline. Even the more progressive 




Pre-war military traditions were highly influential in disciplinary matters and were 
reflected in the frequency of the use of the death penalty. Greater severity was 
reserved for those serving in Regular Army formations than in Territorial Force 
Divisions. Furthermore, the disparate approaches proved to be remarkably resilient 
despite the dilution of the original character of divisions. However, variations did 
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exist and none was more marked than in the New h e s  where, more so than in 
other formations, the divisional commander could shape discipline to his own model. 
Usually this leant more towards the harshness of the Regular Army than to the more 
democratic Territorial Force, but there were significant exceptions. The strong 
tradition of the Territorial Force acted as a counter against the frequent use of the 
death penalty, but this often gave way at times of battle when disciplinary concerns 
became heightened. 
A number of factors caused men to desert. Some simply gave in to fear during 3 
battle, perhaps exhibiting symptoms of shellshock. For others it was a culmination of , 
long-term factors such as absence from their family and community. A threat, whether 
real or imagined, to these familial and communal ties often caused an individual 
soldier to irrational acts. The prospect of returning home, whether by ending the war 
or even the remote possibility of leave, was paramount in most soldiers' minds. The 
erosion of esprit de corps could be rapid in those units with distinct local identities 
that suffered large casualties in battle. Furthermore, large losses in these units often 
magnified men's concerns about their communities. The preservation of community 
ties pre-occupied men's minds on the warfront; 'alienation' was what men feared the 
most. A significant number of capital cases arose out of fear that ties with home were 
in some way threatened. We cannot afford to ignore the impact on soldiers' state of 
mind at these moments. 
Was discipline rigidly applied in the British army as Crown-Prince Rupprecht 
suggested? At times it certainly was, but there were great variations. Different 
commanders amroached discidine in their own wavs and Dractices also varied over 
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time. There is evidence to suggest that the law was even circumvented on occasions; 
courts could find prisoners guilty of lesser offences to avoid harsh punishments. This 
certainly occurred in Italy and probably elsewhere too. But why would courts behave 
in this manner? The retention of consent cannot be ruled out and we must view the 
simplistic view that soldiers were coerced into some form of blind obedience with 
great suspicion. 
Nevertheless the death penalty was used with some regularity. Most often its 
purpose was to re-assert the authority of the divisional commander. The evidence- 
suggests that rarely was there any disciplinary advantage to be gained from an 
execution. The deterrent value of executions was of a more general nature rather than 
as a response to specific disciplinary problems in divisions. Condemnations usually 
followed criticisms or concerns from the High Command rather than arising from 
problems on the battlefield. Accordingly, we must view condemnations as a 
demonstration of the divisional commander's authority - an overt demonstration of 
disciplinary resolve - mainly for the benefit of the High Command. 
0 
I 
0 British army discipline was hampered by the lack of alternatives. Some 
commanders were able to develop strategies to manage their troops, but others simply 
fell back on traditional methods of control characterised by harsh punishments. In 
these divisions the death penalty was often regarded as the only means to prevent the 
increasing problem of desertion. It could also be used to prop-up flagging morale. 
Once more, though, this became less apparent as the character and structure of the 
army was altered over time. 
. 
, 3 16 
That the army was able to accommodate these changes should not be forgotten, but 
there were signs that the army was modernising its attitudes towards discipline, 
morale and the relationship between officers and men. The pervasive notion of a harsh 
disciplinary code enforced by callous commanders, of whom Haig was a paradigm, 
should be treated with caution. Unit commanders were able to express their 
opposition to the death penalty and some divisional commanders were able to avoid 
executions in their units. This is not suggestive of an oppressive hierarchy where 
leniency was never tolerated. Commanders at all levels from battalion to army were 
able to object to executions, though not always successfully. Perhaps this is why a 






Trials for Desertion and Cowardice in Italy 
1917-191S1 
1 Compiled from Courts-Martial Registers. PRO W 0 2  13 19-27. 
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Name Rank Regt Bde Div Date Offence Sentence Disposal Info 
Slater E Pte 10 Queens 124 41 03/11/17 Desertion 2yrs HL Guilty of 
Simpson W Pte 9Yorks 69 23 0811 211 7 Desertion DEATH 10 yrs PS 
Montgomery Pte 10 W Riding 69 23 12/12/17 Desertion DEATH 15 yrs PS 
P 
Absence only 
CravenA Pte 22 91 
OrrissA Pte 19 Middlx Pnr 
Lomas H Pte 21 91 
MandersT Pte 1 SStaffs 91 
Manchester 
( P W  
Manchester 
Sewell R Pte 10 W Riding 69 
Leach G Pte 10 W Riding 69 
AbbottJ Pte 9York& 70 
Mallinson J Pte 10 W Riding 69 
Monk E Pte 10 W Riding 69 
Willcock H Pte 10 W Riding 69 
MellishA Pte 26 R Fus 124 
Jackson W CQM 9 Yorks 69 
Watson J Pte 9 Yorks 69 
Lanc 
S 
Collins G Pte 9 York i3 70 
Eaton E Pte 9York& 70 





WelsbyJ Pte 2KOSB 13 
Parker E Pte 19 Middlx Pnr 
McHughP Dvr ASC 
PareezerS Pte 21 91 




Walton I Pte 12 DLI 68 
Rabjohn F Pte 10 W Riding 69 
NewrnanP Pte 11 70 
Sherwood 
Fstrs 
LesterA Pte 32 R Fus 124 
BeckHC Gnr RFA 
Gibbons M Pte 8Yorks 69 
Cook J Pte 10Queens 124 
Campbell H Pte 10 Queens 124 
WooleyT Pte 10Queens 124 
Caunt H Pte 1 SStaffs 91 
PorterA Pte 26order 20 
Cresswell C Pte 1 S Staffs 91 
Thompson Pte 11 70 
w Sherwood 
Fstrs 
7 18/12/17 Desertion 
41 21/12/17 Desertion 
7 2411 2/17 Desertion 
7 2411 211 7 Desertion 
23 26/12/17 Desertion 
23 2611 211 7 Desertion 
23 27/12/17 Desertion 
23 27/12/17 Desertion 
23 27/12/17 Desertion 
23 2711211 7 Desertion 
41 2911 2/17 Desertion 
23 31/12/17 Desertion 
23 02/01/18 Desertion 
23 03/01/18 Desertion 
23 03/01/18 Desertion 
23 03/01/18 Desertion 
2 yrs HL 
28 days FP2 
2 yrs HL 
2 yrs HL 
2 yrs HL 
2 yrs HL 
1 yr HL 
2 yrs HL 
2 yrs HL 
2 yrs HL 
5 yrs PS 
56 days 
FPl/red to rks 
2 yrs HL 
2 yrs HL 
28 days FP1 









































5 04/01/18 Cowardice/ 2 yrs HL Guilty of 
41 12/01/18 Desertion 2 yrs HL , Susp Guiltyof 
12/01/18 Desertion 56 days FP2 Guilty of 
DesertionIS 40 Absence only 
Absence only 
Absence only 
7 14/01/18 Desertion DEATH 15 yrs PS 
23 17/01/18 Desertion DEATH 15 yrs PS 
23 17/01/18 Desertion/ 2 yrs HL 90 days Guilty of 
23 17/01/18 Desertion DEATH 15 yrs PS 
23 17/01/18 Desertion 2 yrs HL 90 days Guilty of 
AbsencelEsc FP1 Absence only 
FP1 Absence only 
41 25/01/18 Desertion 
30/01/18 Desertion x 2 
23 31/01/18 Desertion 
41 08/02/18 Desertion 
41 08/02/18 Desertion x 2 
41 08/02/18 Desertion x 2 
7 11/02/18 Desertion 
7 11/02/18 Desertion 
7 11/02/18 Desertion 
23 13/02/18 Desertion 
5 yrs PS 
3 yrs PS 
2 yrs HL 
5 yrs PS 
10 yrs PS 
10 yrs PS 
90 days FP1 
1 yrHL 
2 yrs HL 
2 yrs HL 
susp 










90 days Guilty of 
FP1 Absence only 
90 days Guilty of 






Bloom W Pte 
Shuttleworth Pte 
J 
Spriggs J Dvr 
WoodA Dvr 
HewfettH Fitter 
Larson A Pte 
Golding H Cpl 
Vale S Pte 




McLeod J Pte 
Stone R ' Pte 
Cahill J I Pte 
Reilly P Sgt 
Oeakin R Pte 





Johnson JA Pte 
Williams J Pte 
Wenburn Pte 
CE 
Farrell B Pte 
Richardson Pte 
JA 






















































8 York & 
Lancs 
115 R Warks 
115 R Warks 
8 Devon 
8 York & 
Lancs 
8 York & 
Lancs 
9 S Staffs 
















70 23 13/02/18 Desertion 
68 23 17/02/18 DesertiodEsc 




69 23 20/03/18 Desertion 
22/03/18 Desertion 
22/03/18 Desertion 
68 23 23/03/18 Desertion 
02/04/18 Desertion 
91 7 14/04/18 Desertion 
13 5 15/04/18 Desertion 
70 23 17/04/18 Desertion 
95 5 20/04/18 Desertion 
26/04/18 Desertion 
22 7 30/04/18 Desertion 
22 7 30/04/18 Desertion 
144 48 25/05/18 Desertion 
144 48 25/05/18 Desertion 
' 27/05/18 Desertion 
20 7 28/05/18 Desertion 
70 23 30/05/18 Desertion 
143 48 07/06/18 Cowardice/ 
143 48 07/06/18 Cowardice/ 
20 7 18/06/18 Desertion 
70 23 21/06/18 Desertion 
Quitting 
Quitting 










23 26/06/18 Desertion 




48 01/07/18 Desertion 
7 08/07/18 Desertion 
23 10/07/18 Desertion 
12/07/18 Desertion 
7 15/07/18 Desertion 
23 17/07/18 Desertion 
7 06/08/18 Desertion 
23 13/08/18 Desertion 
2 yrs HL Guilty of 
Absence only 
2 yrs HL Susp Guiltyof 
Absence only 
5 yrs PS susp 
5 yrs PS 
2 yrs HL Susp Guilty of 
DEATH 10 yrs PS 
Absence only 
1 yrHL 
2 yrs HL 
2 yrs HL 
5 yrs PS 
DEATH 
DEATH 
90 days FP1 
2 yrs HL 
NG 
red to ranks 
2 yrs HL 
3 yrs PS 
2 yrs HL 
2 yrs HL 
1 yr HL 
1 yr impt 
2 yrs HL 
15 yrs PS 
15 yrs PS 
60 days FP1 
5 yrs PS 
NG 
NG 
5 yrs PS 
2 yrs HL 
90 days FP1 
NG 
10 yrs PS 






2 yrs HL 









































2 yrs HL 
15yrs PS Susp 
6 mos HL 90 days Guilty of 
15 mos HL Guilty of 
Absence only 
FP1 Absence only 
3 20 
Cook J Pte 
Hunt R Gnr 
Turner R Pte 
Allen JH Pte 
Collins J Pte 
Griffith JF Pte 
Fulton A Pte 
SlaterJ Pte 
Avis J Pte 
Powell G Gnr 
Harrison CV Pte 
Garland CB Pte 
Hurst J Pte 
Knight JS Pte 
EvendenG Pte 
Hislop R Pte 
ArmourJ Pte 
Dartford J Pte 
Norton J Pte' 
Pierce G Pte 
Brown T Pte. 
McNulty J Pte 
Stainton T Pte 
Orton W Pte 
McKennaJ Pte 








Ox & Bucks 
LI 
8 York & 
Lancs 




68 23 19/08/18 Desertion 
2710811 8 Desertion 
30/08/18 Desertion 
91 7 06/09/18 Desertion 
144 48 07/09/18 Desertion 
145 48 07/09/18 Desertion 
70 23 12/09/18 Desertion 
70 23 12/09/18 Desertion 
91 7 24/09/18 Desertion 
27/09/18 Desertion 
2 yrs HL 
10 yrs PS 
2 yrs HL 
6 mos HL 
20 yrs PS 
7 yrs PS 
6 mos HL 
6 mos HL 
10 yrs PS 
90 days FP1 
1 S Staffs 91 7 08/10/18 Desertion 90 days FP1 
ASC 23/10/18 DesertionIDrunk 90 days FP1 
11 W Yorks 69 23 31/10/18 Desertion 90 days FPl 
ASC 31/10/18 Desertion 90 days FP1 
13 DLI 68 23 1111 1/18 Desertion 90 days FPl 
10 68 23 1711 1 I1 8 Desertion 18 mos impt 
Northumb 
Fus 
12 DLI 68 23 17/11/18 Desertion 2 yrs impt 
10 68 23 17/11/18 Desertion 
Northumb 
Fus 
10 68 23 17/11/18 Desertion 
Northumb 
Fus 
10 68 23 1711 111 8 Desertion 
Northumb 
Fus 
10 68 23 1711 1 I1 8 Desertion 
Northurnb 
Fus 
10 68 23 17/11/18 Desertion 
Northumb 
Fus 
116 R Warks 143 48 18/11/18 Desertion 
9 S Staffs Pnr 23 20/11/18 Desertion 
11 W Yorks 69 23 27/11/18 Desertion 
8 Yorks 69 23 27/11/18 Desertion 
9 S Staffs Pnr 23 11/12/18 Desertion 
90 days FP1 
10 yrs PS 
90 days FP1 
90 days FP1 
90 days FP1 
10 yrs PS 
10 yrs PS 
3 yrs PS 
2 yrs HL 




30 days Guilty of 









76 days Guilty of 
FP2 Absence only 
f l  fine Guilty of 
Absence only 
76 days Guilty of 








90 days Guilty of 
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